On March 3, the day before Roosevelt’s inauguration, the Roosevelts visit the Hoovers for tea. Hoover has Treasury Secretary Ogden L. Mills make a final plea for joint action as the economy is deteriorating rapidly and the New York Stock Exchange has stopped trading.

Thomas Lamont writes to Roosevelt urging collaboration with Hoover. Federal Reserve and Treasury aides ask Hoover to declare a national banking holiday, but he refuses. Hoover instead asks Roosevelt to use emergency powers from the Trading with the Enemy Act to restrict currency and gold outflow. Roosevelt refuses, telling Hoover to invoke the powers himself. At the Mayflower Hotel, Roosevelt huddles with advisors, including Senator Glass, who argues against closing the banks. Lamont calls, recommending they take no action. At 11:30 pm, Hoover makes a final call pleading for a joint declaration and Roosevelt again refuses. After hanging up, Roosevelt tells Glass he plans to close the banks.

On March 4, Roosevelt and Hoover ride together to the inauguration. The governors of New York and Illinois have declared state bank holidays. In his inaugural address, Roosevelt attacks corrupt financiers and uses their conduct to justify an unprecedented assertion of federal authority. He directs Senator Duncan Fletcher to broaden the banking investigation. On March 5, Roosevelt declares a national bank holiday. The action is received as bold leadership. On March 13, banks begin reopening, and the NYSE gains 15%. Roosevelt pushes through a flurry of bills in his first 100 days, while Glass struggles to gain attention for his banking reform bill.

On March 8, National City Company announces it will voluntarily separate from National City Bank, making Glass’s bill seem partly moot. The next day, Winthrop Aldrich, new head of Chase Bank, publicly declares that all banks, public and private, should be forced to separate their securities businesses. He also proposes barring investment bank executives from serving on commercial bank boards, a move aimed at J.P. Morgan’s business model. The press characterizes this as a clash between the Rockefeller and Morgan interests. Glass is blindsided, as he has a close relationship with Morgan partner Russell Leffingwell and intended to protect the firm. Aldrich courts Roosevelt and secures his support. Glass is frustrated with Roosevelt’s maneuvering.

On March 11, a fight nearly breaks out on the Senate floor between Glass and Senator Huey Long, a populist Democrat trying to block Glass’s bill. Long becomes enraged when he discovers Glass stealthily removed an amendment he had added. The substantive disagreement centers on Glass’s proposal to allow branch banking, which Long fears will lead to New York domination. Long stages a 10-day filibuster against Glass’s bill. Though it eventually passes the Senate, Long kills its momentum, and it dies in the House. The fight elevates Glass’s national profile. On March 12, Roosevelt delivers his first “fireside chat,” assuring the public about reopening banks.

At 9:00 pm on March 21, federal marshals arrest Charles Mitchell at his mansion for tax evasion. President Roosevelt is briefed and approves. Because the statute of limitations is about to expire, US Attorney George Z. Medalie quickly presents the case to a grand jury, which indicts Mitchell for evading $728,000 in taxes in 1929 and an additional amount in 1930. Mitchell hires famed trial lawyer Max D. Steuer and pleads not guilty.

On March 23, Thomas Lamont meets with President Roosevelt. Lamont attempts to act as a peacemaker, telling Roosevelt that J.P. Morgan wants to cooperate with legislators. Roosevelt rejects the overture, stating that investment affiliates must be separated from banking firms within a year. Lamont offers to send Roosevelt a memorandum on banking reform and asks Roosevelt not to put J.P. Morgan in the same class as National City. He requests that Roosevelt consider replacing Pecora. Four days later, Lamont sends his memorandum defending J.P. Morgan’s business model. On March 30, Lamont receives a letter from Mitchell asking for more time to pay interest on his loan from J.P. Morgan.

On May 16, Charles Mitchell’s tax evasion trial begins. In his opening statement, prosecutor Medalie contends that Mitchell’s stock sale to his wife was a sham transaction. Defense attorney Max D. Steuer argues the trial is political, an effort to appease mob psychology. Steuer claims Mitchell sold the stock to protect the bank and was advised the transaction was legal. He tells the jury Mitchell is now broke.

The prosecution’s first witness testifies that Mitchell helped his wife profit from stock pools. On cross-examination, Steuer tries to establish these transactions were common. After eight days, the prosecution rests. Judge Goddard bars Elizabeth Mitchell from testifying. Charles Mitchell testifies he sold the shares to his wife to record a loss because selling them on the open market would have caused a price collapse. He defends not reporting the management fund payment as income, claiming it was an advance. He testifies his lawyer advised him the sale was proper. He says he later repurchased the stock because he could not bear to see Elizabeth’s estate diminished. He describes his financial distress, including being under-margined on his $6 million J.P. Morgan loan. Mitchell’s brother-in-law testifies he had advised Elizabeth to buy National City stock.

In closing, Steuer argues that any citizen may sell a security to record a loss, as long as the sale is actual. Medalie responds with a scathing denunciation, asserting that those in high places must face the consequences when they betray the public trust.

In late May, Roosevelt directs Senator Glass to insert language written by Winthrop Aldrich into his banking bill. The provision mandates the separation of commercial and investment banking for all firms, a direct attack on J.P. Morgan. Glass is furious and complains in a letter to Morgan partner Russell Leffingwell. Columnist Paul Mallon makes the backroom deal public. The American Bankers Association campaigns publicly against the bill but public sentiment is strongly in favor of punishing bankers. Glass is also at odds with Roosevelt over the president’s decision to take the US off the gold standard, which Glass considers a repudiation of contracts.

Glass faces another hurdle from Representative Henry B. Steagall, who insists on a government guarantee of bank deposits. Glass and Roosevelt initially oppose the idea but Steagall’s bill passes the House overwhelmingly. A newspaper reveals the long-running feud between Glass and Steagall over their differing visions. Vice President John Nance Garner and Senator Arthur Vandenberg add an even stronger deposit insurance provision to the Senate bill. Glass must wait for Roosevelt to decide whether to support the bill.

On May 23, Thomas Lamont accompanies Jack Morgan to the Senate Caucus Room as the Pecora hearings begin focusing on J.P. Morgan. The firm’s lawyer has coached the partners to avoid the arrogance displayed by Jack’s father in the 1912 Pujo hearings. Jack Morgan delivers an opening statement on the Morgan ethos of professional ethics.

In a closed session, Pecora compels Morgan to reveal the firm’s secret partnership agreement. Pecora reveals that Jack Morgan and all 19 other partners paid no US income taxes in 1931 and 1932 due to large write-offs for stock losses. Lamont’s son Tom is revealed to have used a “wash sale” to his wife to create a tax write-off, similar to Charles Mitchell. Senator Carter Glass erupts, accusing Pecora of turning the hearing into a circus, revealing his pro-Morgan bias.

Pecora turns his questioning to Morgan’s preferred lists, which offered discounted stock to influential figures. He produces a letter from John Raskob that supports this The hearings shatter Morgan’s public image. Lamont’s friendship with Walter Lippmann ends after Lippmann writes a column blasting Morgan’s monopoly powers.

Lamont testifies again, defending the practice of partners sitting on multiple corporate boards. Jack Morgan makes a final, subdued statement arguing against the separation of banking functions.

On June 16, Senator Carter Glass attends a bill-signing ceremony at the White House. The political momentum from the Mitchell trial and Pecora hearings helps the Glass-Steagall bill gain support. Roosevelt is set to sign the act, separating commercial and investment banking. Roosevelt congratulates Glass, calling him an “old warrior.” At 11:15 am, Roosevelt signs the bill into law. The new law mandates the separation of commercial and investment banks within two years and insures personal bank deposits up to $2,500. There is no carve-out for J.P. Morgan. A past letter from Glass to Russell Leffingwell is described, in which Glass explained the personal toll the bill was taking on him. Glass’s hometown plans a Carter Glass Day, but he declines the honor.

On June 21, Mitchell waits anxiously while the jury on his trial deliberates; he has lost significant weight. With no verdict by 10:30 pm, the judge sequesters the jury. The next morning, the jury sends a question to the judge about how far they should submerge their personal opinions.

When the jury announces a verdict has been reached, spectators rush back into the courtroom, widely expecting a conviction. The foreman announces not guilty on both counts. Mitchell breaks down, weeping, and thanks the jurors and his lawyer, Max Steuer. Prosecutor Medalie is baffled. Steuer tells reporters the verdict proves emotion did not determine the outcome.

Mitchell goes to the Bankers Club for a celebratory lunch, then walks home to be greeted by his wife and friends. The acquittal provokes anger across the country. A sermon by Reverend F. Marion Smith captures the public mood, stating that while Mitchell was not guilty by the letter of the law, public sentiment will not excuse his lack of moral judgment.

On November 23, 1937, George Whitney tells Thomas Lamont that his brother Richard is in a serious financial jam and needs a $1 million loan. Lamont agrees to help. They decide Richard should wind up his business, but they do not report his actions. Three months later, Richard Whitney confesses to another Morgan partner that he has stolen more securities. Richard Whitney is indicted, pleads guilty, and is sentenced to prison. The SEC accuses Lamont and George Whitney of an unwritten code of silence, but the Justice Department declines to prosecute.

The fates of the principal figures are detailed by Sorkin. Richard Whitney is paroled in 1941, dying in 1974. George Whitney becomes chairman of J.P. Morgan in 1950. Jack Morgan dies in 1943. Carter Glass dies in 1946. Thomas Lamont dies in 1948. Charles Mitchell dies in 1955. Ferdinand Pecora dies in 1971.

Herbert Hoover rehabilitates his reputation through humanitarian work and dies in 1964. Winston Churchill dies in 1965. John Raskob’s Empire State Building opens as a financial failure; he dies in 1951. William Durant declares bankruptcy in 1936 and dies in 1947. Jesse Livermore loses his fortune again and dies by suicide on November 28, 1940.

Following his acquittal, Charles Mitchell is found liable for back taxes in a civil suit. In 1935, he starts a consulting firm and then becomes chairman of the investment bank Blyth & Co., rebuilding his fortune. A later-revealed 1931 Federal Reserve report partially vindicates Mitchell’s March 1929 actions.

The narrative concludes with a re-evaluation of Carter Glass, noting he opposed key elements of his own bill, like the FDIC, and was secretly protective of J.P. Morgan. An anecdote confirms Glass’s racist views.

The author reflects that the US changed profoundly after 1929 due to a psychological collapse of confidence. The author identifies systemic weaknesses that contributed to the crash: An old-fashioned NYSE and a fragmented banking system. The author suggests Benjamin Strong’s 1928 death was a critical loss of leadership at the Federal Reserve.

Sorkin argues against viewing Wall Street figures as “simple villains,” noting they acted within the system’s own incentives. He re-evaluates Hoover as highly qualified but a poor communicator, contrasting him with Roosevelt, who inspired trust despite a superficial grasp of economics. The author states the book’s goal was to restore human texture to the historical events of the crash.

The author concludes that the story of 1929 is about enduring human nature: The cycle of optimism, the belief that good times can last forever, and the collective loss of reason. The author posits that the antidote to irrational exuberance is humility—the humility to know that no system is foolproof, no market fully rational, and no generation exempt from the cycle.