Discourses and Selected Writings

If one is going to court, then one should have the attitude that one cannot be forced to act against one’s own will. Even the threat of punishment should not change this. To worry about “externals” more than one’s own “integrity” is to become the “slave” (82) of the externals.

Epictetus argues that reason, especially in the form of syllogisms, helps provide “standards” (84) that allow people to judge their life situations much the same way someone judges which coins are counterfeit and which are authentic.

A scholar who was widely known to have committed adultery in Rome attended one of Epictetus’s lectures. Epictetus argues that being trustworthy is the “most basic human role” (84) and compares someone who violates that trust to a bowl that leaks. Nature may intend women to have more than one lover throughout their life, but still an adulterous man is like someone who steals someone else’s portion at a banquet or someone who goes to the theatre and forces other people out.

People need to approach life in much the same way as a card player and do their best with the cards they are given. Happiness comes from combining “the carefulness of a person devoted to externals and the dignity of one who’s detached” (86), although Epictetus admits it is difficult. He compares this to a “star athlete” (87) who has to be reserved under pressure and concentrate on their goals.

Epictetus further argues that human beings must see themselves like body parts. Each body part has a different function according to its nature. Similarly, if humans think of themselves as “part of a whole” (88) instead of purely as an individual, then it is easier to accept when one lives in poverty or dies before old age.

Life itself is “indifferent, but the use we make of it is not indifferent” (89). For instance, people can die at any time. However, we can determine whether or not the knowledge of death causes us anxiety or not. The central “rule” (91) that Epictetus teaches is that we must remember the difference between what belongs to us and what does not.

The “divine nature” is connected not to the “flesh,” but to “mind, intelligence and correct reason” (92). Reason belongs to humans, not plants and animals, and derives from the fact that “there is a bit of God within you” (92). By failing to make proper use of their “self-determination,” a person betrays the duty to themselves given by God. Epictetus sees his own duty as being “prepared to die and face illness with a godlike dignity” (94).

As a “member of the universe with full citizen rights,” each person has freedom as an individual with reason, but they also have a specific “place in the natural order” and an obligation to act for the “common good” (95). This guideline and the need to act honestly and kindly applies to all family and other social relationships. Epictetus also applies this understanding to the question of justice. If someone does something that wrongs you, it is still wrong and against the common good to wrong that person in return.

When beginning to study philosophy, people have to learn about topics like musical scales and the isosceles triangle. However, everyone is born with an “innate understanding” of “good and bad, right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, happiness, duty, and obligation” (98). The question is how people act upon their understanding of these inborn concepts.

The “starting point” (99) of philosophy is examining the disagreements people have and, by determining who is “right or wrong,” to determine a “standard that we can involve” (99). Taking the example of the concept of pleasure, it is not a reliable standard because it varies and cannot “be something we can rely on and trust” (100).

For Epictetus, debate is important. Like Socrates, those entering a discussion should “compel whomever he spoke with to voice their views.” Then Socrates would evaluate that person’s beliefs and examine their “implications” (101). Also, like Socrates, one must do this without “rudeness or invective” (102).

Anyone who suffers from nervousness does so because they have “set his sights on things outside man’s control” (103). Epictetus offers the example of a lyre player who is confident when playing along but becomes nervous performing before an audience. The musician understands music well, but he does not understand that he desires and values something he cannot control: The audience’s reaction.

To a visitor to one of his lectures, Epictetus would not explain how he teaches because the “learning process is boring to anyone completely new to, and unfamiliar with, a skill” (107). Like with music, Epictetus argues that teaching can only be judged by its results. The “goal” (107) of philosophical education is to get people to avoid frustrated desires and to make sure everyone fulfills their social roles without “conflict, fear, or rancour” (107).

Like a carpenter or a ship’s pilot, people have to learn specific things from philosophy. The first thing to learn is that God exists and directs people’s lives and “to imitate the gods” (107). Philosophical education begins with using words, even without fully comprehending what they mean.

Most people do not have a deep understanding of life and only pursue material benefits. There is, however, a minority who want to reflect more on themselves and the divine. Sometimes this majority mocks the minority, which Epictetus compares to how people who bet on games laugh at people who only watch.

Many people have the instinct to maintain their decisions no matter what. While Epictetus admits that such resolve can be a virtue, the decision “first must be well founded” (110). In his experience, Epictetus remarks that this tendency is worst in those “with a little philosophy” (111).

Epictetus points out that his students may understand that good and evil belong to the human will and that what is outside of the will are not good or evil, but they may not put this understanding into practice outside the classroom. People tend to value success more than how that success is achieved.

Still, people can keep in mind that their fears and anxieties tend to come from the “imagination” and their “own thoughts” (114). Epictetus advises his students to use “what material advantages you have, don’t reflect [on] the ones you are not allowed” (114), to try to avoid dependence on material things including one’s own body, and to keep reminding oneself of God’s law.

Even if someone’s troubles cause unhappiness among loved ones, then one should remember “the cause of their disturbance is the same as yours: judgements” (116). Instead, people must accept God and whatever role God has reserved for them. By submitting to God, one can free oneself from negative emotions.

Anyone new to philosophy must “get rid of their presuppositions” (117) and realize that they will only learn what they actually put effort into learning. One presupposition philosophy students must accept is that many words that are “part of everyone’s vocabulary” like “‘good’” and “‘harmful’” (118) are expanded upon by philosophy teachers.

Preconceptions lead to people having desires that are not “realistic,” which also leads to “inner confusion and unhappiness” (118). Epictetus returns to the example of Medea. She killed her children to get revenge on her husband Jason. Instead, she should have not desired her husband, she should have desired nothing but “what God wants” (119).

Another preconception is that learning logic makes one a philosopher. Epictetus argues that anyone who still constantly experiences negative emotions cannot be called a true philosopher. Students of philosophy should want “to be free from fear and emotion” and “a concerned citizen and philosopher” (120), instead of thinking that just reading philosophy will free them from bad emotions.

Like how people need to regularly paint to become a better painter or run to become a better runner, similar training needs to be put into “moral inclinations” (121). Resisting anger and lust every day makes one better at holding such emotions at bay. On the other hand, indulging in vices like greed makes them worse.

Epictetus advises people to train their moral inclinations by striving toward purity and resisting bad impressions with pious actions like religious sacrifices or associating with people who are moral. If they do develop a bad impression, Epictetus suggests that people should avoid trying “to rationalize your behavior” (124).

Epictetus mentions the “Master Argument,” a logical paradox devised by Diodorus that has the propositions that if every established fact is necessary and if a possibility cannot lead to an impossibility, then in conclusion “something which is neither true nor ever will be true is possible” (124).

He mentions that the Master Argument has been discussed in the writings of many other philosophers and balks at addressing it himself, saying, “what can I add to what’s already been said?” (125). Instead, he recommends not obsessing over the paradox and arguments about it altogether, advising, “Just pay attention to the way you behave and you will discover the school of philosophy you really belong to” (126).

Philosophers who are skeptical of established facts and universals contradict themselves. If you say nothing is universally true, then it is a contradiction because it is still a universal statement. Epictetus gives the example of when Epicurus says “‘rational beings have no natural good will toward one another, believe me’” (129), which Epictetus argues is another contradiction.

Epictetus mocks Epicurus and his philosophy, telling Epicurus to “make like the animal you’ve judged yourself worthy to be: eat, drink, copulate, defecate and snore” (129). In fact, Epictetus argues that nature itself made Epicurus write his opinions down in the form of books, “forcing him to make public his horrid views” (130). He goes on to accuse Epicurus of spreading disbelief in the gods and justice and the idea that it means nothing to be a son or a father. In Epictetus’s mind, Epicurus is also guilty of articulating arguments that could justify adultery or rebellion against one’s parents.

People admit they have some flaws like timidness, but they will always deny others like being impulsive, “stupid,” “unjust,” or “envious” (133). Epictetus believes this is because “people will admit to practically nothing that they regard as dishonourable” (133) and immoral while the flaws they will accept are seen as unavoidable and part of one’s personality, or at least motivated by something positive like love or sensitivity.

Epictetus says such people should inspire us to become aware of our own flaws. How, Epictetus then asks, do we get such awareness? You cannot learn how to “become a better person” (134) from school or even a teacher like Epictetus himself. Instead, you have to apply the syllogisms you learn to everyday situations and impressions, like a sick person uses medicine.

People tend to only show “consideration” for “what is good” (135). Consideration can turn into friendship and love. At the same time, Epictetus says that “the power to love […] belongs only to the wise man” (136). By this, Epictetus means that people who are not wise do not maintain love, friendship, and family ties constantly and are instead “inconsistent” (136) because they allow externals like disputes over land ownership to disrupt their relationships.

Since everyone is motivated by self-interest, Epictetus argues, we allow that self-interest to disrupt our relationships if we identify our self-interest with wealth or anything material. The way to avoid this is to identify one’s self-interest instead with one’s communities, families, nations, and the gods. Epictetus sees self-interest being connected to the wrong things as the cause of wars, going back to the Trojan War. With one’s friends and lovers, Epictetus advises that one purge one’s thoughts of material self-interest when it comes to one’s relationships.

The will and the ability to express an argument well in writing or speech are the greatest gifts to human beings from God. The will is even more important than the ability to see, hear, or grow food. This is because the will allows us to judge what is valuable and what is not. The ability to argue and express oneself well helps the will assert itself. However, while the will may be the greatest of all human faculties, the other faculties such as the bodily senses serve the will.

The danger in this is that students of philosophy are satisfied with just training in rhetoric and debate. This is not enough. Epictetus asserts that students must also strive to learn how to get rid of disordered desires and live in accordance with nature and the will of God.