Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action

Ostrom analyzes several cases where parties have failed to organize to protect a CPR or where institutions designed to do so were threatened. Specifically, she studies two Turkish inshore fisheries, a California groundwater basin with problems, a Sri Lankan fishery, irrigation development projects in Sri Lanka, and Nova Scotian inshore fisheries. She then analyzes common factors accounting for these failures.

Fisheries in Bodrum and the Bay of Izmir, both in Turkey, suffered from rent dissipation and overfishing. Unlike Alanya, Turkey, where the CPR has been protected, the number of fishers was large and heterogeneous. For example, in Bodrum, there was conflict among small-scale fishermen and large-scale operators. There was also an increase in demand for fresh fish near Izmir, incentivizing fishers to bring in more. The national government was not helpful, as it neither limited the number of licenses granted nor enforced rules “forbidding trawlers to fish within a three-mile offshore zone and within bays” (146). Ostrom concludes that there was not one reason for the failure of appropriators to organize and protect the CPR. All these factors contributed, as well as the lack of political arenas in which to obtain low-cost, enforceable agreements.

The water basins in San Bernardino County, California, were considered to be in overdraft condition. There was no plan for resolving this problem. San Bernardino County is the largest in the US, with 83% of its geography consisting of desert. The area experienced dramatic population increases following World War II. There was no consensus on key issues, such as a description of the region as having a single underground river or interconnected basins, whether all parts of the region had overdraft problems, the equality of pumpers, and whether water rights should be separated from land ownership. Despite this lack of consensus, the Mojave Water Agency assumed one answer to these contentious issues. No voluntary water associations formed to work out differences, and therefore no “action has since been taken to limit groundwater pumping” (149).

In the Sri Lankan village of Mawelle, there were several types of fishermen. Ostrom focuses on those using beach seines, or big nets. These nets are capable of harvesting “a ton of fish at one time during the prime period” (149). If Mawelle fishers owned a total of 20-30 seines, there would be an optimization of use. However, they owned 100, a fact that led to overcapitalization and rent dissipation. Until the 1930s, a rotation system ensured relatively equal and profitable incomes for the fishers. The fishers were not able to establish a rule limiting the number of nets, however. 

Legislation in 1933 opened access to people outside the traditional families who fished in this area, and no limits on the number of beach seines were enforced. With a new road connecting Mawelle to marketing centers in the early 1940s, demand for fish increased. With more nets in operation, original fishers were getting good yields only every third year and thus selling their share of nets. With that shift, by 1971, “many of the owners were not members of the same kinship group, owned shares in multiple nets, and hired wage laborers to work their shares” (154). The government, though it had slowed the increase in net licenses, was susceptible to persuasion and bribery. There were no arenas provided by the government at the local level to resolve this dilemma. Thus, despite an awareness of the consequences of adding more nets, the trend continued.

In Sri Lanka, rice production is dependent on irrigation systems. Rice output did not match the expectations of planners. This shortfall was largely due to farmers using more water than is necessary or optimal. Flooding fields of rice paddies greatly reduced “the amount of backbreaking weeding” that a farmer would otherwise have to do (158). Engineers were incorrect in the assumption that farmers would treat water as a scarce commodity; farmers resisted any efforts to require water limitations. As a result, this system not only reduced outputs but also harmed downstream irrigators. 

Focusing on the Kirindi Oya project, Ostrom notes that it was completed under British rule in 1920. From that year until 1958, water was released on fixed dates, and the system was managed by a “dual executive structure” (161). Two watchers were responsible for opening and closing the headgates. In the farmers’ field, a low official, called a vel vidane, could enforce sanctions on those who violated the rules for water usage. Some of these officials were fair, while others succumbed to the influence of large landowners. Since vel vidanes were paid a proportion of the crop yield, they had an incentive to enforce discipline. Despite this motivation, water shortages were still common in this period.

Ten years after independence, in 1958, the system was changed. Administrative secretaries replaced vel vidanes. Paid a fixed sum, these officials had little incentive to enforce rules. Water was released more frequently, causing loss of water in unlined canals: “By the mid-1970s, control over water theft was ‘virtually non-existent’” (163). Large landowners maintained relations with political officials to protect illegal practices, and those who irrigated at the tail end were hurt the most. Farmers continued to flood fields. The failure to achieve effective self-governance and better manage the CPR was attributable to several factors. Internally, there were a large number of farmers, most of whom were poor, with little attachment to the land. There was great cultural and ethnic diversity. Large landowners were able to control water via illegal activities, and there was a lack of physical control structures in the irrigation system itself. The government also proved unwilling to enforce rules impartially.

However, on the left bank of the Gal Oya irrigation project, a breakthrough was made. An agrarian research team assisted by the Rural Development Committee at Cornell University rejected the idea of finding a single model of farmer organization for 19,000 farmers. Instead, it introduced “catalysts,” college-educated organizers with farming backgrounds, into a situation of “mutual distrust and unpredictability” (168). Trained for six weeks, these organizers met with small groups of farmers and helped to resolve practical problems. 

Once farmers started to trust them, the organizer would help form a local organization. Later, that organization was embedded into three larger ones. As a result, farmer behavior changed with water rotation procedures, conflicts declined, and an additional 1,000 acres were brought under cultivation. Better communication was established between the Irrigation Department and farmers, with attitudes toward one another improved. There were some problems, as there was high turnover among the organizers and farmers were expected to take on construction without pay. Nevertheless, this case demonstrates that a small amount of external intervention can change incentive structures even with high levels of distrust.

Nova Scotian inshore fisheries present a case of fragile CPR institutions. In Port Lameron Harbor, almost all the 99 fishers are descendants of fishers who settled there in the late 18th century. They worked out rules of access based on the type of technology used in fishing. This made enforcement easy and reduced the problems that one type of technology could cause for another. However, the system is fragile because it is not recognized by the Canadian government. Federal officials presumed that it is an open-access system and attempted to develop a uniform set of policies for all fisheries along the eastern coast. The government’s initial steps of licensing fishing vessels resulted in local fishers obtaining licenses even if they did not use that type of technology. They were protecting future access for themselves. The experience left them distrustful of central government.

The design principles associated with successful management of CPRs explain these failures. None of the principles was operative in the Turkish cases. Just one—clear boundaries—was operative in the Kirinidi Oya irrigation project. Just two characterized the Mawelle fishery: congruent rules and monitoring. In the Mojave case, or the unsuccessful California Basin, three principles were in operation: collective-choice arenas, conflict-resolution mechanisms, and rights to organize. Thus, no more than three of the seven design principles were present in any of these cases.