Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil

Mitchell begins this chapter by discussing how scholars in recent decades argue that Islam is the root of the oil and democracy problem. These scholars point out that several oil-producing countries, such as Venezuela, Indonesia, and Nigeria, have alternated between periods of democracy and military governments. To them, oil revenue does not always prevent the development of more democratic forms of government. Instead, these scholars believe that the democratic model does not work in the Middle East due to Islam. Many of these scholars blame the US government’s support of conservative political regimes in the Middle East as to why this tension between oil, democracy, and Islam endures.

Scholars suggest we live in an era of “‘Jihad vs McWorld’” (203), a phrase first coined by American political theorist Benjamin Barber, which refers to the twin threats of tribalism and globalism. Western national economies’ drive to continuously expand the market around the world pushes them up against other nation-states (McWorld). The unrestrained globalizing market forces of McWorld has led to an increase in tribalism (Jihad). Both present a threat to democracy.

Mitchell finds this conventional way of thinking about the tension between oil, democracy, and Islam misleading. He argues that “conservative political morality offered by certain forms of Islam is not some enduring feature of the religion that rulers adopt at their own convenience” (202). Instead, rulers find conservative Islam useful because it reflects the views of powerful political and social movements, many of which put these same rulers into power. He also argues that we live “in an age in which the mechanisms of what we call capitalism appear to operate, in certain critical instances, only by adopting the social force and moral authority of conservative movements” (203). For this reason, he prefers the term “‘McJihad’” (203).

To support his assertion, Mitchell discusses the US government’s support of Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud, who became the ruler of what is today known as Saudi Arabia, as one example. In the early 1900s, Ibn Saud relied on British funding and weapons and a religious militia made up of primarily nomadic tribesmen who were dedicated to ridding the region of immorality and corruption (known as the Ikwan) to conquer much of the Arabian Peninsula. From the beginning, Ibn Saud faced tension between the imperial powers that financed him and the conservative religious leaders (muwahhidun or mujahidin) who supported him. To construct the new political order in Saudi Arabia, Ibn Saud needed to find a compromise between the two sides. He worked with the Arabian-American Oil Company (today Aramco) who provided funds and technical and material assistance to help build the country and its oil industry. Due to this corporate arrangement, Ibn Saud’s family grew extremely wealthy (his kin group remains in power today). Ibn Saud also convinced the conservative religious leaders to accept this financial support by letting them “create the moral and legal order of the new state” (211).

Despite this arrangement, tension remained between these two entities. Over the next several decades, the ruling family faced increasing levels of opposition to its corruption and repression of political activity. Much of the opposition was fueled by the religious conservative leadership. The Saudi government eventually exported thousands of young religious activists to fight religious crusades in Afghanistan, Yemen, and Iraq to deal with this domestic challenge. These religious activists eventually shifted focus to direct attacks on Western imperial powers, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City and Washington D.C.

Saudi Arabia came to play a pivotal role in the system of oil scarcity, ensuring that the elites of Saudi Arabia and foreign oil companies reaped substantial profits (which Mitchell refers to as “rents” or premiums from scarcity in this chapter). Mitchell underscores that the alliance between the Saud family and foreign powers alongside the Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia made possible the profits of the oil industry.

Mitchell discusses two significant events to the transformation of politics of the Middle East, starting with the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The US government’s policy of trying to prevent the development of the oil industry in Iraq was failing. Other countries, such as China, France, and Britain, were seeking commercial relations with Iraq and wanted the US sanctions on the country to end. There was also increasing evidence for the decline in the world’s global oil supply. Since Iraq had one of the largest known oil reserves in the world, it seemed increasingly foolish that the US would continue to obstruct the development of its oil industry.

Mitchell suggests that “a group of American militarists” (222), many of whom were neoliberalists, took advantage of the US government’s difficult position in Iraq. They immediately began planning to attack Iraq right after the September 11 attacks, despite those attacks being unrelated to Iraq. The war, which was presented as an opportunity to bring about democratic modes of governing (but was really about oil), brought about grave destruction and drastically worsened the country’s instability and violence.

The revolutionary uprisings that moved across the Middle East in 2011 represent the second event that transformed the region’s politics. These mass protests toppled governments (e.g., Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya) and resulted in brutal civil wars (e.g., Syria).