An Economic Theory of Democracy

Why do you think does Part 1 include an assumption of perfect information, if the rest of the book abandons it? How does it contribute to your understanding of the theory?

Do you accept Downs’s conclusion that office-seekers only care about their private benefits, and see the public benefit as nothing but a means to that end? Use real-world examples to argue for or against altruism in public life.

Downs proposes that in a two-party system each will converge upon one another to play for the middle of the electorate. Analyze the contemporary politics of a current two-state system to test this hypothesis.

How do you regard Downs’s view of influence-peddling as an inevitable and rational feature of politics? Is it plausible for him to distinguish such behavior from outright corruption?

Evaluate Downs’s depiction of ideologies. How does his account of how ideologies develop align with the development of “left” and “right” politics that now prevails in most of the contemporary world?

Is it ultimately possible for a citizen to reduce their information costs and make a well-informed vote, or do they have to make a tradeoff between learning and voting well? Which of the two do you think it is more rational to emphasize?

What do you think of Downs’s conclusion that, for many people, voting is irrational since the costs outweigh the benefits? What can society do to mitigate this effect and what would the side-effects be?

Downs writes that voters will follow sources which align with their selection principles. Analyze his argument with reference to the modern consumption of media, including today’s ideas around “confirmation bias” and the “echo chamber” of social media.