American Creation

George Washington and the Continental Army spent the winter of 1777-1778 camped at Valley Forge. Washington had lost several battles to General Howe earlier in the war, and Howe and his troops were now waiting out the winter in Philadelphia. The Continental Army spread out in a semicircle to the northwest of the city, in some of the most fertile farmland in all the colonies.

Nevertheless, that winter they nearly starved. Farmers in the countryside preferred to sell their crops to the British, who paid in valuable British pounds, rather than to the Americans, who paid in worthless certificates. In addition, the quartermaster department of the Continental Army virtually collapsed when a new appointee failed miserably, leaving soldiers without necessary provisions. Washington appointed the very capable Nathanael Greene to the position, but turning things around took time—the hard winter left the Americans largely without.

More challenging than the supply problems was the length of the war, then nearing its third year. Everyone had expected a quick victory, and the colonists’ patience wore thin as the fighting ground on. In a protracted war, the British had the upper hand with a far greater war chest, for, as Greene put it, “money is the sinews of war” (66). Washington recognized that the much-vaunted patriotism of the American soldiers was not enough. To a visiting delegation from the Continental Congress, he recommended two essential things to create a more professional fighting force: a de facto draft for all the colonies and a lifetime pension for soldiers who signed up for the duration of the war.

On top of these ongoing problems, the officer corps engaged in petty arguments and spats. They were obsessed with rank and with evaluating which deeds warranted a higher or lower position, and their quarrels often required intervention to prevent duels. This may have stemmed from their position resting on merit rather than birth. As Ellis notes, “In the British army, one was an officer because one was an aristocrat. In the Continental Army, one was an aristocrat because one was an officer” (70).

By old-fashioned rules of warfare, both armies waited out the winter months without fighting. The American troops trained under the German officer Baron von Steuben, learning necessary skills like troop formation. Washington sent Greene and a contingent out into the countryside on “foraging” trips—forcing people to sell them crops and livestock. This did little to alleviate their lack of food, as the British had largely beaten them to the punch with foraging trips of their own, but it did show them the extent of people’s suffering.

As winter wore on, Washington began making plans for the spring, trying to guess what Howe’s move might be. The three options were: attacking Philadelphia, attacking New York, or taking a defensive stance. With input from his officers mixed, Washington did nothing, in effect choosing the defensive posture. In the meantime, the French had joined the Americans as allies. In a shifting strategy, the British government recalled Howe and replaced him with General Henry Clinton, whose orders were to hole up in New York and avoid engaging the rebels in land battles. Washington’s defensive strategy would thus be in place for a long time, with the more important battle being one for the hearts and minds of the people.