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By late spring 1930, a stock market rally ends in a long, slow decline. Stories circulate about those who sold early, like Joseph Kennedy, who claimed he knew to sell when “shoeshine boys” gave stock tips. The market becomes known as the “Hoover market”. Richard Whitney, now president of the Stock Exchange, tours the country promoting market resilience, but public appetite has waned. The Great Depression begins, marked by mass unemployment and “shanty towns.” Americans lose trust in banks and hoard cash at home. In spring 1930, John Maynard Keynes publishes A Treatise on Money, arguing for public spending to break bad economic cycles, but his ideas are not embraced: Hoover resists using the budget surplus for relief. Whitney advises government salary cuts. Thomas Lamont appeals to Hoover to veto the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill after more than 1,000 economists condemn it. Despite reservations, Hoover signs it on June 17, 1930. Grain prices collapse and US trade falls 60% within a year. Small banks fail throughout 1930. Hoover and Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon’s adherence to the gold standard prevents expansion of the money supply.
On September 30, 1930, Thomas Lamont celebrates his 60th birthday at J.P. Morgan. He and his wife have established a weekend routine at their New Jersey estate from where Lamont commutes on his yacht. Earlier in 1930, Morgan sold stocks purchased during the crash for a modest profit. Lamont remains publicly upbeat but, privately, partner Russell Cornell Leffingwell knows recovery is distant. On Lamont’s birthday, the market plunges to its yearly low. Writer Matthew Josephson emerges as a critic of Wall Street excess. A new author, Julian Sherrod, a former National City bond salesman, writes Scapegoats: By One of Them after being wiped out financially. The book, which refers to Mitchell only as “Chairman,” reveals that, while salesmen pushed Anaconda Copper stock in August 1929, Mitchell was selling his own shares. Scapegoats becomes a bestseller, damaging Mitchell’s reputation.
On October 28, 1930, John Raskob delivers a radio address to counter articles exposing his work with Michelson to run a covert campaign against President Hoover. The articles reveal how Michelson planted anti-Hoover stories with Democratic congressmen, attracting disapproval. Some editorials blame Raskob for the crisis because he encouraged speculation. In his address, Raskob calls the attacks “childish” and promotes his ideas: the five-day workweek (rather than six days), moving legal holidays to Mondays, and eliminating capital gains taxes. He implies that Hoover and Republicans are to blame for the crisis.
On November 5, 1930, James MacLafferty reports grim midterm results to President Hoover: The Democrats have gained significantly. Hoover’s refusal to engage the press makes him vulnerable to criticism. Unemployment has tripled to over 8 million; over 1,300 banks have failed. Hoover stops calling the crisis a “panic,” using “depression” instead. The market has fallen to 20% below its 1929 low. The results confirm Hoover has lost the national confidence. Franklin Delano Roosevelt wins easy reelection as New York governor, positioning himself for the 1932 presidential run. On December 10, 1930, a rumor sparks a massive run on the Bank of United States in the Bronx. That evening, top bankers meet at the New York Federal Reserve to attempt a rescue, but their compromise collapses. The Bank of United States, with 400,000 depositors, fails, demonstrating that even combined Wall Street power cannot now stop the contagion.
On February 2, 1931, Charles Mitchell testifies before Senator Glass’s subcommittee. National City has lost its largest-bank status to Chase. Mitchell blames the crash on outside credit. Glass retorts that bankers were shifty and complicit. The hearing ends without major confrontation. A “Hooverville”—a makeshift encampment for people without homes—appears in Central Park near Mitchell’s mansion. The market rallies 25% by March 1931. In the spring, Germany threatens to default on debts. On June 5, Lamont urges Hoover to propose a debt-payment holiday. Hoover announces the moratorium June 20. Relief is short-lived. The Bank of Pittsburgh collapses after Treasury Secretary Mellon, asked to contribute to a rescue, demands majority public ownership. From April to August, 563 more banks fail. On September 21, Britain abandons the gold standard; the Dow drops 37% for the month. On October 4, Hoover holds a secret meeting with 40 executives, demanding a $500-million emergency fund, warning that refusal means Congress will impose reforms “ending capitalism as they know it” (315). On December 13, Winston Churchill is struck by a car in New York and undergoes surgery.
In February 1932, President Hoover removes Treasury Secretary Andrew Mellon, replacing him with Ogden L. Mills. Hoover creates the Reconstruction Finance Corporation for debt relief. He appoints Charles Dawes to head it, freeing an ambassadorship for Mellon in Britain. On February 10, Hoover warns Senate leaders the US may abandon the gold standard. Senator Glass and Representative Henry B. Steagall co-sponsor a bill. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1932 passes quickly, allowing the Fed to lend more freely. Hoover believes wealthy Democrats are organizing short-selling pools to sabotage his presidency. He demands action from the Stock Exchange, but president Richard Whitney dismisses his concerns. Hoover enlists Senator Frederic Walcott to launch an investigation and hearings begin on April 11, 1932. Whitney easily deflects questioning. Testimony from market operators produces no revelations. In May, Mitchell testifies about Anaconda Copper but denies wrongdoing. The investigation stalls. In June, Hoover is renominated while Roosevelt secures the Democratic nomination. Hoover dismisses Roosevelt as too sick to handle the presidency.
On election night, November 8, 1932, a poll delivered to Hoover correctly predicts his defeat. Roosevelt wins by 57% to 40%; Democrats take control of Congress. Public apprehension returns over fears Roosevelt will abandon the gold standard. House Speaker Garner forces the RFC to reveal its loan recipients. The revelation that large banks were primary beneficiaries causes new cash hoarding by the public. Senator Norbeck restarts the dormant Senate Wall Street investigation to damage incoming Democrats. Unable to find counsel, Norbeck hires Ferdinand Pecora, a little-known former New York prosecutor. On January 22, Pecora accepts. He decides to focus on the well-known Mitchell and National City Bank to capture attention. At Pecora’s urging, Norbeck announces Mitchell will testify February 21. Pecora’s office receives letters from people who lost savings with National City. Pecora has until March 4, when authorization expires.
On February 18, 1933, President-elect Roosevelt covertly receives a letter from President Hoover warning of a critical situation and urging a joint statement on bank closures and capital flight. Roosevelt appears untroubled. His first choice for treasury secretary is Senator Glass, who is hesitant due to age and health: Glass seeks assurances and formally declines on February 19. The crisis deepens as Michigan declares a bank holiday. Roosevelt refuses to make public statements, determined not to take any responsibility before inauguration. On February 21, Roosevelt names William Woodin as his treasury secretary. By allowing the crisis to worsen, Roosevelt ensures a clean slate. In response, Hoover acknowledges Roosevelt is avoiding ratifying Republican programs and that responsibility for any debacle will be Roosevelt’s.
On February 21, 1933, Charles Mitchell testifies before Ferdinand Pecora and the Senate Banking Committee. He is secretly in deep financial trouble. The hearing begins slowly. Pecora questions Mitchell about National City’s executive bonus pool and Senator James Couzens suggests the bonus system encouraged reckless selling, which Mitchell denies. Pecora forces Mitchell to describe how bonuses paid in July 1929 were later designated as advances, allowing executives to avoid income tax. In the afternoon, Pecora asks about Mitchell’s 1929 stock sales. Mitchell acknowledges selling a large block late in the year for tax purposes. Senator Smith W. Brookhart aggressively questions this sale. Mitchell explains that the buyer lost money and he bought the stock back. Brookhart scoffs at Mitchell’s professed sympathy. Pecora establishes the sale allowed Mitchell to claim a loss of nearly $2.8 million, enabling him to avoid paying any income tax for 1929. Pecora asks if the sale was to a family member. Mitchell confirms it was. The identity of the family member, his wife, is not revealed.
These chapters transition from the 1929 crash to the protracted decline of the Great Depression, shifting focus from market mechanics to societal and political consequences. This transformation is illustrated through the emergence of new, critical voices that challenge Wall Street’s rhetoric. Writers like Matthew Josephson and Julian Sherrod channel public anger into narratives of betrayal. Sherrod’s Scapegoats, written by a former National City bond salesman, uses insider knowledge to expose perceived hypocrisy. The revelation that Charles Mitchell sold his personal Anaconda Copper shares while his salesmen were directed to promote them reframes his public image from a leader of industry to a self-serving figure. This shift marks the point when public anger begins to focus on specific individuals, creating a demand for accountability that will play out through this section. The figure of Lamont highlights the Tensions Between Private and Public Stakeholder Interests; he admits to a colleague that business is “slower than death” (272) while maintaining a façade of confidence. This gap between perception and reality underscores the elite’s continued wish to preserve their own interests, first financial and then reputational.
This section centers on the theme of The Importance of Political Leadership in Times of Crisis. It documents the ideological and practical failures of the era’s elite, portraying their responses as disconnected from the escalating economic suffering. Figures like Herbert Hoover, Andrew Mellon, and Thomas Lamont are depicted as adhering to an orthodox economic approach. Hoover’s commitment to the gold standard, his belief that the problem was psychological, and his signing of the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill reveal a leader struggling to grasp the crisis’s scale. His private meeting with 40 executives, where he warns that their refusal to act might “end[ing] capitalism as they knew it” (304), demonstrates his desperation and the financial elite’s intransigence.
As the established leadership falters, Sorkin shows how the economic crisis itself becomes a contested political arena and an opportunity for point-scoring. Public misery is shown to be a useful political tool. John Raskob’s propaganda campaign against Hoover, managed by Charley Michelson, systematically dismantles the president’s reputation by coining pejorative terms like “Hooverville” (283) that attached the president’s name directly to the nation’s suffering. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s conduct during the presidential transition provides a further example of political calculation. Roosevelt’s refusal to cooperate with Hoover during the bank crisis of early 1933 is presented not as indecision but as a deliberate strategy. By allowing the crisis to worsen under Hoover, Roosevelt ensures he will inherit a clear mandate for new action. This use of “brass-knuckled politics” demonstrates how the national catastrophe accelerated a significant shift in political power, driven by figures who understood how to control the narrative of blame.
The confrontation between Pecora and Mitchell serves as the section’s climax, a study in the collapse of the New Era financier archetype. Presented by Sorkin through original source material, Mitchell’s testimony becomes a public deconstruction of his image. He enters the hearing with the self-assurance of a man accustomed to deference, but his composure deteriorates under Pecora’s questioning. Mitchell’s attempts to justify his bonus system as building esprit de corps are systematically presented as self-serving rationalizations. The hearing culminates in the revelation that Mitchell avoided paying any income tax for 1929 by selling stock at a loss to a family member. Senator Brookhart’s comment, “You did not have a similar sympathy for all those buyers here in the room” (342) articulates the public grievance at the banking elite’s relative ability to mitigate their losses.



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