62 pages 2-hour read

Cuba: An American History

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2021

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Part 10-EpilogueChapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 10: “Confrontation” - Part 12: “Departures”

Part 10, Chapter 27 Summary: “Battle”

Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of death, graphic violence, racism, ableism, and antigay bias.



On Christmas Eve 1959, Fidel Castro traveled to the remote swampland of the Zapata Peninsula of Cuba to celebrate his first Christmas in office at the home of a local charcoal worker. He vowed to invest in developing the area. By the following year, a highway, utilities, and other amenities had been built there, and an enormous seaside resort was being built on Girón Beach. The resort was set to open on May 20, 1961.


On April 17, 1961, just off the coast where the resort was being built, a group of US-trained Cuban exiles arrived by sea with the intention of overthrowing the revolutionary government in Cuba. Due to incomplete intelligence, lack of US military air support, and other factors, the members of the anti-Castro Brigade 2506 were immediately spotted from the resort, where there was a party. By the time they reached the shore, the Cuban military was waiting for them. The invasion—called the Bay of Pigs invasion—was “a perfect failure” (356).


The US-backed coup strategy was planned under Eisenhower and championed by the CIA. The overall plan was to infiltrate the country with anti-Castro guerillas, who would then link up with the arriving soldiers and overthrow the government, all while making it seem like the US was not involved. The CIA believed that the Cuban public would soon rally to their cause. Ferrer describes this belief as “optimism bordering on lunacy” (359). In January 1961, President John F. Kennedy took office and inherited the coup plot. He was adamant that the plotters do more to obfuscate US involvement in the scheme. He refused to commit US military assets like soldiers and robust air support. The CIA’s point man for the plot, Richard Bissell, thought that the landing soldiers could retreat from the swamp to the mountains, seemingly not realizing that the mountains were too far for them to reach quickly. The disorganized scheme quickly fell apart, and by April 20, many of the approximately 1,200 anti-Castro fighters had been captured or killed. All of the parties blamed each other for the failure.


Ferrer argues that regardless of where the fault lies, it is unlikely that the scheme would have been successful even if the soldiers managed to land on the beach without detection. Castro got wind of the scheme and spent months preparing counter measures, such as robust civilian patrols of the beaches. US air strikes on April 15 failed to dismantle Cuban air capabilities and instead only raised awareness of the impending invasion. Thousands of suspected anti-Castro sympathizers were detained on April 16, including Ferrer’s parents. The Cuban armed forces were thus placed on high alert.


The failed invasion created overwhelming public support for Castro’s regime, as it reinforced Castro’s claims about US interference with Cuban sovereignty. It also pushed Castro to seek a closer alliance with the Soviet Union as a bulwark against future US attacks.

Part 10, Chapter 28 Summary: “Brink”

The leader of the Soviet Union in 1962, Nikita Khrushchev, wanted to place nuclear missiles in Cuba to retaliate against the US having missile sites installed in Turkey and Italy that were capable of striking the Soviet Union. Cuba approved of the scheme as a way to prevent another US invasion attempt. Raúl Castro traveled to the USSR in July 1962 to confirm the plans. The first ships carrying munitions from the Soviet Union to Cuba, known as Operation Anadyr, arrived in September of that year. This sparked what is known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.


On September 4, President Kennedy made a public statement announcing knowledge of the Cuban armaments. The US military began to prepare defensive and retaliatory measures. On October 16, a US surveillance flight identified a nuclear missile installation in the small Cuban town of Santa Cruz de los Pinos. The threat of nuclear attack made the situation even more grave. Kennedy warned Khrushchev in a public speech that if the USSR launched a nuclear attack on the US, the US would retaliate in kind. Khrushchev proposed that the USSR would withdraw the missiles from Cuba if the US withdrew its missiles from Turkey. In a secret meeting between Bobby Kennedy and the Russian ambassador, it was agreed that the US would not invade Cuba if the missiles were withdrawn and that the US would withdraw missiles from Turkey in exchange.


Castro learned about the deal from Khrushchev’s public statement on October 28. He was furious that the US and USSR were negotiating the fate of Cuba without including him. In retaliation, he refused to let United Nations weapons inspectors into Cuba to validate the claims of disarmament. Finally, the US settled for surveillance flights to verify claims.


Castro did not believe Kennedy’s reassurances that the US would not attempt to invade Cuba again. Indeed, the CIA continued its attempts to assassinate Castro and otherwise covertly agitate against him. As a result, Cuba drew even closer to the USSR.

Part 11, Chapter 29 Summary: “New People?”

In this chapter, Ferrer describes the measures taken by the Cuban revolutionary government to shape a new, more egalitarian society. For instance, everyone would be referred to as compañero or compañera (roughly, “comrade”) rather than by formal titles in order to emphasize their equality. Revolutionary Argentinean doctor Che Guevara, who fought alongside Castro in the revolution, argued in an essay titled “Socialism and Man in Cuba” (1965) that a new society had been created in Cuba of “new men and new women” (286).


The government expanded public education and instituted a statewide literacy program. Many rural children were sent to boarding schools, and private schools were closed. The literacy project was also a “political project” meant to associate education with the revolution. Urban youth volunteers were sent to the countryside to teach literacy, to the consternation of some of their parents.


The revolutionary government also sought to get more women to enter the workforce by expanding free daycare options and providing paid maternity leave. However, traditional gender roles proved difficult to break. In 1975, the Family Code was passed, stating that men and women were to have equal duties (including in housework), and the language was even incorporated into marriage vows. The government targeted gay people as “unwanted remnants of old bourgeois decadence” and sent them to forced labor camps from 1965 to 1967 (391). The camps were closed due to international pressure.


Despite its willingness to reshape social norms, the revolutionary government was more circumspect when it came to racial relations. For instance, Castro quickly walked back a claim that the revolutionary government intended to integrate social clubs after white Cubans complained. Instead, to address racial inequality indirectly, the government focused its efforts on helping impoverished people, thus assisting the Black Cuban population since many of them struggled to make ends meet. In 1961, Castro announced that the government had “successfully eliminated racial prejudice” (393), making it difficult for Black Cubans to raise racial complaints without being charged with being anti-revolutionary.


In 1969, to address worker absenteeism and make a point about the possibilities of true communism, Castro announced the Ten Million Ton Harvest plan. The goal was to mobilize the entire country to harvest 10 million tons of sugar, the largest in the nation’s history. Schools and workplaces were shut, and everyone, including urban intellectuals and artists, were sent into the cane fields, even though they were not efficient at the work. In the end, the effort was a failure. The most sugar in Cuban history, 8.5 million tons, was harvested, but it came at a time when the price of sugar was low and at the cost of all the other work that had been put on hold. The failure highlighted the threat of underdevelopment in Cuba and was a “turning point in the history of the Cuban Revolution” (398). People’s idealism faltered.


In 1972, Cuba joined the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), the Soviet economic alliance, to bolster its economy.

Part 11, Chapter 30 Summary: “New Americans?”

Hundreds of thousands of Cubans left the island for the US during the revolution and its aftermath. Many landed in Miami and settled in a neighborhood that came to be known as Little Havana. The waves of immigrants had different characteristics. The first wave of Cubans to leave for the US were typically wealthy and well educated. Black Americans were frustrated that Cubans were treated as white, regardless of their skin color, even as Black Americans were still segregated. Many of these early arrivals were funded and supported indirectly by the CIA, which ran many front companies in Miami as part of the Cold War effort.


During the Cuban Missile Crisis, flights between the US and Cuba were suspended. Cubans wanting to leave were forced to do so by boat. In 1965, President Lyndon Johnson announced that Cubans would be granted refuge in the US. Hundreds of thousands of these “Freedom Flight migrants” left on boatlifts and, later, after many drownings, by airlifts (406). Cuba refused to give exit visas to military-aged men, so this wave of immigrants was mostly older and female. Cuban migrants were given preferential treatment under US law because the US wanted to weaken the Cuban communist regime by encouraging departures.


In 1974, anti-Castro Cubans based in Miami formed Omega-7, a paramilitary group that conducted bombings and assassinations in the US against pro-Castro Cubans. In 1978, Castro agreed to a meeting with Cubans who had settled in the US and allowed family reunification visits beginning in 1979. Hardline anti-Castro Cubans like Omega-7 objected to those who visited Cuba and even bombed the Continental Bank in Miami because its president, Bernardo Benes, was a “big proponent of dialogue” with Cuba (409). The visits made Cubans aware of the economic disparities between themselves and their wealthy US-based relatives.


On April 1, 1980, a group of Cubans broke into the Peruvian embassy and demanded asylum and transit to the US. By April 3, the number of Cubans sheltering there ballooned to 10,800. A radio personality turned car salesman named Napoleón Vilaboa proposed a boatlift; he suggested that Miami Cubans use their personal boats to pick up relatives who wished to leave from the port of Mariel. This began the Mariel Boatlift on April 21, 1980. Over the next two months, approximately 114,000 Cubans left on these boatlifts for the US. US immigration services struggled to process the influx and shipped some of the migrants to different parts of the country. The Cuban government “forced” people to leave, especially those who had criminal records or mental disabilities. This created a moral panic in the US newspapers like The New York Times, which reported that “retarded people and criminals” were being sent from Cuba (416). Some of the Cuban migrants who were being held in indefinite detention in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas, staged a prison riot and broke out. Governor Bill Clinton blamed the event for his election loss that fall. Established Cuban exiles in Miami sought to distance themselves from the Cubans who arrived on the Mariel boatlifts, or marielitos, who were poorer, less educated, and more likely to be Black.

Part 11, Chapter 31 Summary: “Other Cubas?”

The Cuban government under Castro was committed to supporting anticolonial movements throughout the world, particularly in Africa. For instance, in 1961, Cuba sent weapons to Algeria to support the fight against the French. In 1966, Cuba hosted a Tricontinental Conference of anticolonial movements where Castro announced the creation of the Organization of Solidarity with the People of Asia, Africa, and Latin America to support the anticolonial effort. Although the US saw Cuba as a Soviet proxy, Cuba often intervened against Soviet wishes. Part of this intervention included civilian missions where Cuba sent aid workers, including doctors, around the world.


In 1961, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) launched a guerilla movement to overthrow the Portuguese colonial regime in Angola. Cuba allied with them and provided military and civilian support. In 1975, Portugal agreed to withdraw from Angola. However, the country was under threat from invasion by apartheid South Africa. On November 5, Cuba committed troops to fight the South Africans. Overall 36,000 Cuban troops were sent to fight with the MPLA against US-backed South Africa. Their contributions were key to the MPLA winning the war, particularly after the Cuban forces triumphed at the battle in Cuito Cuanavale against the South Africans. Cuban forces and civilian support remained in Angola until 1991. Ferrer says that the win “projected Cuba’s power and legitimacy on multiple fronts—military, political, moral” (430).

Part 12, Chapter 32 Summary: “Special Years”

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union. In 1991, after a coup, Gorbachev was forced out, and the Soviet Union dissolved. This threated the Cuban economy, which was highly dependent on Soviet support since it joined COMECON in 1972. This change was not unexpected; in 1990, the US refused to loan the USSR money unless it ended trade subsidies with Cuba, and the USSR complied. In 1991, the US pressured the Soviet Union to remove all military support from Cuba. Castro only learned of the agreement from the public announcement.


In January 1990, Castro instituted a “special period in times of peace” (438), meaning harsh austerity measures and rationing. There were food shortages, gasoline shortages, and other hardships. The US government felt certain that the US embargo with Cuba coupled with the collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Castro’s regime in Cuba would soon fall. Instead, Castro turned to tourism and international investment to support the economy. International investment had been highly limited for decades; restrictions were loosened to attract investors from Spain, Canada, and elsewhere. In 1993, Cuba legalized the use of the US dollar to capture more of what had previously been black-market trade. It allowed people to open small businesses like bed and breakfasts.


The tourism trade created income inequality as those in the service sector—including sex workers—earned US dollars rather than Cuban pesos and therefore were wealthier. This had a racial component as well, as white Cubans had nicer homes that were better suited to the growing bed-and-breakfast economy than Black Cubans.


On August 11, 1994, Castro announced that he would not prevent “rafters” (people on rafts) from leaving the island. President Bill Clinton only allowed those who reached American beaches to stay; those who were caught at sea would be returned or held at Gitmo. In 1995, the US agreed to issue 20,000 visas for Cubans a year, and approximately 189,000 applied. Castro silenced dissenters on the island; protestors and dissidents were often imprisoned, and writers were censored.


After the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, it was thought that the US would soften its stance toward Cuba. Instead, in 1996, the US passed the Helms-Burton Act that strengthened US sanctions against Cuba. Castro passed a concomitant Law 88 in response that prohibited collaborating with the US. Ferrer argues that the reason why relations hardened is because conflict between the US and Cuba was not about communism or the Cold War but about Cuban sovereignty and American empire.

Part 12, Chapter 33 Summary: “Open and Shut”

On July 31, 2006, Castro was ill and announced that his brother, Raúl, would be serving as president. The US hoped that it would gain international support for finally intervening in Cuba now that Castro was weakened, but the international community did not “join the U.S. campaign for regime change” (453). Under Raúl’s presidency, Cuba pursued some “modest” economic reforms, like liberalizing self-employment opportunities and permitting cell phones. Raúl signaled that he was open to working with the US, but his openness was ignored.


In 2008, Barack Obama was elected president. Obama stated that he wanted to close Gitmo and open relations with Cuba. In 2014, the US reopened its embassy in Havana, and Americans were permitted to travel directly to the island. In March 2016, President Obama visited the island, the first sitting president to do so since Coolidge in 1928. Still, Castro was skeptical of Obama’s ability to achieve his goals of normalizing relations.


On November 25, 2016, Castro died. Two weeks earlier, Donald Trump won the US presidency. The Trump regime reversed any advancements in normalizing relations that were made during the Obama administration.


In 2019, Cuba adopted a new Constitution that permitted more foreign investment and private property. Yet the Cuban military, headed by Raúl, and its business conglomerate GAESA, expanded its ownership to control a majority of businesses. Censorship of artists and activists increased. Despite Trump tightening sanctions, the Cuban economy survived with support from Russia, Venezuela, and China. However, many ordinary Cubans suffered deprivations.

Epilogue Summary: “If Monuments Could Speak”

The Black Cuban sculptor Teodoro Ramos Blanco created sculptures of leading Cuban independence figures throughout the 20th century. For instance, he made sculptures of Antonio Maceo and José Martí. However, he also “loved to carve anonymous people” (468). Ferrer uses this as an analogy for history as a whole, which is made up of both individual leaders and ordinary people. She argues that it is important to consider history through the lives of ordinary people. She hopes that an understanding of Cuban history will inform future efforts to create “a new relationship between Cuba and the United States” (470).

Part 10-Epilogue Analysis

In the concluding sections of Cuba: An American History, Ferrer covers aspects of Cuban American history that are likely more familiar to most readers: the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961), the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962), and the Mariel Boatlift (1980). Notably, Ferrer addresses each of these major events in concise, focused chapters that allow her to preserve the book’s momentum while avoiding rehashing moments that are already discussed often in academic and popular discourse. Instead, she uses more space to focus on descriptions of other aspects of the Cuban Revolution that may be less familiar to readers, such as the legislation around equal gender rights. These details illuminate the lived experiences of people in post-revolutionary Cuba, in keeping with Ferrer’s aim to tell a “people’s history.”


Although Ferrer’s accounts of these three key events in Cuban history are brief, she does intervene to shape the historiography in important ways. This is most notable in her direct critique of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Ferrer insists that the assumption that an exile-led invasion could overthrow the revolutionary government was “lunacy.” She explicitly criticizes the bulk of historical analysis of this event that has failed to interrogate this flawed thinking. Ferrer writes that “even as government and scholarly studies pointed to all these insufficiencies and errors, they failed to consider a much more fundamental question: Would it have been possible for an exile invasion to succeed at all?” (365). This rhetorical boldness is striking because Cuba: An American History largely has an even-handed tone. Ferrer’s argument underscores the theme of The Consequences of US Policy on Cuba, as she points out that American politicians consistently misread the popular support in Cuba for Castro’s revolution.


Ferrer’s analysis of the Mariel Boatlift likewise counters the dominant narratives about the marielitos, or the people who migrated from Cuba to the US during that time. She illustrates how US media and Cuban propaganda cast the marielitos as criminals or as having a disability or mental illness in order to whip up moral panic. Ferrer counters this claim by pointing out that “Cuban law criminalized alcoholism, homosexuality, drug addiction, vagrancy, political dissidence, and participation in an ever-present black market” (415). In other words, many Cubans with criminal records were not hardened, dangerous criminals at all. In this way, Ferrer discredits simplistic and xenophobic portrayals of marielitos in American popular culture, such as the gangster Tony Montana played by Al Pacino in Scarface (1983).


Ferrer also emphasizes how The Historical Impacts of Enslavement and Racial Politics shaped the reception of the marielitos by white, Black, and Cuban Americans. She notes that established Cuban Americans in Miami were reluctant to accept the marielitos because “they would change the community,” which Ferrer says was a euphemistic way of expressing racist and classist dismay that the marielitos were “more diverse in terms of race and class” (418). These new arrivals were poorer and more likely to be Black, and their presence challenged the image of Cuban immigrants as assimilated, white, and middle class. Meanwhile, white Americans were more direct about their racism and xenophobia; for instance, the Ku Klux Klan staged a protest outside a holding center for Cuban migrants. Black Americans, too, protested in Miami during the boatlift, and Ferrer says that these protests were “seen as an expression of African American frustration and discontent over the favorable treatment to Cubans and never to them” (418). This highlights structural inequalities that extended beyond the problem of immigration. By including these diverse responses to the Mariel Boatlift, Ferrer shows how enslavement and racial hierarchy in both the US and Cuba continued to influence US-Cuban relations.


In the final chapters, Ferrer draws together these strands to conclude her argument about the consequences of US policy on Cuba, emphasizing how it connects to the long history of imperialism on the island. Typically, accounts of US-Cuba relations focus on the Cold War. However, Ferrer argues that this framing is insufficient. If the conflict were solely the product of the Cold War, US-Cuba relations would have been normalized following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Instead, as Ferrer shows, the relationship between the two countries only grew more complicated. She concludes that the dynamic is characterized by “a struggle between American power and Cuban sovereignty” (451), which clarifies the role of the US as “just an empire” (452). This conclusion explicitly counters the dominant American myth that argues that the US is “an empire for liberty” (452). This reframing repositions Cuba’s hostility to the US as an anti-imperial stance.


Ferrer ends on a note of optimism as she hopes that there is still a possibility for understanding between the two nations. She argues that understanding history itself can generate empathy and reconciliation, and she positions her own work in Cuba: An American History within that theory of historiography.

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