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Ada FerrerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of death and graphic violence.
After President Machado fled Cuba, Carlos Manuel de Céspedes, son of “Cuba’s first independence hero” (236), took power. He wasn’t suited to the office and relied heavily on Sumner Welles, the US ambassador to Cuba. The problems facing Cuba continued unabated. Sergeants and corporals in the military under the leadership of military stenographer Fulgencio Batista took the largest military base, Marianao. Left-wing students encouraged the Sergeants’ Revolt to go further, and by September 5, 1933, the military had taken over the government. It appointed Ramón Grau San Martín as president. Upon coming to power, Grau vowed to abolish the Platt Amendment. In response, the US sent warships to Havana Harbor.
While the US decided whether to attack Cuba and refused to recognize the new government, the Grau regime instituted leftist reforms like female suffrage and nationalization of sugar mills. Ultimately, President Franklin Roosevelt decided not to pursue military intervention. However, the Grau administration ran into trouble when it faced resistance from right-wing, wealthy Cuban elites who resisted reforms led by progressive Secretary of the Interior Antionio Guiteras. Batista, the head of the military, sided with the elites and “cultivated” a relationship with US ambassador Welles. In October 1933, Batista’s forces killed at least 10 workers at a sugar mill that had been taken over by the workers.
After Welles left office, he was replaced by Jefferson Caffrey, a supporter of the US-backed United Fruit Company massacre of workers in Colombia in 1928. Caffrey advised Batista that the US would only recognize Cuba’s government if Grau stepped down and someone more amenable to US interests was appointed. Grau stepped down on January 15, 1934, and Batista appointed Carlos Mendieta as president of Cuba three days later.
On May 29, 1934, the US and Cuba agreed to the abolition of the Platt Amendment.
Grau left for Miami, Florida, where he continued to advocate in exile as a leader of the Auténtico Party. Batista was now “the most powerful figure in Cuban politics” (249). Presidents who served under him were “largely figureheads.” Batista maintained some popular support with programs like national rent control, support for unions, and strategic pardons for opponents.
Beginning in 1939, a new constitutional referendum was organized to address the flaws in the last one due to US influence and oversight, which was represented most obviously in the Platt Amendment. This was a hugely popular project that reflected factions across Cuban social and political classes, from conservatives to communists. The constitutional convention began on February 9, 1940, and it was widely followed throughout the country. The tensest debates were over whether the Constitution would prohibit racial discrimination, which the final form ultimately did. This “progressive charter” was signed on July 1, 1940, and it focused on “social rights” like labor laws and education.
On October 10, 1940, Batista officially became president, and the new Constitution came into effect.
On October 10, 1948, Carlos Prío Socorrás was being sworn in as president of Cuba when the outgoing Minister of Education, José Manuel Alemán, drove up to the national treasury with four trucks, stole $19 million, and fled to the US. Ferrer argues that this is emblematic of how the Cuban presidents between 1940 and 1952 betrayed the promises of the new Constitution.
Batista was president from 1940 to 1944, and his administration was rife with corruption. In 1944, Ramón Grau San Martín, who had fled to Miami after being deposed in 1933, was elected president. In 1948, Grau’s prime minister, Prío, was elected. Ferrer says that all three administrations were “plagued” by corruption. This state of affairs was both created and encouraged by the close connections between the Cuban government and the American mob.
The US mob had long used Cuba as a “trans-shipment point” to smuggle alcohol during Prohibition (261). By the 1930s, legendary mob accountant Meyer Lansky oversaw a number of “family” businesses on the island, including casinos. In 1946, mob boss Lucky Luciano convened a meeting of the five families at the Hotel Nacional in Havana. The mob made connections with the Cuban government, although Luciano himself was exiled by Cuba because the US threatened to cut off Cuban access to pharmaceuticals if it did not exile him. This period became known for its “gangsterismo,” or mob-style violence and politics.
During this same time, progressive political organizer and radio personality Eduardo Chibás launched an anti-corruption campaign. In January 1947, he sent a letter to President Grau urging him to combat corruption. On May 11, he announced his intentions to start a new party, and soon after, he met with a number of people to discuss this aim, including a young Fidel Castro. Although Chibás did not win in the 1948 election, he garnered massive public support. On August 5, 1951, he swore to present evidence of the education minister’s corruption on his radio show. However, he ended up shooting himself in the stomach with a gun he took out of a suitcase. Whether this was an intentional act or an accident is unclear.
In 1952, Batista ran for president again. However, believing that he would not win at the polls, he instead enacted a military coup on March 10 and took over the presidency from Prío. He faced little resistance other than a student protest in which Castro took part.
On January 28, 1953, Cuba celebrated the centennial of Cuban independence leader José Martí’s birth. A monument to Martí was installed in Havana’s Central Park. In eastern Cuba, workers organized a monument to Martí to be installed at the “island’s highest point” (275), Pico Turquino, near where Martí died in battle. Celia Sánchez, the daughter of a local doctor, accompanied the sculptor Jilma Madera to the installation. The monument was installed on May 19, the anniversary of Martí’s death.
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro was living in Havana and planning an attack on the Moncada Barracks in Santiago, which were “the island’s second-largest army installation” (278), as part of a plot to overthrow the corrupt Batista government. Castro and his brother, Raúl, planned the attack for the same day as the Santiago carnival, when people would be distracted. On July 26, 1953, they attacked the barracks but were quickly defeated. The army killed many of Castro’s fellow revolutionaries. Castro escaped into the mountains but was caught a few days later. Despite the failure, the action garnered public support for the movement because people saw Batista’s military response, which included torture and execution, as disproportionate. Castro would later call his revolutionary project the 26th of July Movement in honor of this date.
Castro was put on trial for his actions. A lawyer by training, he defended himself and was sentenced to prison. In his closing argument, he argued about the need for revolution. He spent his time in jail reading Karl Marx, Immanuel Kant, and other revolutionary thinkers, and he educated his fellow inmates about the revolutionary struggle. Ferrer notes that over the years, Castro gave different answers as to whether he considered himself a Marxist.
In November 1954, Batista won a “sham election,” and in 1955, he pardoned many of his opponents, including Fidel Castro. Ferrer notes that Castro was just one of many revolutionary leaders opposing Batista’s authoritarian regime at that time. For instance, the Federation of University Students had been protesting Batista since 1952. In 1955, the students organized into a Revolutionary Directorate led by José Antonio Echevarría. They attacked Batista’s police forces on November 27, 1955. On December 7, 1955, on the anniversary of the death of Antonio Maceo, students and workers protested in Havana, and the security forces fired on them. The Cuban public increasingly turned against Batista due to these and other repressive acts. Workers went on strike across the country. The Revolutionary Directorate planned to assassinate Batista and killed several high-ranking officials, including the chief of police.
After his pardon, Castro went to Mexico, where he wrote a manifesto for his 26th of July Movement. The ousted President Prío, who was now living in Mexico, supported Castro, and Castro allied with the Revolutionary Directorate. He also allied with the anti-Batista organizer Frank País, who, along with Celia Sánchez, helped organize local support. Castro planned to arrive with his supporters on November 30, 1956, in Santiago to overthrow Batista’s government with his allies. However, his arrival in Cuba from Mexico was delayed due to severe storms. He was unable to meet up with his allies since the authorities had discovered their plot, and his troops were attacked. Castro fled into the mountains with his remaining 15 men. Batista announced that Castro had been killed.
On January 17, 1957, Castro and his supporters took a small army outpost in La Plata in the mountains, marking the beginning of “the war against Batista’s army” (300). To garner more support and get the news out that he was still alive, Castro arranged an exclusive interview with Herbert Matthews, a New York Times reporter. Castro understood the importance of propaganda and good press to a revolutionary movement. In the interview, Castro made it seem like he had a larger army than he actually did. On February 24, 1957, the interview made the front page of the Times and garnered public support for Castro in both Cuba and the US. The next month, Castro did an on-camera interview with Robert Taber for CBS that similarly increased his public support. Volunteers arrived in droves to support his campaign.
On March 13, 1957, the Revolutionary Directorate attempted to assassinate Batista in the Presidential Palace. However, they were unsuccessful, and many were killed, including their leader, Echeverría. Frank País, the anti-Batista organizer in Santiago, was killed by the police on July 30. Although anti-Batista sentiment was rising throughout the country, Castro was the only prominent anti-Batista leader left alive. His 26th of July Movement continued to fortify its numbers and strength in the mountains of eastern Cuba. Popular opposition continued to build, and the Catholic Church joined the anti-Batista movement. In May, Batista tried and failed to “End Fidel.” Faced with mounting pressure, Batista left Cuba on January 1, 1959.
After Batista left, Castro’s revolutionary forces quickly took Havana, Guantánamo, and Santiago. They were greeted by cheering crowds. Castro gave a speech announcing that “[t]he Revolution begins now” (316). The revolution had widespread public support in Cuba. Castro became prime minister, and Manuel Urrutia was appointed as president. The revolutionary government quickly purged the Batista regime and executed over 500 of its supporters. It issued a flurry of progressive legislation, including rent cuts, increased labor rights, and more. Most controversially for the US and the elite landowning class, the government enacted an Agrarian Reform Law that broke up large landholdings and nationalized elements of sugar production. Americans, who owned most of the large sugar plantations in Cuba, protested the terms of the reform and pleaded for US government intervention. Centrists and moderates in the Cuban government, like President Manuel Urrutia, protested the rapid pace of change. On July 16, 1959, Castro announced his intention to resign in protest over Urrutia’s anticommunist rhetoric, which he saw as strengthening the position of the revolution’s opponents. After public outcry, Urrutia resigned instead.
The Cuban Revolution took place in the context of the Cold War between the US (representing capitalism) and the USSR. (which stood for communism). Although Castro eschewed directly stating his views on communism, he was consistent in his anti-US rhetoric following decades of US colonial control of Cuba. He saw accusations that his regime was communist as a way of provoking the US to attack the nascent revolutionary regime.
The Cold War tensions were heightened when the deputy prime minister of the Soviet Union, Anastas Mikoyan, arrived in Havana for a visit promoting Soviet science, technology, and culture on February 4, 1960. During his visit, Cuba agreed to sell 20% of Cuban sugar to the USSR. for five years at a discount. This was interpreted by the US as an intention to break with its longstanding favored-nation status since Cuba sold most of its sugar to the US. Media coverage by the American press and wire services like the Associated Press became increasingly negative toward the revolutionary government. Cuban newspapers that ran wire service articles criticizing the regime were appended with caveats stating that the wire stories “d[id] not conform to the truth” (340). Conservative newspapers that refused to run caveats folded in protest or were seized by the government. This represented how some civil liberties were neglected even as rapid progressive changes supported by the people continued apace.
On March 4, 1960, the French ship Le Coubre carrying Belgian munitions exploded in the port of Old Havana. Seventy-five people were killed, and hundreds were wounded. The Americans blamed the Cubans, and the Cubans blamed American sabotage. At the funeral for those killed, Castro delivered a fiery speech criticizing the US and stating “the revolution’s new motto: ‘Patria o Muerte.’ Fatherland or Death” (344). Ferrer says that Cuban paranoia about US intervention and sabotage was understandable: In November 1959, President Eisenhower had signed a directive to covertly overthrow the Castro regime and install a more US-friendly government, as they had done elsewhere in Latin America. The plan was approved on March 17, 1960. A key part of the plan was to train a paramilitary force outside Cuba that could lead an invasion of the island as part of the overthrow. The US counterrevolution hoped to garner support by claiming that Castro had betrayed the core values of the revolution.
The US responded with overt pressure as well. When the Cuban revolutionary government took control of US-owned oil refineries on the island, the US responded by “cutting” the amount of sugar it would buy from Cuba. Cuba retaliated by selling the sugar to the USSR. On August 5, Castro announced the nationalization of more US-owned companies, including sugar mills, a telephone company, United Fruit, and electric companies. In September, Cuba nationalized US-owned banks. He gave a speech at the United Nations General Assembly critiquing the US at length. On January 3, 1961, the US closed its embassy in Havana, marking the end of official diplomatic relations between the countries.
Cuba: An American History is a trade history, meaning that it is a historical narrative written for a general, non-expert audience. Often, trade histories do not include footnotes or endnotes, although they do typically include a bibliography. This is because footnotes or endnotes are considered distracting and disruptive to the narrative flow. However, this work stands apart: Ferrer, an academic historian, includes an extensive and detailed set of endnotes that span 62 pages and justify her claims. These sources are a combination of primary and secondary academic materials. For example, Endnote 1 of Chapter 19 demonstrates Ferrer’s rigorous methodology: She justifies her descriptions of the aftermath of Cuban president Machado’s ouster by citing a primary document, namely a letter from US Consul Hurley to the secretary of state, and secondary sources, such as the work Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (1971) by Hugh Thomas. The inclusion of these sources, in addition to Ferrer’s archival work, indicates the depth of scholarship justifying Ferrer’s claims.
The opening of Chapter 19 illustrates another narrative technique that Ferrer uses throughout her narrative: a captivating personal anecdote that leads into a discussion of the wider historical forces at play. This method is especially obvious in the opening of Chapter 21, “The Suitcases,” where Ferrer opens with a description of outgoing Education Minister José Manuel Aléman’s heist of the national treasury on inauguration day. Although this anecdote breaks with the chronological timeline of events—as it takes place in 1948, a little later from where the narrative previously left off in 1940—it creates a sense of intrigue. Importantly, Ferrer uses it to contrast this theft and corruption with the myth that the period from 1940 to 1952 was “the pinnacle of formal democracy” in Cuba (260). This anecdote sets up a larger argument about the erosion of democracy and law in Cuba.
In these chapters, Ferrer makes her most significant intervention in the historiography of the Cuban Revolution. She explicitly distances herself from polarized interpretations along Cold War lines. She also eschews framing the revolution using the “great man” lens that would focus solely on Fidel Castro’s role. For instance, she notes both positive aspects of the revolution, such as rent control legislation and improved labor rights, and negative aspects, such as the crackdown on the freedom of the press. Notably, while Ferrer discusses Castro’s impact on the revolution, she grounds his rise within the larger context of The Role of Mass Movements in Shaping Historical Events.
Ferrer discusses Castro’s popularity and organizational skill, but she emphasizes that his success depended on preexisting popular movements. For instance, she describes the actions of other anti-Batista organizations like the Revolutionary Directorate and the support that Castro received from other anti-Batista movements on the ground in Cuba, even when he himself was in Mexico. She also emphasizes the widespread popular support that greeted the revolution’s early achievements, like Batista’s ouster. Ferrer describes scenes of cheering crowds, holding “signs reading ‘Thank you, Fidel’” (318), and the enthusiasm of both the US and Cuban public.
This outpouring of popular support contrasts with the attempts by the US government to stir up anti-Castro sentiment. While American policy makers were successful in getting some Cuban exiles to join them, they erroneously assumed that there was widespread anti-Castro sentiment in Cuba that was just waiting to be released. Ferrer describes this view as “lunacy” that did not reflect Cuban realities. She implies that if they were right, the US might have accomplished its goal of a coup in Cuba as they had done elsewhere in Latin America.
Ferrer also explores how The Consequences of US Policy on Cuba encouraged anti-US sentiment. After the revolution, Cuba’s agrarian reform and nationalization of US-owned businesses and banks angered American officials as well as the American press, and they retaliated with economic pressure and anti-Castro sentiment. These actions, however, only served to deepen Cuba’s distrust of the US, and Castro sought an ally in the USSR. Ferrer argues that this was the natural consequence of years of US dominance over Cuban economics and politics, which had resulted in anti-American sentiment.



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