Into That Darkness: An Examination of Conscience

Content Warning: This Themes section references acts of genocide, racial violence, and murder that were perpetrated under the Nazi regime and that are discussed in Into That Darkness.

Almost everyone implicated in the crimes at Treblinka whom Sereny interviews shirked personal responsibility for those crimes. Sereny’s implied argument is that Treblinka was possible because of the capacity of people like Stangl to convince themselves that they weren’t personally responsible for their actions. People around the Stangls are quick to say that despite his positions at Sobibor and Treblinka, he wasn’t responsible for the murders there. In Sereny’s final argument, decisions of right and wrong ultimately occur at the individual level, leaving every person accountable for their actions.

One of the main ways the people implicated in Nazi crimes shirked responsibility was by charging the person above them with their responsibility. Stangl often did this with Christian Wirth, who was directly above him both in the T4 euthanasia program and in Aktion Reinhardt. In his stories about Wirth, Stangl paints him as the mind and driving force behind the atrocities. He doubtlessly was that, but of course, it was Stangl who would implement and optimize Wirth’s policies. Stangl rationalizes that since the idea to exterminate the Jews or euthanize the disabled wasn’t his own, he wasn’t responsible for executing those ideas.

This rationalization originated in Stangl’s police training. He explains to Sereny that according to his training, a crime is defined as an intentional action by a perpetrator against a victim. All four elements—perpetrator (subject), victim (object), action, and intent—are required for something to constitute a crime. He explains that by that definition, his role at Treblinka wasn’t a crime: “if the ‘subject’ was the government, the ‘object’ the Jews, and the ‘action’ the gassings, then I could tell myself that for me the fourth element, ‘intent’ […] was missing” (407). In Stangl’s mind, it is the intent, not the action, that is immoral and makes a crime; since he lacked the hatred behind someone like Wirth’s intent, Stangl rationalizes that it ultimately wasn’t him who meant the Jews harm.

There is also a social aspect of morality in Sereny’s framework. While not ultimately responsible for Stangl’s moral corruption, social factors undoubtedly shaped that corruption. The Stangls’ vacation outside of Sobibor in 1942 encapsulates how pernicious this social aspect can be. After learning what Sobibor was, Theresa was distraught by her husband’s position there. However, when she raised her concerns to her hosts, she was met with the same attitude of shirking individual responsibility that she’d found in Stangl: “We’ve known about [the true purpose of Sobibor] since the beginning. But you must calm yourself; it is dreadful, but there is nothing to be done. We are convinced that your husband is a decent man” (339). The hosts were just as concerned about shielding their own consciences from guilt as they were to affirm that Stangl was a good man and that they weren’t associating with a monster. This type of passing responsibility on to another is socially acceptable, which makes it easier for people like Stangl to do.

In Sereny’s final argument in the epilogue, morality is based on individual decisions between right and wrong. The conglomeration of these actions forms the social aspect of morality, which amplifies the character of those actions, whether good or bad. In times of widespread moral corruption and lack of accountability, the individual needs to act as a corrective.