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Epictetus defines freedom as being able to live how one chooses without compulsion. At the same time, no one “wants to live with delusion and prejudice, being unjust, undisciplined, mean and ungrateful” (174). From these premises, Epictetus concludes that bad people, because they are trapped by bad traits and false ideas, are not free.
In fact, Epictetus goes so far as to say a Roman senator and consul is as unfree as an enslaved person. Imagining a debate with one such senator, Epictetus points out that he is under the authority of the emperor, which Epictetus describes as being like “a slave in a very large household” (175), and asks if he has ever done something he did not want to do in order to please a lover.
Next, Epictetus compares people like the senator to captive animals. Citing Diogenes, Epictetus declares that the “one way to guarantee freedom is to be ready to die” (176). To elaborate on the point, Epictetus describes a freed formerly enslaved person who finds himself with no work and has to rely on sex work. When the formerly enslaved person joins the army, he is still subjected to other people’s control. Even if he rises through the ranks and becomes a senator, Epictetus says he only “experiences the poshest and most prestigious form of enslavement” (177).
Through this discussion Epictetus means that people misapply the preconception of “bad” in different ways. For example, one such misuse of the preconception of “bad” is believing that failing to win the favor of the emperor is “bad.” Elaborating, Epictetus argues that everyone wants to be happy and to have freedom. Even becoming the emperor’s confidant will not guarantee those things. Instead, being close to an emperor will only cause one to live in constant fear of losing one’s position and to have to act as a subordinate whenever in the emperor’s presence.
However, Epictetus adds that people have “many masters” (180). By this, he means that it is not really the emperor that we fear, but “death, exile, dispossession, jail and disenfranchisement” (180). Likewise, people are likely to love the emperor because of the hope of wealth and social advancement. These are the masters everyone has.
True freedom can only be achieved by following what Epictetus describes as the “science to living well” (181). Like writing or playing a musical instrument, living well is something that requires constant practice. Namely, it requires knowing what is not under our control, which includes things such as how attractive we are or the well-being of friends and relatives, and not having “irrational desire” (184) based on these factors.
Avoiding such detrimental desires requires “allying ourselves with God,” which means not desiring “what doesn’t really belong to you” (186). It also means not holding onto what is lost. As Epictetus phrases it, “If [God] gives he also takes away. So why try and resist him?” (186). Since humans are created beings, they are under an obligation to God to enjoy the life they have and not complain.
Epictetus advises that one should cleanse their thoughts of desires for what is unattainable. If one is abused by someone in authority, then they should be comforted by the knowledge that a person who commits an injustice will face their own punishment. Epictetus reasons that, just as a “plant or animal fares poorly when it acts contrary to its nature” (189), a person guilty of injustice suffers because they are going against human nature.
Of course, it is true that innocent people suffer. However, Epictetus argues that the “victim may be majestic in suffering […] and come through a better, more fortunate person” while the oppressor is “the one who really comes to harm” (189) because they have forsaken their human nature and become like an animal.
Epictetus again confronts the Senator with the fact that he is not free because he is dependent on the emperor and his courtiers. When the Senator counters by asking if Epictetus is free, Epictetus admits, “I continue to value my poor body, I attach great importance to keeping healthy—though it isn’t healthy at all” (192). One free man Epictetus can show the Senator is Diogenes, because he owned no permanent possessions, he did not care about appearances, he considered the gods his parents, and he thought of the entire world as his home country.
Another example is Socrates, who did have a nation he was loyal to and loved ones. However, “all these were subordinate to the law and the need to obey it” (194). This was exemplified by the fact that Socrates was willing to let himself be executed, acting like “someone alone and unattached” (194), simply because he believed he was following his sense of honor and natural law.
Epictetus concludes by saying that even if one gets the material things they desire, they will find that they still suffer from “anxiety” and they still desire something “lacking” (195). Instead of trying to win favors from a wealthy person, Epictetus urges the Senator to attach himself to a philosopher, as that way “you won’t go away unedified or empty-handed” (196).
Epictetus cautions people trying to improve their character to reconsider their friendships. He warns them that they will have to choose between improvement and maintaining their popularity with their old acquaintances.
Epictetus advises, “If you forfeit an external possession, make sure to notice what you get in return” (197). This is especially important when one exchanges their freedom, honor, or self-control for material benefits and social positions. Epictetus clarifies it is alright to own and use material things, as long as they are “granted” to one and are used well. Otherwise, one should focus on “virtue” and “what is good for you” (198).
While the desire for wealth and influence lead people to give up their freedom, Epictetus claims the same is true for those who want “a life of peace and quiet, of travel and scholarship” (198). Books are externals too, and Epictetus adds that the books that should be read are the ones that make the reader “peaceful” (198). He cautions against becoming frustrated over the advice given in books and encourages listeners to try to practice philosophy in their everyday lives rather than read about it.
Epictetus also tells his students they should be open to being among many people and to leisure. If the crowds are annoying with their noise, then it should be seen as a nuisance outside anyone’s control and an opportunity to be tested. When a student objects that he wants a “peaceful life” (202), Epictetus responds that he should follow God’s law and be sociable. If being among groups of people annoy him, he should “train aversion only on things within your power” (202). Peace is only truly achieved when a person is able to overcome what formerly caused them pain and annoyance.
Epictetus notes that people have a tendency to share private information with those who have already shared their own. He adds that this is an unsafe assumption, often used in Rome to entrap people who are criticizing the emperor. In such situations, Epictetus claims, “I remind myself that one person cannot harm another, but it is rather our own actions that help or harm each other, then I refrain from acting similarly” (205).
When a student objects that it is “unfair” (205) not to confide in someone who has confided in you, Epictetus argues that simply because someone entrusts one with their secrets does not mean they are trustworthy. Only those who prove themselves to be “trustworthy, high-minded and reliable” (205) deserve one’s confidence. At the same time, anyone who is “fond of externals” (206) does not deserve such confidence, because they will always prioritize their own desire over their character and moral integrity.
Little of Book IV survives, but the passages that are left suggest that the discourses here elaborate on concepts and advice established in the other books. For example, Epictetus elaborates on The Distinction Between What We Control and Do Not Control. He takes this distinction to the degree that he argues that desire for what we do not control puts us under the control of others. This is what Epictetus means when he says, “Because over and above the rest we have masters in the form of circumstances, which are legion. And anyone who controls any one of them controls us as well” (180). In practice, this means recognizing that a professor has control over those students who desire a high grade or an employer has control over those who desire a raise. Epictetus would say that, in this way, we relinquish our freedom to these people.
What this mean in terms of Freedom Through Self-Discipline and Reason is that, while freedom may be “the greatest good of all” (179), it is also something that no one has in a complete and stable way. This is why Epictetus takes time to dispute the traditional Greek and Roman legal definition of freedom, which simply covers anyone who is not an enslaved person. Instead, Epictetus’s understanding of freedom is much more complicated and multi-faceted: “I still can’t face my masters, I continue to value my poor body, I attach great importance to keeping healthy—though it isn’t healthy at all” (192), Epictetus says when he admits he, too, is not entirely free.
Thus, one cannot be free in the sense that one can ever liberate oneself completely from the authority of others and from dependence on others. What true freedom requires is perfect and disciplined indifference to outside circumstances and a lack of attachment to any object, social recognition, or nation. Needless to say, this is not something many people achieve, nor does Epictetus suggest it is possible for most people, even himself. Instead, the implication throughout the Discourses is that this is not a goal to achieve, but rather an ideal to continually strive toward.
Book IV also gives Epictetus’s answer to the question that daunts many philosophers and theologians: How one can accept the fact that bad things happen to good people and good things happen to bad people. Epictetus’s answer is “No bad person [..] lives the way he wants, and no bad man is free. Who wants to live life experiencing sadness, envy and pity, being frustrated in their desires and liable to experience what they want to avoid?” (174). Such an answer serves multiple purposes in Epictetus’s philosophy. First, it explains why students should avoid the dangers of attachment, irrational desire, and submission to externals. Second, it helps serve as an explanation as to why evil continues to exist despite the fundamental benevolence of the divine and Epictetus’s claims that people are fundamentally inclined toward the good as defined by a universal natural law.
Epictetus’s philosophy is deceptively simple at a glance. It may seem that it is primarily just about exercising self-control over emotions and practicing ascetism. However, Epictetus’s discussion of freedom is a demonstration of just how complex Stoicism can be in both theory and practice.



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