Getting Past No

William Ury, co-founder of Harvard's Program on Negotiation and co-author of Getting to Yes, presents a five-step method for negotiating successfully when the other side refuses to cooperate. The book builds on the joint problem-solving framework that Ury and Roger Fisher developed in Getting to Yes, addressing the question that earlier book's readers most frequently asked: What do you do when the other side keeps saying no?

Ury defines negotiation as any back-and-forth communication aimed at reaching agreement when interests are both shared and opposed. He identifies a common dilemma: being "soft" to preserve a relationship means giving up one's position, while being "hard" to win means straining or destroying the relationship. The alternative is joint problem-solving, an approach that is "soft on the people, hard on the problem" (5). Rather than attacking each other, parties sit side by side and attack the problem. This approach revolves around interests, the underlying needs, fears, and desires that motivate each side, rather than positions, the concrete demands each side states.

Five barriers prevent joint problem-solving in practice: one's own reactive impulses under stress; the other side's negative emotions, which prevent them from listening; their habit of digging into rigid positions; their dissatisfaction with the prospect of agreement, whether because they fear losing face or because the proposal was not their idea; and their inclination to dominate if they view negotiation as win-lose. Ury maps a corresponding five-step strategy he calls "breakthrough negotiation," using an indirect approach inspired by Japanese martial arts: instead of pitting strength against strength, the negotiator goes around resistance.

Before detailing the five steps, Ury stresses that preparation is the single most important factor in negotiation success. He identifies five preparation elements: interests (what each side truly cares about), options (creative possibilities for mutual gain), standards (independent benchmarks like market value or precedent), alternatives, and proposals. Central among these is BATNA, or Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement, one's best course of action if no deal is reached. BATNA is the key to negotiating power. Ury advises identifying and strengthening one's own BATNA, estimating the other side's, and preparing three proposals ranging from aspirational to barely acceptable.

Step One, "Go to the Balcony," addresses one's own reaction. Ury identifies three natural but counterproductive responses to difficult negotiators: striking back, which escalates conflict; giving in, which rewards bad behavior; and breaking off, which carries high costs. The antidote is to imagine climbing from the negotiation stage to a balcony overhead, a metaphor Ury credits to Harvard colleague Ronald Heifetz. From the balcony, one gains detachment and perspective. Ury categorizes opponent tactics into stone walls (refusals to budge), attacks (threats and insults), and tricks (deceptive maneuvers), and advises negotiators to recognize these tactics, know their own emotional vulnerabilities, and buy time to think through pauses, breaks, and deliberate slowing of the pace.

Step Two, "Step to Their Side," addresses the other side's negative emotions. The secret of disarming, Ury argues, is surprise: doing the opposite of what the other side expects. Instead of resisting or pressuring, one listens actively, acknowledges the other side's points and feelings without necessarily agreeing, and finds areas of agreement wherever possible. He illustrates with the breakdown of a $150 million AT&T-Boeing telecommunications deal. Boeing's purchasing director walked out after AT&T refused to put service promises in writing. The AT&T sales chief later salvaged the deal by arranging a private meeting, acknowledging Boeing's concerns without defending, and explaining the cultural gap between Boeing's "engineering culture" (74) and AT&T's "relationship culture" (75). The negotiation resumed and concluded successfully. Ury also recommends replacing "but" with "yes…and," making "I" statements rather than accusatory "you" statements, and accumulating small agreements to build momentum.

Step Three, "Reframe," addresses the other side's rigid positional behavior. Reframing means redirecting attention from positions toward interests, options, and fair standards. The primary tool is the problem-solving question: "Why?" to uncover interests; "Why not?" to invite criticism that reveals hidden concerns; "What if?" to explore options hypothetically; and "What makes that fair?" to shift discussion toward standards. Ury illustrates with U.S. Senator Joseph Biden's 1979 meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko over a proposed amendment to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II treaty. Rather than arguing against Gromyko's flat rejection, Biden asked for advice on how to respond to skeptical senators. Drawn into the problem, Gromyko reversed himself and consented. Ury advises making questions open-ended and harnessing silence after asking them. For specific tactics, he recommends ignoring or reinterpreting stone walls, deflecting attacks by redirecting them toward the problem, and exposing tricks through probing questions rather than direct accusations.

Step Four, "Build Them a Golden Bridge," addresses the other side's dissatisfaction with the prospect of agreement. Ury argues that pushing makes agreement harder and that one should instead draw the other side toward a mutually satisfactory solution. He details four techniques: involving the other side by soliciting their ideas and offering choices; satisfying unmet interests, including intangible needs for security, recognition, and autonomy; helping them save face by showing how circumstances have changed or enlisting third-party recommendations; and going slow to go fast by breaking agreements into manageable steps. He cites President John F. Kennedy's pledge not to invade Cuba during the 1962 missile crisis, which allowed Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to present the withdrawal of missiles as having safeguarded the Cuban revolution.

Step Five, "Use Power to Educate," addresses the other side's belief they can win through dominance. Ury identifies a "power paradox": the harder one pushes the other side to say no through coercion, the harder one makes it for them to say yes, because agreement would mean accepting defeat. Instead, power should educate the other side that the only way for them to win is for both sides to win together. Techniques include reality-testing questions, warnings (distinguished from threats by their objective tone), and demonstrations of one's BATNA using minimum force. Ury also introduces the "third force," meaning other parties who can deter aggression, promote negotiation, and build coalitions. Even when holding superior power, he warns that imposed outcomes are unstable, citing the punitive peace after World War I that contributed to World War II.

Ury concludes with the parable of 17 camels that three sons cannot divide according to their father's will until a wise woman lends them an 18th, making the fractions work and leaving one camel to return. The breakthrough strategy, Ury suggests, is that "eighteenth camel" (159) that helps parties solve seemingly intractable problems. He illustrates with two extended examples: a salary negotiation in which an employee applies all five steps, and a 47-hour hostage standoff at Kings County Hospital in October 1982, in which Detective Lieutenant Robert Louden negotiated with armed robber Larry Van Dyke and secured the release of all five hostages unharmed. The book closes with Abraham Lincoln's response to a woman who upbraided him for speaking kindly of Southern rebels: "Why, madam, do I not destroy my enemies when I make them my friends?" (171). Ury frames the breakthrough strategy as designed to turn adversaries into negotiating partners.