69 pages 2-hour read

Discourses and Selected Writings

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 108

A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.

Themes

The Distinction Between What We Control and Do Not Control

A central part of how to apply Epictetus’s philosophy to everyday life is constantly distinguishing between what we control and own and what we do not control and own. This means, as Epictetus himself says, “What philosophy has taught me […] is to be indifferent to events beyond the will’s control” (71). For Epictetus, this is the essence of philosophical wisdom.


In practice, the distinction entails total control over one’s emotions, even in response to traumatic events, such as the loss of a job or the death of a loved one, or to existential issues like one’s awareness of death. For Epictetus, we cannot control the circumstances and events we face, only our reactions to or, as he terms it, our “impressions” of them. Even if someone else wrongs us, we should strive to maintain a stoic indifference because “no one is undone by the actions of others” (68), but rather by our reaction to the actions of others. As he says, “The best and most important thing is under our control and the basis of God’s own well-being—the use of external impressions” (210).


Another method Epictetus advises is to apply this distinction rigorously to our desires and our hatreds. Specifically, we should control our desires for what we do not have. As Epictetus advises, “Don’t ever lay claim to anything belonging to others” (91). At the same time, we must also control our aversion toward things we cannot avoid or control. For example, Epictetus would advise someone who hates being around other people to train themselves to dismiss that aversion when in a social situation. This is the most crucial aspect of Epictetus’s applied philosophy: “As long as desire and aversion are under your control, there is nothing more to worry about” (81).


Epictetus then addresses why such distinctions are important. He reasons that desire for something beyond what we already have is irrational: “For you will learn by experience that […] the things that men admire and work so hard to get prove useless to them once they’re theirs. Meanwhile people to whom such things are still denied come to imagine that everything good will be theirs if only they could acquire them” (195). Instead, people should make “careful and skillful use” (86) of the cards they are dealt.


These principles are not something to be just memorized, but practiced indefinitely. They should become so habitual that they “recur to morning and night” (188). More than something to be rationalized, the treatment of desire and aversion is something that requires constant training for the rest of one’s life.

Freedom Through Self-Discipline and Reason

Epictetus suggests that freedom, in the sense that one can be completely independent from others and all authorities, is impossible. As Epictetus remarks, “Who is really self-sufficient, fool—apart from the universe itself?” (214). At the same time, if one defines freedom as the freedom from anxiety and other negative emotions, then Epictetus suggests that sort of freedom is possible, if difficult to attain even those in power and with wealth. In fact, Epictetus goes so far as to admit that even he is not free by his own definition. “By God I wish I were [free], and I pray to be; but I still can’t face my masters, I continue to value my poor body, I attach great importance to keeping healthy—though it isn’t healthy at all” (192). Epictetus argues that the only way to achieve freedom is through self-discipline and reason.


As Epictetus’s confession suggests, true freedom means detaching oneself from one’s own desires and aversions and being satisfied with one’s own circumstances. By desiring something that is not ours or letting someone inspire fear in us, we are surrendering our freedom to what Epictetus calls externals—any person, institution, object, or event that can exert control over us through our fears and anxieties or desires. For example, a bodybuilder obsessed with their own athleticism and the size of their muscles has surrendered their freedom to their desire to impress others with their appearance, a professor who is ambitious to gain tenure has relinquished their freedom to the university they work for, and someone who lives under a government they hate loses their freedom when they start to suffer anxiety whenever they read the news.


In Epictetus’s own words: “At any rate, if you see someone fond of externals, someone who values them over their own moral integrity, you can be sure that he is vulnerable to thousands of people who can frustrate or coerce him” (206). Thus, in Epictetus’s view, it is not so much that an employee loses their freedom to their employer because that employee depends on paychecks from their employer. Instead, real freedom is lost because the employee fears losing the paycheck and whatever consequences come from that.


This is why self-discipline and reason are so important. If one surrenders part of one’s freedom to travel to a fear of flying in an airplane, then that person should use their reason to rationalize that flying is a relatively safe mode of travel and train oneself mentally until that assurance comes instinctively. Our anxieties and fears come from our impressions of external circumstances and objects, but these are irrational impressions. Reason itself is “a collection of individual impressions” (51) that have been rationally interpreted and aligned with nature.


It is best to understand Epictetus’s idea of freedom as an entirely interior process. We cannot be truly free of outside forces, whether it is the need for food and shelter or the reality of death. However, we can claim freedom by teaching ourselves to regulate our own negative and overwhelming thoughts about external forces and circumstances.

Philosophy as Daily Practice Rather Than Theory

Often Epictetus compares practicing philosophy to athletic training, claiming, for example, “I’m presenting to you the real athlete, namely the one training to face off against the most formidable of impressions” (123). For Epictetus, the primary goal of true philosophy is to teach people how to live virtuously and reasonably. For this reason, he consistently emphasizes philosophy as daily practice rather than theory. 


This is not to say that abstract principles do not play a role in Epictetus’s philosophy. The practices Epictetus prescribes are based on the premises that God exists and takes a benevolent interest in humanity and that humanity has an innate capacity for reason: “If we could completely subscribe, as we should, to the view that we are all primary creatures of God, and that God is father of both gods and men, I don’t believe that we would ever think mean or lowly thoughts about ourselves” (11), Epictetus says. The idea of a divine is key to Epictetus’s theory that there is a universal natural law that is innately good and that humans are inclined toward obeying this law.


Epictetus urges his students to concentrate on their daily actions and whether or not they are in accordance with their philosophical principles. He argues that instead of focusing on “‘How many lines I read, or wrote, today,’” it is better to focus on how “‘I applied impulse today the way the philosophers recommend, how I desisted from desire, and practised aversion only on matters that are under my control. I wasn’t flustered by A or angered by B; I was patient, restrained and cooperative’” (200, emphasis added). He admits that a philosopher should be skilled and entertaining enough in speaking to “solicit an audience” (172), but that what matters most is the content of the speech and not the rhetorical flourishes. A lecture in philosophy is not meant to be entertainment like a play, but rather like a stay in a “hospital” where “you should have suffered, not enjoyed yourself” (172).


If Epictetus’s philosophy is a regiment like long-term medical treatment or athletic training, though, it is almost certainly a lifelong one. Even Epictetus himself admits that he has not achieved the ideal (192). Instead, he holds up Diogenes the Cynic, who “had eliminated any means to capture him, there was no opening to attack or seize him in order to make him a slave. Everything he owned was disposable, and only temporarily attached” (193). Even so, Epictetus dissuades people from trying to join Diogenes’s school of philosophy, the Cynics. Except for exceptional individuals like Diogenes or Socrates, the regiment of Stoic discipline is a lifelong process.

blurred text
blurred text
blurred text

Unlock every key theme and why it matters

Get in-depth breakdowns of the book’s main ideas and how they connect and evolve.

  • Explore how themes develop throughout the text
  • Connect themes to characters, events, and symbols
  • Support essays and discussions with thematic evidence