Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Ostrom examines the organization of mountain grazing and forest CPRs in Switzerland and Japan, as well as irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines. Ostrom notes that these systems have survived for at least 100 years and as many as 1,000 years. While each system has distinct rules, the appropriators themselves play a significant role in monitoring in all of them. Given their long-term survival and the harshness of their environments, Ostrom suspects that appropriators have found principles of “good institutional design in a CPR environment” (59).

In the village of Tőrbel, Switzerland, there has been a mix of privately owned farmland and communally owned property for centuries. In 1483, the residents of the village established an association to regulate the use of the alpine grazing lands, forests, and waste lands. Boundaries of the communal property are well defined, and access to it is limited to citizens. Local regulations additionally limit appropriation levels. In most villages, a form of proportional allocation is used, dependent on the number of animals that a farmer feeds over the winter, the amount of land owned by the farmer, the value of said land, the amount of hay produced, or the number of shares owned in the cooperative. In all cases, the appropriators make the decisions about the use of the CPR, and overgrazing has been prevented.

In Japan, where common lands have been regulated by villagers for centuries, there has not been one case of a commons suffering ecological destruction. In a study of the villages of Hirano, Nagaike, and Yamanoka, one researcher explained that villagers clearly defined common lands and recognized the need for their management. Traditionally, rights of access were granted to households, not individuals. Village assemblies developed detailed rules covering times of access and amounts to be withdrawn. The rules vary and specifically accommodate local conditions. A village headman determines when harvesting can begin. All villagers are required to contribute to work that maintains the commons, and each village establishes monitoring systems. Violators are assessed using a series of escalating penalties, with minor fines for first-time violations. Compliance with the rules is high, with violations occurring sporadically because of impatience to begin harvesting and disagreements with the village headman’s decisions.

In the Huerta region of Spain, farming would not be possible without irrigation systems. There, for at least 550 years, “farmers have continued to meet with others sharing the same canals for the purpose of specifying and revising the rules that they use, selecting officials, and determining fines and assessments” (69). In Valencia, where the farms are small, water is allocated proportionally to the size of land. There are seven major canals. Farmers eligible to receive water from a particular canal meet every second or third year to elect a syndic, who participates in weekly tribunals with the other syndics and serves as the executive officer of the irrigation unit. To be a syndic, the individual has to own farmland served by the canal. 

Rules for allocating water vary depending on whether there is an abundance of water, seasonal low water, or drought. In the most common condition of seasonal low water, farmers receive water on a fixed rotation and take as much as needed when it is that farm’s turn. There is a high level of monitoring both by ditch riders, who assist the syndic, and by the appropriators themselves. Fines for non-compliance are low, and there is “a remarkable conformance rate” (75). 

In Murcia and Orihuela, water rights are also tied to the land, but rainfall is less. Each farmer is assigned a fixed time period to withdraw water, but the amount available is dependent on conditions. Guards are employed for monitoring. There is a water court where farmers can bring charges against other farmers and have their complaints heard. In Alicante, where water is the scarcest, there is a minimum land ownership requirement to vote in the community assembly. Since there is a dam in this area, national authorities exert more control. Nevertheless, in all these regions, irrigators defend their rights and participate in decisions. All the systems have benefited farmers and demonstrated a capacity for longevity.

Like in Spain, the zanjeras in the Philippines have given a central role to “small-scale communities of irrigators who determined their own rules, chose their own officials, guarded their own systems, and maintained their own canals” (82). The internal organization of each zanjera differs, but there is an underlying pattern. All members farm some land in the best location and some in the most challenging one. The members of each zanjera elect a leader. Dams have to be re-built and repaired. Farmers are required to participate and have an attendance rate of 94%. There are fines for non-attendance, which are paid in full. When water is scarce, rotation systems are put in place. In this system, water is not allocated optimally to enhance crop production, but the system does well in ensuring the completion of maintenance and construction. Importantly, the farmers consider the allocation of water to be legitimate, as opposed to a random assignment by an external expert.

In all these successful cases, behavioral norms have developed among individuals who share a past and expect to stay together. Their reputations matter to them and, thus, they are less likely to engage in non-compliance. Despite distinct operational rules, all these CPRs are sustainable, with rules “modified over time according to a set of collective-choice and constitutional-choice rules” (89). 

Ostrom identifies seven design principles common to these case studies. First, all have clearly defined boundaries, with those with rights to withdraw from the CPR stipulated and the CPR itself marked. Second, appropriation rules governing access are related to local conditions and provision rules. Third, most of those impacted by the rules can participate in modifying those rules. Fourth, monitors who ensure compliance are either accountable to the appropriators or are the appropriators themselves. 

Fifth, appropriators who violate the rules are likely to face a series of graduated sanctions. First-time offenses are met with “surprisingly low” sanctions. The costs of monitoring are reasonably low given the design of the systems. This enforcement ensures that appropriators are confident that others are following the rules. Small punishments are enough to deter non-compliance for most who care about their reputations. However, repeat offenders meet with steeper fines. Discretion is used in hard times as well. Sixth, appropriators and officials have access to low-cost arenas to resolve conflicts. There is always ambiguity in rules, and for that reason, there must be an easy way to settle disputes. Seventh, the right of appropriators to create their own institutions is not challenged by external governmental authorities. Ostrom adds that the “more complex, enduring CPRs” meet an eighth principle; namely, they are organized in multiple layers of “nested enterprises” (101), such as locally, regionally, and nationally.