Identity: Youth and Crisis

Chapter 5, the “Theoretical Interlude,” shows Erikson’s interest in clarifying where he stands with regard to other psychoanalysts—not just Freud, but also Heinz Hartmann and Alfred Adler. These comparisons are important to Erikson because he is not only defining certain terms that are key to his theory of psychosocial identity development, but considering where psychoanalysis itself is heading. Echoing Adler, Erikson argues for Psychoanalysis as Social and Political Critique: In a rapidly changing world, he argues that psychoanalysis must take into account the relationship between societal change and individual identity.

Erikson posited in Chapter 1 that one reason traditional psychoanalysis “cannot quite grasp identity” (23) is because it doesn’t have terms to conceptualize the environment. The environment plays a role in all the terms he goes on to define in Chapter 5.

Erikson differs from Freud in his conceptualization of ego identity. Freud posited an “ego ideal”—a conception of the ideal self toward which the individual strives. Erikson’s rejection of this concept is at the core of his social criticism. In his view, the pace of technological and cultural change in the post-WWII era is such that no stable north star of identity can exist. Not only is individual identity in constant flux, but so are the societal standards that individuals use to define their identities.

Erikson establishes early in the chapter that he agrees with Hartmann’s term “self-representation” to mean the image that an individual has of the self. The formation of this self-representation is a conscious process, separate from the work of the ego which is unconscious. He also agrees with Hartmann that humans are born with an inner ability to adapt to an predictable environment, although Erikson believes this environment (and the child’s ability to adapt) changes as the child progresses through the stages of the life cycle.

However, he departs from Hartmann with regard to the impact of cultural conditions on the ego. Hartmann and others stated that analysts must use common sense in viewing differences in cultural conditions as they impact the ego. Erikson, in contrast, believes the analyst must be deeply invested in cultural differences, especially as they relate to basic values passed along from one generation to another. This is how new leaders arise in a society. He crystallizes this belief by saying that something in the ego process and something in the social process is “well, identical” (224). His conversational rhetoric here implies that this point should be obvious, even if previous observers have not understood it as such. This symbiosis between the ego and society is foundational to Erikson’s theory of Psychosocial Development and the Mutual Contract.

A few pages later he brings up the work of Alfred Adler, who quite dramatically broke with Freud in 1911 over his introduction of social considerations into psychoanalysis. Adler today is considered a “neo-Freudian” along with Erikson, Jung, and Karen Horney. He shares Erikson’s belief that while childhood experiences are important to human development, the importance of society and culture on human development must be factored into any meaningful form of psychoanalysis.

In Erikson’s view, Adler’s theories threatened Freud’s assumption that psychoanalysis was a science that existed outside of a worldview. With Adler, Erikson questions the nature of psychoanalysis, its contributions to the world to date, and the need for it to change along with the changing times. Since changing social and historical factors impact the individual’s identity development, they must also produce changes in the practice of psychoanalysis.

Erikson’s descriptions of pop cultural phenomena exemplify this effort to build a psychoanalysis that responds to cultural change. For example, he describes the dance craze known as the Twist as “machinelike pulsation with a semblance of rhythmic abandon and ritualistic sincerity” (244). His highly formal and analytical description of the dance is ironic, highlighting what he sees as the insincerity of its performative liberation. The larger point is that this dance craze is a means of collective identity formation—Through this “ritualistic” dance, young people signal their collective rejection of the older generation’s behavioral standards, while simultaneously telegraphing conformity within their own nominally rebellious in-group. This analytical approach is typical of Erikson’s methodical approach to observable behaviors, like those of the children building with blocks and toys whom he will describe in Chapter 7.