65 pages • 2 hours read
Blood in the Water
A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Part 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Part 3: “The Sound Before the Fury”
“Tom Wicker” Summary
Tom Wicker was a journalist writing for the New York Times, interested in social justice. He was called to Attica to act as a witness to negotiations between the rebel prisoners and the state of New York, at the formers’ request. Thompson suggests that he approached the prison with trepidation.
Chapter 15 Summary: “Getting Down to Business”
At this stage, on the second day of the rebellion, the prisoners had no intention of giving up, and Oswald and Dunbar, his deputy, had no intention of going back into the yard. As such, Tom Wicker and other members of the observers committee, who now numbered 33 men in total, would enter D Yard to continue the negotiations. As Thompson says, they “took it for granted that no one wanted ‘the irrationality of bloodshed and death’” (105). The key sticking point, though, remained the question of prisoner immunity, and the Wyoming County district attorney, Louis James, made it clear that he did not have the authority, or desire, to grant this.
Before the observers committee went into D Yard again, they visited C Block, which had been recaptured by the state. There they saw anxious state troopers and abused and injured prisoners crying for help. Thompson describes how William Kunstler, a charismatic and well-connected lawyer, had joined the observers. So, too, did Tom Soto, a young Puerto Rican priest associated with Youth Against War and Fascism. Kunstler agreed to be the lawyer for the prisoners. Further, the observers and the prisoners set out to thrash out a new, coherent and realistic set of demands. They worked all night, and by Saturday, September 11, they had composed a new, unified list. An executive of six of the observers committee members, including Eve and Kunstler, then agreed to present these to commissioner Oswald.
Chapter 16 Summary: “Dreams and Nightmares”
The observers had managed to secure two key documents. First, they had obtained a signed document from District Attorney James that promised there would be no mass prosecutions or retaliation in the event of a surrender. Second, they had a document in which Oswald promised to accept 28 of the prisoners’ 33 demands in some form, with his response to each point. Although he had refused to agree to legal amnesty, observer Jones, as Thompson highlights, claimed that “this was the best of all possible things which could be achieved” for the prisoners (119).
Meanwhile, Bobby Seale, a leading member of the Black Panthers, had arrived and was eventually persuaded to speak to the prisoners. It was hoped that his presence would help convince the prisoners to accept the two documents and thus avert bloodshed. However, Seale not only dismissed the documents as worthless but behaved in an aloof manner with the prisoners, giving only a short speech and then leaving, thus increasing tensions in D Yard. Jones tried to save the deteriorating situation. His efforts were not working, so Kunstler intervened, winning back the crowd until he inadvertently revealed that CO William Quinn had died from injuries sustained in the riot. The importance of legal amnesty increased even further with this news, and the 28-point document was rejected and torn up. Hearing that his compromise had been shot down, Oswald authorized retaking the prison by force for 6:00am the next morning unless there was a breakthrough in negotiations.
Chapter 17 Summary: “On the Precipice”
The chances of a peaceful resolution to the situation were looking increasingly slim. Although Oswald had temporarily delayed the assault, Thompson says, he was being increasing pressured by families of hostages, COs, officials, and organizations to use force. As such, the observers had to try something new, and quickly. At this point, Bobby Seale had returned to Attica but been turned away for refusing to try to make the prisoners accept compromise. The observers committee had thus pinned its hopes, firstly, on getting Governor Rockefeller to visit Attica to personally assure inmates that there would be no reprisals. Second, the committee hoped to get the media involved as a way of putting pressure on Rockefeller to do this. The observers managed to speak to Rockefeller. However, despite assurances that he would not have to meet with prisoners in the yard, he declined to come.
Two journalists were allowed into Attica, along with the observers. They interviewed hostages, who stressed their good treatment at the hands of the inmates and pleaded with the Governor to make an appearance and grant the prisoners amnesty. Finally, Tom Wicker gave a speech to the crowds outside the prison, who were hostile to him. Oswald made the final decision that no further negotiations would be permitted.
Chapter 18 Summary: “Deciding Disaster”
An attack on the prison was now imminent, and it was officially confirmed when General Buzz O’Hara rang Rockefeller at 11:00pm on the night of September 13 to ask permission for an attack. Rockefeller responded, “You have it” (156). The retaking itself would fall to Major John Monahan of the New York State Police and Superintendent Mancusi. It was clear, Thompson emphasizes, that with these choices of more junior figures, Rockefeller was trying to protect his highest-ranking officials should anything go wrong. Two things assured there would be a bloody outcome. First, the state troopers and COs who would do the retaking were clearly both exhausted and eager for revenge. Second, they were going to use shotguns and pistols in the retaking, backed up by rifles, although the prisoners had no firearms.
Part 3 Analysis
On the surface of things, the final deal offered the prisoners was a good one. Among the 33 inmate demands, only replacing Mancusi as superintendent, and the granting of full legal amnesty, were not, regarding substantial points, accepted. With the latter point, they had assurances. On the one hand, Oswald had offered “complete administrative amnesty to all persons associated with this matter” (121). On the other, they had a signed letter by the district attorney stating that there would be no unfair legal reprisals. Prisoner skepticism, however, was understandable. In terms of demands about conditions, it would be easy to water down or postpone concessions once inmates had surrendered. It would also be easy to interpret terms like “adequate” and “healthy”, as for instance in demands for “adequate medical treatment” (123), to allow for a continuation of the status quo.
More importantly, the documents stopped short of full legal amnesty. At best, “administrative amnesty” suggested there would be no guard reprisals, or reprisals in the prison itself, but left the door open for later potential criminal prosecutions. Especially given that CO William Quinn had just died, this amnesty was critical. Prisoners might well be prosecuted for murder in connection with his death. Too much seemed to hang on the word of Oswald and James, and yet it still may have been achievable to get the prisoners to accept this, and to avert bloodshed, if either Seale or Rockefeller had acted differently. As Thompson notes, Tom Wicker certainly felt this way about the former. He believed that Seale, who commanded respect among the inmates, should have explained, “Look, you’ve gone as far as you can. You’ve made a political point to the whole world. You’ve made The Man listen. Now a lot of you are going to get killed if you push it any further” (140). In fact, Seale, co-founder of the Black Panther party, was half-hearted about Attica. The situation did not seem to interest him. It is likely that he did not want to risk his standing as a radical by being part of any perceived compromise.
At the other end of the political spectrum, Governor Rockefeller was also concerned about his image. Again, it is possible that if Rockefeller had gone to Attica, disaster may have been averted. The assurance of the Governor himself that there would be no reprisals, and that the deal offered would be honored, could have gone a long way to re-assuring inmates. But, as Thompson emphasizes, Rockefeller felt “it was too politically costly to make the trip” (155). Despite promises that he would not have to meet prisoners in the yard, and the pleas of the hostages, he, like Seale, did not want to appear weak or compromising. Further, the fact that President Nixon had backed this decision would have indicated it was the astute move. Prospective Republican presidential candidates, so the thought might have gone, cannot be seen to pander to riotous criminals. Indeed, an even more cynical interpretation would suggest that Rockefeller wanted a violent retaking of the prison. It is hard to know with certainty, but such an idea is not radically inconsistent with either Republican political attitudes of the time, nor with Rockefeller’s later actions and comments. It could explain, for instance, why he permitted the use of firearms in the assault.
In any case, a key idea of the observers was proven fatally mistaken in connection with Rockefeller’s involvement. The observers committee had believed, as Thompson notes, that it should “enlist the aid of the American people” (143), by explaining the risk of bloodshed, to put pressure on Rockefeller to personally resolve the crisis. This belief betrayed a misunderstanding both of Rockefeller and of American public opinion. Doubtless there were those who did sympathize with the plight of the prisoners. There may also have been men and women who would regard a violent storming of the prison as abhorrent. These people, however, were not Rockefeller’s principle constituency. Instead they were people, like those in the small town of Attica itself, who sided with law enforcement and believed that the prisoner rebellion should be crushed. This feeling was only strengthened by Quinn’s death.
Perhaps the only other thing that would have forestalled tragedy would have been a proper ultimatum. Neither Oswald nor Rockefeller offered this. Neither told the prisoners that violence would follow if the deal on the table was rejected. This fact supports the suspicion that Rockefeller wanted a show of force against the rebellious prisoners. Whether or not he anticipated the full consequences of this decision is a topic covered in the next part.
Unlock all 65 pages of this Study Guide
Get in-depth, chapter-by-chapter summaries and analysis from our literary experts.
- Grasp challenging concepts with clear, comprehensive explanations
- Revisit key plot points and ideas without rereading the book
- Share impressive insights in classes and book clubs