Art as Experience

Dewey defines criticism as judgment rooted in perceptive engagement with works of art. The value of criticism depends on the quality of perception. Genuine criticism begins in direct aesthetic experience and develops through judgment that both discriminates details and unifies them into an appreciation of the whole.

He criticizes the “judicial” model of criticism, which treats the critic as a judge handing down authoritative verdicts of praise or blame. Such legalistic criticism substitutes precedent, prestige, and rules for direct perception, often stifling appreciation of new artistic movements. Dewey illustrates this argument with examples, showing that critics condemned Renoir, Cezanne, and Matisse as diseased, crude, or second-rate. These “judicial” criticisms were born of clinging to outdated standards of technique. He contrasts this with the artists’ path, arguing that genuine artists absorb tradition and transform it through their own vision.

As a reaction to “judicial” criticism, “impressionist” criticism denies judgment altogether, focusing on personal responses rather than fixed standards. Dewey acknowledges that impressions are the raw material of judgment, but he insists that to “define an impression is to analyze it” (305), and analysis necessarily moves toward judgment grounded in objective features of the work. Subjective feeling lacks value unless tethered to the object’s properties.

Dewey says the heart of criticism lies not in standards but in criteria derived from the nature of aesthetic experience. Criteria emerge through inquiry into how a work integrates its medium, form, and matter. Criticism, then, is a venture; it is hypothetical, fallible, but socially testable because works of art are publicly available for shared experience. The critic’s role is to discriminate significant features, unify them into a coherent perspective, and thereby re-educate perception.

Dewey warns against two fallacies. The reductive fallacy isolates one element—historical context, biography, psychoanalysis, or technique—and treats it as if it explains the whole work. The confusion of categories fallacy translates aesthetic value into moral, scientific, or philosophical terms, reducing art to an illustration of ideas that is external to its medium. Against these errors, Dewey insists that criticism must focus on the intrinsic significance of the medium, where art achieves its integration of matter and form.

He reframes criticism as a facilitation of perception rather than a pronouncement of worth. The critic’s moral task is to remove prejudice and open vision, helping others participate in the same processes of experience that produced the work of art.

Art as Experience concludes by situating art within civilization. Dewey says art is not identical with aesthetic experience but is a “quality that permeates an experience” (326), transforming human and social materials into ordered rhythms of fulfillment. Because culture shapes individuals, art records and judges the quality of a civilization. From ancient rites and ceremonies to modern painting and music, art transmits collective meaning across time.

Dewey traces how cultures have used art to integrate social life. In ancient Greece, poetry and drama were civic forces, with Plato’s demand for censorship showing how deeply the arts influenced morals and politics. In the Church, sacraments, music, and imagery are central to community life, and they are more influential than doctrines alone. Renaissance art, by contrast, reflected the revival of secular experiences shaped by classical models, extending subject matter beyond biblical themes into myth and contemporary life. Each culture leaves its “collective individuality” indelibly on its art, which in turn allows later ages to participate imaginatively.

Next, Dewey questions whether people can truly appreciate the art of foreign or remote cultures. He acknowledges that their total experience cannot be replicated, yet he insists that one can enter into their attitudes imaginatively. By doing so, an individual’s experience is broadened and prejudices weakened. The early 20th century’s embrace of “primitive, Oriental, and early medieval objects of art” illustrates how integration of unfamiliar forms expands contemporary sensibility (334). Art, then, is a medium of communication that is more universal than speech, and it is able to transcend historical and linguistic barriers.

Turning to modern industrial society, Dewey argues that the fragmentation of culture—caused by the rise of science and machines—has isolated art from daily life. Science, while disruptive, also promises new sources of vision by revealing humanity’s continuity with nature. Industrial production, however, has sharply divided useful and fine art, stripping workers of aesthetic satisfaction in their labor. This separation, reinforced by economic structures of private gain, threatens the vitality of art in civilization. For Dewey, the solution lies in reorganizing social and industrial life so the majority of people have opportunities to participate in creation and enjoyment.

Dewey redefines the relation of art and morals. Instead of direct moral instruction, art expands the imagination, making new desires, sympathies, and ideals possible. He insists that by liberating perception from prejudice and opening individuals to possibilities beyond the status quo, art becomes more moral than fixed moralities, which tend to preserve custom rather than inspire growth.