Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Until the publication of this book, it was conventional wisdom that external entities, such as central governments, had to manage common pool resources (CPRs). Those using the CPR were deemed incapable of successful management and/or organization. Ostrom’s work challenged this assumption, arguing that those using small-scale CPRs are in the best position to determine rules for them and to enforce those rules. As a result, the book became a seminal one in the field and influenced the work of other scholars, who used case studies to test Ostrom’s theories.

Twenty years after its publication, Berge and van Laerhoven concluded that subsequent research has, for the most part, confirmed the validity of Ostrom’s eight design principles for the successful management of CPRs (Berge, Erling, and Frank van Laerhoven. “Governing the Commons for Two Decades: A Complex Story.” International Journal of the Commons, vol. 5, no. 2, Sept. 2011, pp. 160-87). They note that the methodologies have broadened from field studies to quasi-experimental methods and meta-analyses of core characteristics. Additionally, the scope of studies has moved beyond agricultural settings and includes CPRs that cross international boundaries. Ostrom’s work laid the foundation for these approaches.

Ostrom’s work has drawn criticism as well. There are questions about its limited applicability to small-scale settings. Additionally, some scholars argue that the commons should be distinguished from partnerships. They assert that in a true commons, there is open access, and more traditional theories of collective action apply (Block, Walter, and Ivan Jankovic. “Tragedy of the Partnership: A Critique of Elinor Ostrom.” American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 75, no. 2, Mar. 2016, pp. 289-318). These debates demonstrate the ongoing interest in commons management.