An Army at Dawn

With the return of Patton to the frontlines come more opportunities for Atkinson to examine the commander's record and performance in North Africa. Tactics and decision-making aside, the tyrannical and draconian Patton, as depicted by Atkinson, has a remarkable effect on morale—it's only that Atkinson cannot tell if the effect is positive or negative: "Morale improved, perhaps because of Patton, perhaps despite him" (402). Given all the other factors Atkinson highlights that contribute to higher morale among the troops—most importantly, the realization that Rommel can be beaten—it may be difficult to accept that Patton's behavior, which includes urinating into inadequate foxholes, is the reason for the boost in spirits. Morale is also up due to the United States' dramatic ramp-up in construction and supplies. Atkinson writes, "'The American Army does not solve its problems' one general noted, 'it overwhelms them.' There was prodigal in economy—of time, of motion, of stuff—but beyond the extravagance lay a brisk ability to get the job done" (415). Atkinson cannot overstate the importance of logistics to both the American war effort and, more specifically, to morale itself.

Again, it isn't fair to evaluate Patton solely on his involvement in North Africa. Aside from being stuck in Casablanca for most of the campaign, Patton is frequently sidelined from the most intense battles through no fault of his own. Yet by repeatedly assessing a general's value "on the basis of personal courage under fire" (151) as Atkinson puts it, Patton makes a series of questionable decisions with grave consequences. In his zeal to reach the fighting around El Guettar, Patton sends Allen unencrypted messages which signal to the Germans that the Americans have cracked Axis codes, which in turn causes the enemy to change them. Worse still is Patton's orders to General Orlando Ward "to get out there and get that hill. You lead the attack personally. Don't come back 'til you've got it" (446). Decades removed from combat training or front-line infantry experience, Ward is hit in the eye with a piece of shrapnel after his carbide jams.

Of the sequence of events surrounding Ward's injury and subsequent relief of his command, General Bradley—paraphrased by Atkinson—says Patton "provided more snarling criticism than useful tactical advice or infantry reinforcements. Ward had been unlucky, Bradley believed. But luck in war was a general’s one indispensable virtue" (457). Indeed, while courage, a tactical mind, and a talent for logistics are all described as essential traits of a great general, events in the book suggest that the strongest quality generals can possess is one they have no control over: luck. This sentiment is echoed throughout the book as otherwise great men fall prey to forces they cannot control.

On the other side of the battlefield, Rommel, the Desert Fox himself, is also relieved of his command. He is at least in part a victim of Hitler's arrogance, reflecting once again how individual egos—especially Hitler's—override more well-considered tactical arguments. After rejecting Rommel's urgent plea to shrink the bridgehead, Hitler tells him, "If the German people are incapable of winning the war, then they can rot" (416). By the waning days of the North African campaign, Hitler grows so certain of himself that he rejects truth altogether: “'Hitler wanted to be stronger than mere facts, to bend them to his will,' Kesselring's chief of staff observed. 'All attempts to make him see reason only sent him into a rage'" (416). While the Allies' ultimate success in both the North African campaign and World War II in general is largely the result of America's industrial strength, improvements and adjustments made by commanders, and certainly the bravery of individual soldiers, this is one of numerous instances in which Hitler's individual narcissism plays a role in the Axis' demise.

As Rommel exits the North African Theater, it's worth taking stock of his legacy as a great general and whether it stands up to scrutiny. At least prior to the defeat at El Alamein, Atkinson states, "Rommel’s first successes in Africa manifested the audacity, tactical brilliance, and personal style […] that contrasted so invidiously with British lumpishness" (319). At the same time, Atkinson points out that Rommel's war-time reputation—like that of Patton's—is boosted immensely by state propaganda depicting him as a larger-than-life figure of tactical mastery: “Like most of history’s conspicuously successful commanders," Atkinson writes, "Rommel had an uncanny ability to dominate the minds of his adversaries" (318). Given the role Nazi propaganda plays in shaping his reputation, this may be an example of perception becoming reality.

Rommel's legacy is further complicated by what some historians refer to as the Rommel Myth. Following World War II, Germany sought to frame Rommel in the popular imagination as apolitical and reluctant toward Nazi ideology and anti-Semitism. This depiction is supported by Rommel's alleged implication in the July 20, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, for which Rommel is given the choice of execution or suicide by cyanide pill. (He chooses the cyanide pill). Not unlike the Lost Cause of the Confederacy in the US, the Rommel Myth, according to historian Peter Caddick-Adams, is an effort by post-war Germany toward reconciliation and forgiveness that allows Rommel to emerge as "the acceptable face of German militarism, the 'good' German who stood apart from the Nazi regime." (Caddick-Adams, Peter. Monty and Rommel: Parallel Lives. New York: The Overlook Press. 2012.)

Finally, Atkinson examines the legacy of Rommel's foil, Montgomery. His descriptions of Montgomery's victories at El Alamein and the Mareth Line show a commander with a sharp tactical mind and the impressive ability to improvise. That said, Montgomery also falls victim to the persistent Allied sin of failing to pursue the enemy with all due haste. For many commanders, this is an understandable psychological response, as when II Corps and First Army fail to give chase to Rommel after the fierce fighting around Kasserine: "Having been knocked about for more than a week, senior commanders wanted only to put some distance between themselves and their tormentors" (387).

Atkinson suggests that for Montgomery, his sluggish pace when pursuing enemies in retreat is a product of the general's narcissism: "'Once Monty had his reputation,' charged the British air marshal Arthur Coningham, 'he would never risk it again'" (420). The relative lack of aggressiveness with which General Montgomery's Eighth Army pursues Rommel after the Battle of El Alamein has dire consequences for the Allied troops in North Africa. For example, had Montgomery continued to engage with Rommel as he fled across Libya, the costly February 14 offensive might have been avoided. Coningham argues this is because of Montgomery's reluctance to fight a battle he knows he can't win, speaking to the theme that individual men's egos play an outsized role over the course of the war.