In Doughnut Economics, Kate Raworth contends that many economic models explored by former academics and theorists failed to recognize the fluidity and nuance of both economies and their participants. Raworth traces how the archetype of people created by economic theorists became more and more shallow over time, reducing people to luxury-seeking individuals interested only in their own pursuit of wealth. Her argument points out not only the lack of complexity in these assertions; it also demonstrates how these simplistic representations shape economic policy and personal goals.

In Chapter 3, Raworth analyzes the development of the “rational economic man” (81), or Homo economicus. This builds on her exploration in Chapter 2 of the limiting depiction of “actors” within the economy, such as the market, the commons, the state, the household, and more. She discusses how the way these actors are described in early economic models shapes how they are treated or what is expected from them by governing bodies, thus creating a cycle that reinforces the purpose the entities serve in society. For example, she writes, “The most important assumptions of a model are not in the equations, but what’s not in them; not in the documentation, but unstated; not in the variables on the computer screen, but in the blank spaces around them” (58). This quotes emphasizes that the models created inherently fail to recognize the subjectivity, insight, and variability of real life. She points out that to meet the evolving needs of people, the economy, and the environment, governments need to avoid relying solely on simplistic models and instead pivot to more thoughtful, responsive approaches.

The current lack of nuance in theory is demonstrated in both imagery meant to depict how the economy works and the concept of the rational economic man. A brief summation of the role individuals play in the economy began with Adam Smith, who employed a complex representation of human nature and desires. He highlighted humanity’s desire to serve themselves, but he also acknowledged that within all people is the desire to aid others as well. After many reinterpretations, William Stanley Jevons eventually reduced this definition to a completely self-serving, singular individual driven only by their desire for consumption and wealth accumulation. Raworth is deeply critical of this, not only due to its inaccuracy but because of how it shapes human behavior. She asserts that by “encouraging us to expect the worst in others, it brings out the worst in us: dreading the role of the chump, we are often loath to heed our nobler instincts” (86). This also limits how societies and their economic models engage with individuals, reducing them solely to consumers rather than human beings with a diverse set of needs. By adopting a more nuanced approach, Raworth argues that these models would not only be more realistic and effective, but that they would also serve people better by accommodating their needs. Furthermore, it would encourage a broader social attitude that drives people to be more communal and less self-serving in their impulses.