Discourses and Selected Writings

A governor complained to Epictetus about those who complained about him showing too much support for an actor during a performance, and they cheered for the other actors. Epictetus tells him he has two options: Either stop cheering for his favorite actor so loudly, or stop being upset that other people are doing what he does but for different actors. He points out that, since he is a governor, other people see him “as a model and standard of conduct” (149). Further, Epictetus says the governor cannot complain about being “vilified” (150) in public if he tries to assert his opinions over everyone else’s.

When a student asks to be allowed to go home because he feels ill, Epictetus tells him that he should prioritize “getting rid of bad judgements and gaining others in their place” (150) over anything else, even sickness. Then he declares that, “I hope death overtakes me when I’m occupied solely with the care of my character” (151).

One can train for impressions by considering what is good and what is bad. If someone is condemned by the emperor, then it is “not bad” (152) since it is outside of their control. However, if that person is able not to be overcome with emotion, then it is “good” (152). Even in bad circumstances, one should not blame the gods, because humans were made “tough and proud” and the gods “made it possible” for people to “be happy despite” (153) circumstances.

If someone cannot get their friends to emulate them, then that person will wind up emulating their friends. This happens even if one has a friend who acts and talks badly because “they talk such garbage from conviction, whereas your fine talk is no more than lip service” (154). Then he chastises his students for leaving school only to go pursue entertainments like a theatrical performance or a gladiatorial show, showing “no serious discipline” (154). He urges them to “forsake your old habits, and your non-philosophical friends” (154).

Epictetus suggests that we should not see good health and illness as either inherently bad or good. How one uses their health is what is good or bad. Even misfortunes can benefit a person by testing and forcing them to improve their character, a process Epictetus compares to athletic training. Even death can be made good if it “will make […] your glory, or the occasion for you to show how a person obeys the law of nature” (156) and illness can likewise be made into something ennobling.

To someone who was considering becoming a Cynic, Epictetus advises them not to do so “without God’s approval” (157). In addition, Epictetus warns that the Cynic “only has his honour to protect him” (158). Cynics also have to serve as an example of looking for the good in places other than material things and desires and not be afraid of confronting people over the fact that they are living badly.

To elaborate on the point, Epictetus argues that even the legendary king Agamemnon was “not […] happy” (159) even though he was at least a better ruler than the emperor Nero. He then imagines a Socratic debate between a Cynic and Agamemnon. The Cynic tells Agamemnon, who has anxiety before a battle, not to worry about the survival of his soldiers because “death signifies nothing more than the separation of body and soul” (160). When Agamemnon remarks that he is fighting to retrieve his wife Helen who has run off with the Trojan prince Paris, the Cynic argues that Agamemnon should look for the good within himself rather than chasing after his desires.

Epictetus also warns being a Cynic will require a lot of travel, living like a beggar, and being subjected to physical abuse. It also means that one will have no recourse to the emperor for help, only the divine, but a Cynic will not blame God for their misfortunes either. Nor could a Cynic marry a woman or make a friend unless they are as good as they are.

Even so, Epictetus quickly adds that no one wise wants to be a Cynic. Given the way “things […] are,” a Cynic cannot be distracted from their “sacred ministry” (164) by a wife and children. The Cynic will have to be wise and great enough to lead their community, which is unlikely. Epictetus also claims the Cynics of his day have fallen short of the ideals of the founder of Cynicism, Diogenes: “Don’t think he hectors strangers in a spirit of impudence; he is acting like a father, or a brother—like the vicar of God, the father of everyone” (165). In sum, they have to be physically prepared to endure hardship and abuse and must have a moral constitution strong enough to serve as an example to others.

Like an athlete or carpenter, people who want to educate others have to “tell yourself what you want to be” and “then act your part accordingly” (169). Each person needs to perform their social and labor role, whether it is an orator, a musician, a philosopher, or a carpenter. Epictetus condemns those who learn or teach philosophy only to make people good at rhetoric, eloquence, and praising people in power, not for making them into better people.

Epictetus does concede that a “true philosopher” will “solicit an audience” in order to draw in “people who stand in need of help” (172). He then compares a philosophy school to a hospital. People come not to enjoy themselves, but to receive something akin to a painful and difficult surgery. If an audience comes away from a lecture by a philosopher complimenting him on his use of language and historical references, then that philosopher has failed.