An Army at Dawn

Born in 1885, Patton led the Western Task Force's invasion of Casablanca. After building Casablanca into a massive supply depot, Patton took over command of the American II Corps from General Fredendall. Patton was among the more controversial military leaders of World War II. Patton's powerful oratory, showcased through wartime propaganda and the Oscar-winning 1970 biographical film Patton, have solidified Patton's legacy as one of the greatest generals in American history. However, Atkinson is ambivalent about Patton. He grants him a number of positive attributes, including: "energy, will, a capacity to see the enemy’s perspective, and bloodlust" (151). However, Atkinson is also critical of Patton's weaknesses surrounding logistics, empathy with his own soldiers and, perhaps most ruinously, "an archaic tendency to assess his own generalship on the basis of personal courage under fire" (151).

Atkinson goes on to say, "Determined and energetic, [Patton] could also be boorish and abusive, incapable of distinguishing between the demands of a disciplinarian and the caprices of a bully" (402). On one occasion, Patton evaluated General Terry Allen's foxhole and, deeming it insufficient, urinated in it. Morale improved with his arrival to the front, Atkinson argues, though it may have been in spite of Patton, not because of him. After the North African campaign, Patton led divisions in the invasion of Sicily and the decisive Battle of the Bulge in Belgium. In December 1945, Patton died in an automobile accident in Germany.

Roosevelt was the President of the United States during the North African campaign. While most of the war effort was directed by Eisenhower, Roosevelt made two of the biggest decisions during the North African campaign, both of which were made in the face of opposition from key military advisers. The first was to countermand his top generals in choosing to invade North Africa rather than launch a full-scale assault on Berlin through France. Atkinson writes, "The president had made the most profound American strategic decision of the European war in direct contravention of his generals and admirals" (16).

The second major decision was to announce publicly that an Allied victory and an end to the war was contingent on the unconditional surrender of the Axis. To this day, Roosevelt's declaration remains highly controversial. Many argue that a peace treaty with Nazi Germany could have countered the influence of Soviet General Secretary Stalin, who both during and after the war ordered a great number of atrocities committed in the Soviet Union and throughout Eastern Europe. Roosevelt's demand of unconditional surrender may have also caused anti-Hitler officials in the Nazi Party to abandon plans to launch a coup of Nazi Germany. Throughout the war, Roosevelt's health declined. He died in April 1945 at the age of 63, a month before Nazi Germany's unconditional surrender.

Rommel was the top German military commander in North Africa. Nicknamed the Desert Fox, Rommel is considered by Atkinson and other historians to be among the most accomplished military tacticians of the 20th century. Although Rommel won numerous impressive victories over the Allies in Tunisia, the failure of his March 6 Operation CAPRI offensive against General Montgomery was personally and politically devastating to him. When Rommel begged Hitler to withdraw the Afrika Korps to the Tunis bridgehead in the wake of the failed offensive, Hitler relieved him of his command. Rommel's reputation—like that of Patton's—benefited significantly from propaganda: “Like most of history’s conspicuously successful commanders, Atkinson writes, "Rommel had an uncanny ability to dominate the minds of his adversaries" (318). Considering the role played by Nazi propaganda in creating this larger-than-life persona, the Allies' obsession with Rommel may be an example of perception becoming reality.

Further complicating his legacy is the Rommel Myth. In the wake of World War II, Germany sought to position Rommel as apolitical and resistant to Nazi ideology. This depiction was buttressed by Rommel's alleged implication in the plot to assassinate Hitler. After being fingered as a coconspirator, Rommel was given the choice of execution or suicide by cyanide pill. Rommel opted for the cyanide pill, dying in October of 1944. According to historian Peter Caddick-Adams, the Rommel Myth is an effort by post-war Germany toward reconciliation and forgiveness that allows Rommel to emerge as "the acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime." (Caddick-Adams, Peter. Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York: The Overlook Press. 2012.)

Hitler was the German Führer and leader of the Nazi Party. Under his leadership, Nazi Germany espoused an extreme ideology of anti-Semitism and white supremacy. His 1939 invasion of Poland ignited World War II, drawing Great Britain and France into the conflict. As the war progressed, Hitler's decision-making became increasingly reckless and eventually unhinged. After Japan's bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hitler preemptively declared war on the United States, even though Germany's agreement with Japan did not require him to do so. According to Atkinson, "It was perhaps the Führer’s gravest miscalculation and, as the British historian Martin Gilbert later wrote, 'the single most decisive act of the Second World War.'" (8).

Hitler's arrogance reemerged late in the North African campaign. After rejecting Rommel's urgent plea to shrink the bridgehead, Hitler told him, "If the German people are incapable of winning the war, then they can rot" (416). By the waning days of the North African campaign, Hitler grew so certain of his own strategic acumen that he rejected truth entirely. On April 29, 1945, following the defeat of the German army, Hitler committed suicide by a gunshot wound to the head.

Born in 1887, Montgomery was the commander of the British Eighth Army in North Africa. Following his victory at the 1942 Battle of El Alamein, Montgomery pursued Rommel across Egypt and Libya west into Tunisia to meet with the rest of the Allied troops in North Africa. Atkinson's descriptions of Montgomery's victories at El Alamein and the Mareth Line show a commander with a keen tactical mind and able to improvise on the battlefield. That said, Montgomery was also guilty of a sin that plagued the Allied army repeatedly throughout the North African campaign: the failure to pursue the enemy with appropriate haste.

Atkinson argues that for Montgomery, his slow pace when pursuing enemies in retreat was a product of the general's narcissism. The relative lack of aggressiveness led to serious consequences for the Allied troops. Atkinson argues that had Montgomery done a more effective job of slowing Rommel as he fled west to Tunisia, the devastating February 14 offensive might have been avoided altogether. Montgomery's reluctance to fight a battle he wasn't certain of winning speaks to the theme that individual men's egos played an enormous role over the course of the war. After the North African campaign, Montgomery continued to distinguish himself in Europe, particularly at the Battle of the Bulge. He survived the war and died of unspecified causes in 1976 at the age of 88.

Bradley was Patton's deputy who took over command of II Corps following Patton's departure to prepare for the Sicily invasion. Bradley reflected a great number of qualities Atkinson values in a general. During the final push to Tunis, Bradley displayed an aggressiveness Atkinson finds frequently lacking in Allied commanders at this stage of the war. He also possessed a great deal of tactical acumen, improvising a path around the perilous Mousetrap and understanding before his superiors the importance of capturing Hill 609. In Atkinson's telling, Bradley's ability to combine the keen tactical thinking of Montgomery with Patton's unrelenting belligerence was crucial in breaking through the Axis bridgehead. Following the Sicily invasion, Bradley commanded the First United States Army in the Normandy invasion. Bradley left active duty in 1953 and died in 1981 at the age of 88.

Fredendall led the Central Task Force's landing in Oran. He later commanded the II Corps during the march to Tunis until Eisenhower relieved him of command following the Kasserine fiasco. Atkinson's portrayal of Fredendall is deeply ambivalent as he points out that despite persistent structural and logistical problems outside his control, Fredendall committed several tactical errors during the Allies' disastrous February in 1943 that were difficult to forgive. During the fight to save the Faïd Pass, Atkinson characterizes Fredendall's performance as "a mincing sequence of half-measures destined to make a bad predicament truly dire" (308). Even worse was the underground bunker Fredendall ordered to be built for himself, which was not only costly but also considered an act of cowardice by top commanders. According to the American historian Stephen E. Ambrose, Bradley considered the bunker "an embarrassment to every American soldier." (Ambrose, Stephen E. D-Day, June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of World War II. New York: Simon & Schuster. 1994.)