Anarchy, State and Utopia

“The possible ways of understanding the political realm are as follows: (1) to fully explain it in terms of the nonpolitical; (2) to view it as emerging from the nonpolitical but irreducible to it, a mode of organization of nonpolitical factors understandable only in terms of novel political principles; or (3) to view it as a completely autonomous realm.”

Nozick sets up his argument for the minimal state in the first chapter of the book. He uses a traditional Lockean approach, which sets the origins of society in a pre-political realm, namely the state of nature. Nozick believes that this leads to a logical exploration of the just organization of society.

“We may proceed, for our purposes, by saying that a necessary condition for the existence of a state is that it (some person or organization) announce that, to the best of its ability (taking into account costs of doing so, the feasibility, the more important alternative things it should be doing, and so forth), it will punish everyone whom it discovers to have used force without its express permission. […] This still won’t quite do: the state may reserve the right to forgive someone, ex post facto; in order to punish they may have not only to discover the ‘unauthorized’ use of force but also prove via a certain specified procedure of proof that it occurred, and so forth. But it enables us to proceed. The protective agencies, it seems, do not make such an announcement, either individually or collectively. Nor does it seem morally legitimate for them to do so.”

Nozick discusses the difference between the protective agency and a pre-state form of organization for the purposes of protection at the community and state levels. Nozick does not think that an agency’s ability to punish represents a state-like power since the state is more extensive in what it can do, not least through its domination of protection activities.

“Can behavior toward a person be constrained so that he is not to be used for any end except as he chooses? […] Even the requirement that he merely should not object to any use we plan would seriously curtail bilateral exchange, not to mention sequences of such exchanges. It is sufficient that the other party stands to gain enough from the exchange so that he is willing to go through with it, even though he objects to one or more of the uses to which you shall put the good. Under such conditions, the other party is not being used solely as a means, in that respect. Another party, however, who would not choose to interact with you if he knew of the uses to which you intend to put his actions or good, is being used as a means, even if he receives enough to choose (in his ignorance) to interact with you.”

In this quote, Nozick examines the ethical implications of using individuals as a means to an end in the context of transactions and exchanges. He argues that a person doesn’t need to agree with every aspect of how their action or goods will be used, as long as they benefit enough from the exchange to want to participate in it. However, he posits that if a person would refuse to participate in an exchange if they were aware of all the uses of their actions or goods, then their involvement constitutes being used merely as a means.

“There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has. He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is entitled to force this upon him—least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance (as other individuals do not) and that therefore scrupulously must be neutral between its citizens.”

Here, Nozick emphasizes the moral significance of individual autonomy and the ethical problem of using individuals to benefit others. He criticizes the concept of an “overall social good” as a justification for such actions, suggesting that it obscures the ethical issue of imposing sacrifices on individuals without their consent or compensating benefit. Nozick argues that this practice disrespects individuality. He thinks it is particularly unjust when such a practice is enforced by a government. Nozick rejects most forms of collectivism based on this idea. His use of a parenthetical hypothetical question—“(Intentionally?)”—invites the reader to meditate on the state’s intentions.

“The moral side constraints upon what we may do, I claim, reflect the fact of our separate existences. They reflect the fact that no moral balancing act can take place among us; there is no moral outweighing of one of our lives by others so as to lead to a greater overall social good. There is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others. This root idea, namely, that there are different individuals with separate lives and so no one may be sacrificed for others, underlies the existence of moral side constraints, but it also, I believe, leads to a libertarian side constraint that prohibits aggression against another.”

In this quote, Nozick once more articulates the fundamental principle of individualism that he bases his libertarian philosophy on. He asserts that moral constraints on actions arise from the recognition of each person’s distinct and separate existence. He rejects the notion of sacrificing individuals for a perceived greater social good, arguing that no moral calculus can justify such sacrifices. This viewpoint forms the basis for a libertarian constraint against coercion. Here, Nozick also addresses the common question of justice and harm in a libertarian society: If individuals can act as they choose, what prevents someone from harming another if they want to? His response is speculative and posits that mutual respect for each other’s individuality will prevent interpersonal violence.

“One ubiquitous argument, not unconnected with side constraints, deserves mention: because people eat animals, they raise more than otherwise would exist without this practice. To exist for a while is better than never to exist at all. So (the argument concludes) the animals are better off because we have the practice of eating them. […] I trust I shall not be misunderstood as saying that animals are to be given the same moral weight as people if I note that the parallel argument about people would not look very convincing. We can imagine that population problems lead every couple or group to limit their children to some number fixed in advance. A given couple, having reached the number, proposes to have an additional child and dispose of it at the age of three (or twenty-three) by sacrificing it or using it for some gastronomic purpose. In justification, they note that the child will not exist at all if this is not allowed; and surely it is better for it to exist for some number of years.”

With this example, Nozick critically examines the moral argument used to justify the consumption of animals, which suggests that animals benefit from being raised for consumption, as it grants them existence in the first place. He challenges this reasoning by drawing a parallel to humans, implying that such an argument would be unacceptable and morally repugnant if applied to people. This analogy highlights the problematic nature of justifying actions based on the supposed benefits of existence, especially when it involves exploiting sentient beings such as animals and children. Here, Nozick uses hyperbole to emphasize his point.

“Voluntary consent opens the border for crossings. Locke, of course, would hold that there are things others may not do to you by your permission; namely, those things you have no right to do to yourself. Locke would hold that your giving your permission cannot make it morally permissible for another to kill you, because you have no right to commit suicide. My nonpaternalistic position holds that someone may choose (or permit another) to do to himself anything, unless he has acquired an obligation to some third party not to do or allow it.”

Nozick contrasts his “non-paternalistic” stance with Locke’s view on voluntary consent and moral boundaries. Nozick argues that an individual may consent to any action being done to them, barring obligations to others, suggesting a broader scope for personal autonomy and the moral weight of consent. Non-paternalism is an important idea for Nozick and most libertarian theorists, as they consider that any imposition coming from a source of power holds an authoritarian, controlling, and infantilizing hold on individuals. This argument does not address interpersonal coercion or societal conditions that could compel someone to consent to being harmed by another.

“There remains a puzzle about why fear attaches to certain acts. After all, if you know that you will be compensated fully for the actual effects of an act, so that you will be no worse off (in your own view) as a result of its having been done, then what is it that you are afraid of? You are not afraid of a drop to a less preferred position or a lower indifference curve, for (by hypothesis) you know that this won’t occur.”

In this quote, Nozick challenges the idea that fear is always linked to tangible loss or detriment, pointing out that individuals may still experience fear despite assurances that no material harm or degradation will come to them. This suggests that fear can be rooted in factors beyond just the physical or economic impacts of an action, possibly including ethical, emotional, or psychological dimensions that are not addressed by mere compensation.

“The principle of compensation requires that people be compensated for having certain risky activities prohibited to them. It might be objected that either you have the right to forbid these people’s risky activities or you don’t. If you do, you needn’t compensate the people for doing to them what you have a right to do; and if you don’t, then rather than formulating a policy of compensating people for your unrightful forbidding, you ought simply to stop it. In neither case does the appropriate course seem to be to forbid and then compensate. But the dilemma, ‘either you have a right to forbid it so you needn’t compensate, or you don’t have a right to forbid it so you should stop,’ is too short. It may be that you do have a right to forbid an action but only provided you compensate those to whom it is forbidden.”

Nozick rejects the oversimplified binary view that if one has the right to forbid an action, then compensation is unnecessary, and if one lacks this right, the action should simply be allowed. Nozick introduces a nuanced perspective, suggesting that there may be situations where one has the right to forbid certain actions, but this right is contingent upon providing fair compensation to those who are restricted by such prohibitions, acknowledging their loss or inconvenience.

“Soldiers who know their country is waging an aggressive war and who are manning antiaircraft guns in defense of a military emplacement may not in self-defense fire upon the planes of the attacked nation which is acting in self-defense, even though the planes are over their heads and are about to bomb them.”

In this quote, Nozick uses the example of the soldiers fighting an unlawful war to illustrate a moral imperative that he considers inviolable at the individual level: to judge a situation harmful and immoral and make a moral decision, disregarding their government’s position. This kind of theory places great pressure and trust on the individual and their ability to judge a situation. This argument also reflects the era in which Nozick was writing—in the wake of the Vietnam War, many Americans were contending with the idea that military action is not always justified. A libertarian perspective that allows for anti-war sentiment diverges from typical conservative ideology without adhering to leftist ideas of pacifism.

“The person who uses an unreliable procedure, acting upon its result, imposes risks upon others, whether or not his procedure misfires in a particular case. Someone playing Russian roulette upon another does the same thing if when he pulls the trigger the gun does not fire. The protective agency may treat the unreliable enforcer of justice as it treats any performer of a risky action.”

This quote highlights Nozick’s understanding of the moral implications of imposing risks on others through unreliable procedures or actions. He equates the use of an unreliable procedure for enforcing justice with the act of playing Russian roulette, emphasizing that even if harm does not occur in a specific instance, the inherent risk posed is unethical. Nozick suggests that a protective agency, in its role of maintaining justice, should treat individuals who employ unreliable methods of enforcement as it would treat anyone performing potentially harmful, risky actions.

“More precisely, we have partially explained in invisible-hand fashion the existence of the ultraminimal state. What is the explanation of how a minimal state arises? The dominant protective association with the monopoly element is morally required to compensate for the disadvantages it imposes upon those it prohibits from self-help activities against its clients. However, it actually might fail to provide this compensation. Those operating an ultraminimal state are morally required to transform it into a minimal state, but they might choose not to do so. We have assumed that generally people will do what they are morally required to do. Explaining how a state could arise from a state of nature without violating anyone’s rights refutes the principled objections of the anarchist.”

Nozick suggests that the dominant protective association, which holds a monopoly over protection services, has a moral duty to compensate those it restricts from engaging in self-help activities. However, he acknowledges the possibility that this moral obligation may not be fulfilled, leading to a failure in transforming the ultraminimal state into a minimal state. This discussion counters anarchist arguments by demonstrating how a state can emerge from a state of nature without infringing upon individual rights, provided that moral obligations are adhered to in the process.

“It might be thought that the difference is merely a matter of greater or lesser probability. When a nation is about to launch an attack, or has announced that it will when and if it reaches a certain level of readiness, the probability is very high that it will attack. Whereas the probability is not as great that any nation getting stronger will attack when it attains greater strength. But the distinction between the cases does not depend upon such probability considerations.”

Nozick argues that the distinction between situations where a nation explicitly indicates its intent to attack and scenarios where a nation simply gains strength without declaring hostile intentions is not merely a matter of probability assessment of an attack occurring; rather, it involves deeper ethical and strategic considerations. This is part of Nozick’s exploration of justifications for defensive actions and the moral complications involved in interpreting and responding to potential threats in international relations. Ultimately, Nozick thinks that states are larger individuals and act accordingly.

“Consider whether the dominant protective agency is entitled to be the one which is dominant. Is a restaurant you choose to go to on a given evening entitled to your patronage? Perhaps one is tempted to say, in some circumstances, they merit it or deserve it; they serve better food, less expensively, and in nicer surroundings, and they work long and hard to do so; still, they are not entitled to your patronage. You do not violate any entitlement of theirs if you choose to go elsewhere. By choosing to go there, though, you do authorize them to serve and bill you. They have no entitlement to be the one which serves you, but they are entitled to serve you. Similarly, we must distinguish between an agency’s being entitled to be the one wielding certain power from its being entitled to wield that power. Is the dominant agency's only entitlement, then, its being entitled to wield the power? We can reach questions of entitlement by another route that illuminates further the situation of persons in a state of nature.”

In this quote, Nozick implies that entitlement is more complex than simply earning or deserving support; it involves a mutual acknowledgment of authority and service. This distinction informs his inquiry into the legitimacy and moral basis of political authority, particularly how individuals in a state of nature may consent to or authorize certain powers without implying an inherent entitlement to those powers by the entities that wield them.

“The term ‘distributive justice’ is not a neutral one. Hearing the term ‘distribution,’ most people presume that some thing or mechanism uses some principle or criterion to give out a supply of things. Into this process of distributing shares some error may have crept. So it is an open question, at least, whether redistribution should take place; whether we should do again what has already been done once, though poorly. However, we are not in the position of children who have been given portions of pie by someone who now makes last minute adjustments to rectify careless cutting. There is no central distribution, no person or group entitled to control all the resources, jointly deciding how they are to be doled out. What each person gets, he gets from others who give to him in exchange for something, or as a gift.”

Nozick criticizes the assumption that resources are initially distributed by a central authority, which then might need to redistribute them to correct any discrepancies. Nozick argues that in reality, resources are not allocated by a central entity but are acquired through individual exchanges and gifts. This perspective implies that the concept of redistribution, based on a notion of rectifying initial distribution errors, is fundamentally flawed. Nozick’s analysis underscores his libertarian position, which emphasizes the importance of individual transactions and consensual exchanges over collective or governmental interventions in resource allocation. Once more, Nozick rejects the position of a child ruled over by a paternalistic hand, even if this hand may be beneficial overall.

“One traditional socialist view is that workers are entitled to the product and full fruits of their labor; they have earned it; a distribution is unjust if it does not give the workers what they are entitled to. Such entitlements are based upon some past history. […] This socialist rightly, in my view, holds onto the notions of earning, producing, entitlement, desert, and so forth, and he rejects current time-slice principles that look only to the structure of the resulting set of holdings. (The set of holdings resulting from what? Isn’t it implausible that how holdings are produced and come to exist has no effect at all on who should hold what?) His mistake lies in his view of what entitlements arise out of what sorts of productive processes.”

In this quote, Nozick acknowledges the validity of concepts like earning, producing, and entitlement, which are central to this socialist perspective. However, he criticizes the specific interpretation of these concepts by socialists, suggesting that their understanding of the entitlements arising from productive processes is flawed. He thinks that the process of production and the labor process do not dictate property or who gets what because there is a process of acquisition and transaction, which the socialists forget about.

“Whoever makes something, having bought or contracted for all other held resources used in the process (transferring some of his holdings for these cooperating factors), is entitled to it. The situation is not one of something’s getting made, and there being an open question of who is to get it. Things come into the world already attached to people having entitlements over them. From the point of view of the historical entitlement conception of justice in holdings, those who start afresh to complete ‘to each according to his ___.’ treat objects as if they appeared from nowhere, out of nothing. A complete theory of justice might cover this limit case as well; perhaps here is a use for the usual conceptions of distributive justice.”

Nozick’s perspective in this quote challenges the notion of open-ended distribution, emphasizing that objects and resources are not spontaneously generated but are connected to specific individuals through their efforts and transactions. Nozick’s stance highlights the historical entitlement conception of justice, contrasting with distributive justice models that may disregard the origins of property and the individual’s role in its creation. This perspective underpins a key element of Nozick’s libertarian philosophy, where justice is rooted in individual rights and the history of property acquisition and transfer. The allusion to Karl Marx in this quote—“to each according to his ___”—is meant to undermine Marx’s adage from his 1875 Critique of the Gotha Programme. Marx argued “from each according to his ability to each according to his need” as a method of distributive justice (Marx, Karl. “Critique of the Gotha Programme.” Marx & Engels Selected Works, vol. 3, Progress Publishers, 1970, pp. 13-30); Nozick, by contrast, argues that need has nothing to do with it.

“The general point illustrated by the Wilt Chamberlain example and the example of the entrepreneur in a socialist society is that no end-state principle or distributional patterned principle of justice can be continuously realized without continuous interference with people’s lives. Any favored pattern would be transformed into one unfavored by the principle, by people choosing to act in various ways; for example, by people exchanging goods and services with other people, or giving things to other people, things the transferrers are entitled to under the favored distributional pattern. To maintain a pattern one must either continually interfere to stop people from transferring resources as they wish to, or continually (or periodically) interfere to take from some persons resources that others for some reason chose to transfer to them.”

Nozick’s writing style is academic, but his Wilt Chamberlain example creates a hook for ordinary readers. Nozick uses a professional athlete to illustrate his idea that in some situations, engaging in rightful transactions results in unequal distribution or resources. Nozick’s overall argument is that natural patterns lead to inequality due to the differences between people’s abilities. A “favored pattern,” such as equality, would involve a constantly regulating entity disrupting the natural configuration between people. Nozick opposes this interference because he thinks that it infringes on individual rights.

“Maintaining a distributional pattern is individualism with a vengeance! Patterned distributional principles do not give people what entitlement principles do, only better distributed. For they do not give the right to choose what to do with what one has; they do not give the right to choose to pursue an end involving (intrinsically, or as a means) the enhancement of another’s position. To such views, families are disturbing; for within a family occur transfers that upset the favored distributional pattern. Either families themselves become units to which distribution takes place, the column occupiers (on what rationale?), or loving behavior is forbidden. We should note in passing the ambivalent position of radicals toward the family. Its loving relationships are seen as a model to be emulated and extended across the whole society, at the same time that it is denounced as a suffocating institution to be broken and condemned as a focus of parochial concerns that interfere with achieving radical goals.”

Nozick rejects the concept of maintaining a specific pattern of distribution in society, highlighting its restrictive nature on individual autonomy. He argues that patterned distributional principles, which aim for a particular allocation of resources, infringe on an individual’s right to use their possessions as they see fit, including the freedom to enhance someone else’s position through voluntary actions such as familial transfers. The family example illustrates that in a natural scheme (the family), distributional patterns are not egalitarian but “loving,” meaning that some members can be loved more than others. By citing “the ambivalent position of radicals toward the family,” Nozick is appealing to conservative audiences—“family values,” while not yet a mainstream political catchphrase in 1974, is a core principle for American conservatives.

“People’s talents and abilities are an asset to a free community; others in the community benefit from their presence and are better off because they are there rather than elsewhere or nowhere. (Otherwise they wouldn’t choose to deal with them.) Life, over time, is not a constant-sum game, wherein if greater ability or effort leads to some getting more, that means that others must lose. In a free society, people’s talents do benefit others, and not only themselves.”

Nozick challenges the zero-sum-game perception of resource distribution, emphasizing that in a free society, the advantages gained from one’s abilities and efforts do not necessarily come at the expense of others but can contribute to overall societal enrichment. This perspective underscores the value of individual contributions and the symbiotic relationship between personal achievements and communal prosperity.

“People generally judge themselves by how they fall along the most important dimensions in which they differ from others. People do not gain self-esteem from their common human capacities by comparing themselves to animals who lack them. (‘I’m pretty good; I have an opposable thumb and can speak some language.’) Nor do people gain or maintain self-esteem by considering that they possess the right to vote for political leaders, though when the franchise was not widely distributed things may have been different. Nor do people in the United States today have a sense of worth because they are able to read and write, though in many other societies in history this has served. When everyone, or almost everyone, has some thing or attribute, it does not function as a basis for self-esteem. Self-esteem is based on differentiating characteristics; that’s why it’s self-esteem.”

In this quote, Nozick’s perspective suggests that self-esteem is inherently tied to personal attributes or achievements that set one apart. He believes that a deeper human need for individuality and distinctiveness forms a sense of self-worth. Nozick emphasizes the importance of personal differences over commonalities in the development of self-perception and identity. Instead, he rejects views about self-esteem that aim to eradicate difference; from his perspective, this includes any egalitarian theory.

“Even if it is more difficult to obtain external investment than the previous paragraph makes out, union treasuries now contain sufficient funds to capitalize many such worker-controlled firms which can repay the money with interest, as many private owners do with bank loans, and even with loans from labor unions. Why is it that some unions or groups of workers don’t start their own business? What an easy way to give workers access to the means of production: buy machinery and rent space, and so forth, just as a private entrepreneur does. It is illuminating to consider why unions don’t start new businesses, and why workers don't pool their resources to do so.”

The quote invites reflection on the structural and ideological barriers that might prevent unions or workers from engaging in entrepreneurial activities despite the apparent feasibility. Nozick’s observation points toward his inquiry into the dynamics of labor, capital, and the nature of entrepreneurial risk taking, contrasting the theoretical ease of establishing worker-controlled firms with the practical challenges and societal norms that might inhibit such ventures. Overall, Nozick rejects the complaints that labor unions have about workers’ rights and conditions of labor because he finds the ideology they adhere to paternalistic.

“The answer for Marx lies in the unique character of labor power; its value is the cost of producing it (the labor that goes into it), yet it itself is capable of producing more value than it has. (This is true of machines as well.) Putting a certain amount of labor L into making a human organism produces something capable of expending an amount of labor greater than L. Because individuals lack the resources to wait for the return from the sale of the products of their labor (see above), they cannot gather these benefits of their own capacities and are forced to deal with the capitalists. In view of the difficulties with Marxist economic theory, one would expect Marxists to study carefully alternative theories of the existence of profit, including those formulated by ‘bourgeois’ economists. […] An alternative explanatory theory, if adequate, presumably would remove much of the scientific motivation underlying Marxist economic theory; one might be left with the view that Marxian exploitation is the exploitation of people’s lack of understanding of economics.”

In this quote, Nozick criticizes Marx’s theory of labor power. He notes that labor power, like machinery, can produce more than the labor invested in it; however, unlike machinery, human laborers cannot wait for the long-term benefits of their labor due to their immediate financial needs, leading them to engage with capitalists. Nozick then challenges the robustness of Marxist economic theory, suggesting that a more meticulous exploration and understanding of alternative profit theories, including those of non-Marxist economists, might undermine the scientific basis of Marx’s theory of exploitation. He implies that Marxian exploitation might be rooted more in a misunderstanding of economic principles than in the capitalist system itself.