Guns, Germs, and Steel

Of all the developments associated with civilization, writing is seen to be most decisive. If knowledge brings power, then writing is a tool for transmitting knowledge accurately and in greater detail and quantity. Writing also played a major role in the modern age of conquest, with the commands of monarchs and merchants conveyed in written form. Likewise, accounts of earlier expeditions could motivate and assist later ones. Despite its value, however, not all peoples developed writing, and some peoples developed it much earlier than others.

Inventing a language would seem to be a difficult task, and this explains why there are only a few instances of such inventions throughout history. The oldest known writing system is Sumerian cuneiform, and Diamond suggests that the Sumerians’ introduction of phonetic representation is perhaps the most important event in the history of writing. This system consisted of a complex mixture of three types of sign: logograms (referring to a whole word or name), phonetic signs (used for spelling syllables, letters, grammatical elements, or parts of words), and determinatives (which were not pronounced but were used to solve ambiguities). Even so, its phonetic signs were not sufficient to constitute a complete syllabary or alphabet.

The indigenous societies of Mesoamerica have also provided evidence of independent writing, organized along similar lines to those of Sumerian writing. These two languages do not bear any relation to each other, but Diamond seems them as evidence of “the underlying universality of human creativity” (222).

After, the principles or details of these independent writing systems spread, their influence could manifest itself in two ways: in “blueprint copying,” which involves copying or modifying an available blueprint; or “idea diffusion,” which occurs when one receives only a basic idea and has to reinvent the details. While blueprint copying and modification are the simplest options for transmitting technology, these methods are sometimes unavailable; for example, blueprints may be unreadable or kept secret. The knowledge of such inventions may nevertheless inspire others to formulate their own methods to achieve the desired result. Indeed, Diamond notes that idea diffusion probably led to many of the ancient writing systems.

Writing spread to some societies but not others because of the limitations of early writing systems. Early scripts were ambiguous, complex, or incomplete, and knowledge of writing was limited to professional scribes. The first Sumerian texts, for instance, were factual accounts produced by temple and palace bureaucrats. It was only once the Sumerians progressed towards phonetic writing that they began to produce prose narratives. The Mycenaean Greeks, meanwhile, failed to reach a comparable stage: Writing in this context was restricted to accountants’ records of such items as wool and flax. Greece reverted to a stage of pre-literacy after this civilization fell, yet, when writing returned in the eighth century BCE, it became a vehicle for poetry and humor. The Greek alphabet, which was reminiscent of Egyptian hieroglyphs, included 24 signs for the 24 Greek consonants, with the first example of such writing being a line of poetry scratched onto a jug.

Food production and societal evolution were necessary prerequisites for the development of writing, yet food production did not guarantee the development of writing. Some food producing societies did not develop writing because they developed food production much later than others. Others did not develop writing because they were isolated geographically. The diffusion of writing was subject to the same obstacles as the spread of food, livestock, and other resources.

In Crete, 1908, archeologists discovered a disk covered in writing that dates back to around 1700 BCE. The disk is the earliest printed document in the world, but the imprints upon the clay were made by stamps that were presumably not made solely for the purposes of this single disk. Humanity’s next efforts at printing appeared in China 2,500 years later, which raises the question of why the disk’s technology was not adopted in the Mediterranean. Also, why did it originate in Crete in 1700 BCE rather than in another location at another time? Does technological innovation depend on “the accidents of the birthplaces of a few inventors” (241), or are some societies are more receptive to change than others?

Disputing the adage that necessity is the mother of invention, Diamond points out that inventions have often come from people who are curious and enjoy experimenting. Some inventions find application and usefulness long after being created. Likewise, public acceptance may only arise after considerable time, when people have come to believe that they need the invention. Sometimes, inventions created for one purpose serve another. Finally, inventions are often incremental: Technology develops cumulatively rather than as the result of individual heroic acts.

Four factors influence society to embrace an invention. The first is the economic advantage that the invention offers. Ancient Mexicans did not deem the wheel useful, for instance, as they had no domestic animals to which they could hitch wheeled vehicles. The second factor is social value and prestige. The third factor is compatibility with vested interests. For instance, Britain carried on using gas lighting long after other countries had converted to electric, as British governments had invested heavily in this earlier form of lighting. The fourth factor is the ease with which an invention’s advantages could be observed. For example, two British Earls observed the usefulness of canons at the battle of Tarifa in Spain (CE 1340); hence, the adoption of this form of weaponry by the English army.

Historians of technology have proposed 14 factors that can exert an influence on the possibility of technological innovation. Increased life expectancy is one factor, as it gives inventors time to accumulate knowledge and produce delayed rewards.

Five factors involve economics or the organization of society. 1. The availability of cheap labor discourages innovation, while labor scarcity or high wages stimulate the search for technological solutions. 2. Laws protecting the ownership rights of inventors reward innovation in the US, while the lack of such laws discourages it in China. 3. Modern industrial societies provide copious training opportunities. 4. Modern capitalism offers potential rewards to invest capital in technological innovation. 5. The strong individualism within US society allows successful inventors to keep their earnings.

The next four factors are ideological. 1. Risk-taking behavior (which is essential for innovation) is more prevalent in some societies than others. 2. The scientific outlook of post-Renaissance European society has contributed a great deal to its modern technological primacy. 3. Tolerance of diverse views (including heresy) encourages innovation, while a more rigid, traditional outlook stifles it. 4. Religions vary greatly in their responses to technological advancement.

The remaining four factors seem inconsistent. 1. War has often been a catalyst for technological innovation, yet wars can also cause devastating setbacks to such innovation. 2. Strong centralized governments have encouraged technology in some countries yet stifled it in others. 3. Many northern Europeans imagine that innovation is bred in rigorous climates where survival is impossible without it, while a contrasting viewpoint is that benign environments provide people with sufficient time to devote themselves to innovation, as they are not occupied with a constant struggle to survive. 4. Some people believe that innovation is bred by plentiful resources whereas others believe that scarcity of resources motivates innovation.

Do these factors differ from continent to continent in a systematic manner? The idea that certain cultures are backwards in terms of technology is merely an assumption. New Guinea, for example, is home to both conservative societies that resist modernization and innovative societies that selectively adopt new ways, thus demonstrating that attitudes can vary between different societies within the same continent/hemi-continent. Likewise, they can vary within the same location over time.

Where do innovations come from? Most technology is imported rather than produced locally, depending on the ease of invention and the proximity of a society to other societies. Some inventions are developed from natural raw materials in a straightforward manner, as evidenced by plant domestication. Writing is an example of a much more difficult innovation, the kind more often imported than invented independently.

When a useful invention spreads to other societies, it typically does so in one of two ways. Societies receptive to the invention adopt it through peaceful trade, espionage, emigration, and war. Those that don’t, find themselves at a disadvantage because they lack such technology. They may become overwhelmed or replaced by the more advanced party if their disadvantage is considerable. Also, geographical location means that some societies can receive new technology more readily than others.

The spread of technology means that the importance of the original invention becomes overtaken by the process of diffusion and the new technology that it begets. Advancements often build upon previous innovations, and, likewise, new technologies and materials can be combined to create even more innovations.

Here, Diamond returns to the printed disk: there is no evidence that this disk brought about a diffusion of the technology involved or led to its popularization. By contrast, printing spread throughout medieval Europe after Gutenberg printed his Bible in CE 1455. The difference is that the European printers combined six technological advances, most of which were unavailable to the maker of the disk found in Crete. Additionally, the disk was produced in a context where only a limited number of individuals possessed knowledge of writing. There was therefore little demand for the product or incentive to invest in further production.

The rate of technological development has advanced over the years and Diamond points to two significant jumps. The first occurred between 50,000 and 10,000 years ago and was probably caused by genetic changes in the human body; specifically, modern brain function and the capacity for modern speech. The second jump occurred after people had adopted a sedentary lifestyle, which enabled them to amass non-portable possessions.

Diamond summarizes that technology typically develops fastest in large, productive regions featuring many potential investors and competing societies. Intercontinental differences stem from three factors: time of onset of food production, barriers to diffusion, and human population size. Eurasia is the world’s largest landmass and encompasses the greatest number of competing societies. It was also home to the two earliest centers of food production (the Fertile Crescent and China), and its east-west axis enabled the rapid spread of innovations without the hindrance of major ecological/geographical barriers. The Americas, by contrast, were fragmented by ecology and geography. Moreover, because technology catalyzes itself, the effects of these differences became even more exaggerated. 

Diamond focuses on the spread of government and religion in this chapter, observing the role of missionaries, teachers, doctors, bureaucrats, and soldiers in incorporating formerly isolated people into broader human society. This assimilation can be peaceful, but it can also be the result of force.

Four widely recognized social structures represent different stages of social evolution: bands, tribes, chiefdoms, and states. Until at least 40,000 years ago, all humans probably lived in bands—the smallest type of society, made up mostly of close relatives by birth or marriage. They are nomadic hunter-gatherers whose land is not divided among sub-groups or individuals, and there is no economic specialization, stratification into different social classes, or formal institutions. Leadership was informal and acquired via qualities such as strength, personality, intelligence, and fighting skills.

Tribes are larger and usually have fixed settlements (though some herders move on a seasonal basis). Evidence suggests that tribal organization began to emerge in the Fertile Crescent around 13,000 years ago. Settlements required food production or concentrated resources that could be hunted and gathered. Unlike a band, a tribe consists of more than one formally recognized kinship group.

Despite their differences, bands and tribes share some characteristics. Tribes and bands both have informal, egalitarian systems of government where decision-making is communal. Similarly, their social systems do not consist of ranked lineages or classes, nor do they feature bureaucracy, taxes, or a police force. Every able-bodied adult participates in growing, gathering, or hunting food, and economy is based on reciprocal exchanges.

Where a society comprises more than a few hundred members, conflict resolution between strangers becomes more complicated. People consequently had to learn new skills such as “how to encounter strangers regularly without wanting to kill them” (273). This has consequently fostered a shift in social organization, and chiefdoms, which trace back to the Fertile Crescent around 5500 BCE, took the place of tribes. The chief held recognized office based on hereditary right and exercised a monopoly on the right to use force. In contrast to states, however, chiefdom bureaucrats had generalized rather than specialized roles.

Because of its increased size, a chiefdom required plenty of food. This was usually obtained by food production, though hunting and gathering was still practiced in some areas. Members of a chief’s lineage had hereditary privileges, while chiefdoms also featured many jobs that could be filled by slaves. Their most distinctive economic feature, however, was that they did not rely on reciprocal exchanges but cultivated a new system of redistributive economy. The chief would receive wheat from farmers at harvest time and would then throw a feast for everyone or store the wheat and distribute it gradually. This applied to labor as well, the results of which could, again, be redistributed in the form of irrigation systems, for example, or retained for the benefit of chiefs in the form of lavish tombs, for instance. This redistribution became tribute—a precursor to taxes.

All centrally governed, non-egalitarian societies could become kleptocracies that transfer net wealth from commoners to the upper classes. So how can a social elite live more comfortably than commoners while gaining popular support? Diamond lists four strategies. 1. Disarm the populace and arm the elite. 2. Redistribute much of the tribute received in popular ways. 3. Use the monopoly of force to maintain public order and curb violence, thereby promoting happiness. 4. Construct a religion or ideology justifying kleptocracy.

The form of social organization most familiar to us today is that of the state. States trace back to Mesopotamia, around 3700 B.C, and feature the largest number of inhabitants. Their central control is more far-reaching and their economic distribution—taxation—is more extensive. Similarly, conflict resolution goes through formal laws, a judiciary, and police. The core distinction between chiefdoms and states is that states are not organized along kinship lines but along political and territorial lines. Also, while chiefdoms are typically monolingual and consist of only one ethnic group, states are often multilingual and multiethnic.

States have become the prominent form of social organization in part because they are normally more advanced in terms of weaponry and technology. A centralized decision maker assembles troops and resources, while religious and political ideology can encourage, or coerce, people to fight—even at the cost of their lives. Diamond compares this attitude with his own time spent with tribes, during which he has observed no displays of patriotism or suicidal fervor. Quite the opposite, these tribes organize ambushes with an emphasis on minimizing risk.

The size of a regional population is the main predictor of its social complexity; and large or dense populations typically arise under conditions of food. This is not an one-directional cause and effect relationship—rather, intensified food production and social complexity fuel each other.

Advanced societies possess numerous capabilities that have brought about intensified food production and thus population growth. Food production also contributes to the specific features of complex societies in three ways. 1. It entails seasonal inputs of labor, meaning that farmers become available for other tasks once the harvest has been stored. 2. It organizes food production in order to generate stored food surpluses that feed all tiers of a socially stratified society. 3. It requires sedentary living, which is necessary in order to accumulate possessions, develop technology, and construct public works.

Food production therefore permits various aspects of complex societies. But why is it that bands and tribes cannot accommodate a population of hundreds or thousands? And why do all large societies have complex centralized organization? Diamond concludes that there are at least four reasons. 1. Conflict among unrelated individuals becomes more of a problem as populations increase, thus necessitating a formal means of conflict resolution. 2. Increased population size brings with it the growing impossibility of communal decision-making. 3. Large societies require both a reciprocal economy and a redistributive economy, with goods that are in excess of an individual’s needs redistributed by a centralized authority. 4. Large food-producing societies have high population density, requiring densely populated regions to support large, complex societies.

How do small, simple societies evolve into large, complex ones? The answer depends partly on evolutionary reasoning, with societies competing with one another and becoming larger and more advanced in the process. Chiefdoms, for instance, conquer or combine with one another to form states. States constitute the most advanced form of socialization and possess the most authority. They are therefore able to use their military power to conquer and seize other territories. States experience problems because of their larger size, such as public resentment towards kleptocracy and attempts to seize leadership. However, if they overcome these problems, they possess an advantage over smaller, less advanced societies.

War, or the threat of war, has often been a key factor in the amalgamation of societies. However, war has existed throughout human history, so this in itself does not explain why societies began to merge. Population density would seem to be a deciding force here: Where density is low, the survivors of a defeated group can simply move away. Where it is moderate, as with tribes, a defeated party cannot to any vacant areas; however, since tribal societies without intensive food production have no use for slaves, the defeated individuals are subsequently killed. Where density is high, as with chiefdoms and states, the defeated individuals again have nowhere to flee; however, chiefdoms and states have economic specialization, meaning that these individuals can be used as slaves. Alternatively, the victors can deny them political autonomy, force them to pay regular tribute (in the form of food or goods), and assimilate their society into the new chiefdom or state.

In conclusion, population density and sedentary living played key roles in a chain of causation leading to the emergence of fully-fledged societies. Such societies were formed by the conquest and amalgamation of existing territories, with germs, writing, technology, and centralized political organization serving as important tools in enabling triumph. Societies therefore emerged via competition, with food production once again exerting an influence throughout.