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Lynn HuntA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Content Warning: This section of the guide includes discussion of graphic violence, racism, religious discrimination, gender discrimination, and rape.
In mid-June 1776, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Declaration of Independence, initially describing certain truths as “sacred & undeniable.” He revised the phrase to “self-evident,” asserting “that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness” (15).
13 years later, Jefferson was in Paris as the French began drafting their own statement of rights. The Marquis de Lafayette, a veteran of the American Revolution, composed an early version in January 1789, likely with Jefferson’s assistance. After the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789, the National Assembly debated a 24-article draft prepared by a committee of 40 deputies. Following six days of heated discussion and amendments, the Assembly voted on August 27 to provisionally adopt the 17 approved articles as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.
The French Declaration proclaimed the natural and sacred rights of “man” and assigned sovereignty to the nation rather than the king, sparking international debate. On November 4, 1789, Richard Price delivered a London sermon celebrating this new understanding of rights. Edmund Burke responded with fierce opposition in his Reflections on the Revolution in France (1790), a founding text of conservatism. Observers were divided over whether the French Revolution heralded a new era of freedom based on reason or a descent into anarchy.
For nearly two centuries, the French Declaration embodied the promise of universal human rights. In 1948, the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights echoed it, proclaiming in Article 1 that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
Yet the documents’ origins reveal contradictions. The 18th-century men who declared these “universal” rights excluded vast categories of people: those without property, people of color whether free or enslaved, religious minorities, and women.
This raises the book’s central paradox—what Hunt calls “the paradox of self-evidence” (19): If rights are truly self-evident, why must they be declared, and why only in specific times and places? How can they be universal if not universally recognized? The claim of self-evidence ultimately relies on an emotional appeal that resonates widely.
Human rights must be natural (meaning that they belong to people innately, rather than being granted by a government), equal, and universal. Yet these qualities are insufficient by themselves. Rights become meaningful only when they gain political content—when they are guaranteed in the secular world and demand active participation from those who hold them.
The English Bill of Rights of 1689 invoked “ancient rights and liberties” rooted in English law and history. By contrast, the American and French Declarations insisted on equality and universality. The crucial transformation occurred between 1689 and 1776, when rights previously seen as belonging to particular peoples—freeborn Englishmen, for example—became universal and natural.
Terminology reveals this shift. In the 18th century, “human rights” usually meant something different from today’s usage. Jefferson primarily spoke of “natural rights” and adopted “rights of man” only after 1789. When he used “human rights” in 1806 regarding the African slave trade, he did not intend those rights to apply to those enslaved in America. Terms like “rights of humanity” proved too general for direct political use.
The French coined a new expression in the 1760s: “rights of man” (droits de l’homme). The phrase gained currency after appearing in Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract (1762). By June 1763, an underground newsletter reported that it had become common usage, associated with Rousseau’s works. Enlightenment writers, including baron d’Holbach, Raynal, and Mercier, adopted it in the 1770s and 1780s.
Before 1789, the phrase had little presence in English. The American Revolution prompted the Marquis de Condorcet to define the rights of man in 1786, explicitly linking them to American independence. By early 1789, Lafayette, Sieyès, and Condorcet all used the expression in drafting declarations. By spring 1789, even before the Bastille fell, the idea of a declaration of the rights of man permeated French political circles.
Though the phrase “rights of man” was widely used, few offered precise definitions before 1776. Rousseau offered none. The jurist William Blackstone defined these rights as the natural liberty of humankind. Writers like d’Holbach and Mirabeau referred to such rights as if they were self-evident. The Calvinist pastor Jean-Paul Rabaut Saint-Etienne, writing to the French king in 1787 about Protestant rights, asserted that everyone now knew what natural rights were, yet he struggled to articulate their limits.
The claim of self-evidence relies on what Denis Diderot called an “interior feeling,” common to philosophers and ordinary people. The Swiss natural-law philosopher Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui agreed that liberty could only be proved by each person’s inner feelings. Human rights rest on widely shared emotional dispositions—convictions about human nature and moral judgment in the secular world.
This disposition required two interlocking capacities: autonomy and empathy. To have human rights, people had to be seen as separate individuals capable of independent moral judgment, but to form a political community, these autonomous individuals also had to empathize with others.
In his 1998 book The Invention of Autonomy, the moral philosopher J. B. Schneewind argues that by the late 18th century, a new belief emerged: All “normal” individuals are equally capable of living together in a morality of self-governance. Yet not everyone was imagined as equally capable. Children and those classified as “insane” lacked reason. Enslaved people, women, and those without property were thought to lack the independence required for full autonomy. Women especially seemed to have no path to independence; they were defined as inherently dependent on fathers or husbands.
Nevertheless, empathy could work against longstanding prejudices. In 1791, the French revolutionary government granted equal rights to Jewish people. In 1792, men without property were enfranchised. In 1794, France officially abolished slavery. Rights remain open to question because our sense of who has rights constantly changes. The human rights revolution is ongoing.
Autonomy and empathy are embodied cultural practices with physical and emotional dimensions. Individual autonomy hinges on an increasing sense of bodily separation and integrity. Empathy depends on recognizing that others feel and think as we do. Over several centuries, individuals became psychologically and legally more independent. Greater bodily integrity and clearer boundaries between bodies emerged through rising standards of shame, sleeping arrangements, table manners, and evolving notions of interiority.
A surge occurred in the second half of the 18th century. Absolute paternal authority was questioned. New ways of making and responding to art gave primacy to the individual imagination. Novels and newspapers proliferated. Torture and extreme corporal punishment came to be seen as unacceptable. These changes reinforced bodily integrity and empathetic selfhood.
The campaign against judicial torture illustrates this shift. After Montesquieu attacked the practice in Spirit of Laws (1748), asserting that nature itself condemned it, torture became a major issue. Voltaire, Beccaria, and others joined the campaign. By the 1780s, abolishing torture had become essential to human rights doctrine. Accounts of torture produced empathy through new views of pain, just as novels generated it by inducing new sensations about the inner self. This proliferation of empathy became the foundation of human rights.
The argument depends on recognizing that reading novels had physical effects that translated into brain changes and emerged as new social and political concepts. New reading experiences created new individual experiences of empathy, which made possible new concepts like human rights. Although psychology has often been dismissed by historians, this account insists that social and political change must ultimately account for alterations in individual minds. For human rights to become self-evident, ordinary people had to develop new understandings that arose from new kinds of feelings.
A year before publishing The Social Contract, Jean-Jacques Rousseau gained international attention with his best-selling epistolary novel Julie, or the New Héloïse (1761), which updated the 12th-century forbidden romance story of Héloïse and Abelard. Julie, the new Héloïse, falls in love with her tutor Saint-Preux but yields to her authoritarian father’s demand that she marry Wolmar, an older Russian soldier.
18th-century readers responded with extraordinary emotion. Critics and admirers alike reported being overwhelmed, and the novel quickly went through numerous editions and translations. Reading Julie modeled a new form of empathy, encouraging identification with characters across boundaries of class, sex, and nation.
Novels drew readers into identifying with ordinary people unknown to them. Through fictional letter exchanges, epistolary novels taught a new psychology and laid the foundations for a new social and political order. They made middle-class heroines and even servants, like the eponymous protagonist of Samuel Richardson’s Pamela, the equals of rich men, demonstrating that people shared fundamentally similar inner feelings and dramatizing the universal desire for autonomy. The chapter notes that the period’s most influential novels of psychological identification—Richardson’s Pamela (1740) and Clarissa (1747-48) and Rousseau’s Julie (1761)—appeared just before the concept of the rights of “man” crystallized.
Empathy is universal and rooted in the brain’s biology, but cultures shape how it is expressed. In the 18th century, readers learned to extend empathy across traditional social boundaries, seeing strangers as like themselves. Without this learning process, “equality” could have no deep meaning or political consequence.
The epistolary novel’s rise between the 1760s and 1780s coincided with expanding literacy and a surge in fiction about ordinary life; by 1789, French novel production had more than doubled since midcentury. While peasants read rarely, urban servants did. Ordinary heroes and heroines became household names, displacing aristocratic protagonists common in 17th-century fiction. Scholars often link the novel’s rise to capitalism, the middle class, the public sphere, the nuclear family, and nationalism; this chapter focuses instead on the novel’s psychological effects and their connection to the emergence of the rights of “man.”
In epistolary fiction, there is no authorial point of view outside the action; the perspective is the characters’ as expressed in their letters. Editors—Richardson and Rousseau styled themselves as such—heightened realism by obscuring authorship. The form fostered identification by constructing “character” through interiority. In Pamela, for instance, the heroine narrates her employer Mr. B’s attempts to seduce her directly to her parents. With no narrator mediating, the reader experiences both her peril and her insistence on self-possession.
Richardson’s works ignited cultural phenomena. Pamela spurred multiple editions, parodies, theatrical adaptations, and even public celebrations. Clarissa followed with high expectations; its tragic plot—Clarissa’s flight from a coerced marriage, Lovelace’s seduction and rape, her refusal of his repentant proposal, and her death—devastated readers across Europe and inspired immediate translations. Although some contemporaries mocked Richardson’s “tedious lamentations,” many found themselves absorbed as if living among the Harlowe family.
Men and women alike identified with female heroines. Readers wrote of intense attachment to Julie, often identifying with her rather than with Saint-Preux or Wolmar. Her struggle to master passion and live virtuously became their own. By its form, the epistolary novel suggested that all selves possessed interiority and were, in that sense, equal. The exchange of letters turned a servant like Pamela into a model of proud autonomy rather than a stereotype of the downtrodden. Clarissa and Julie similarly came to stand for individuality itself.
Contemporaries knew from experience that novels affected bodies as well as minds, but they disagreed about consequences. Clergy and physicians warned that novels could erode morality and religion, excite eroticism, and inspire imitation of vice. Some, like Samuel-Auguste Tissot, linked novel reading to harmful excesses. Others feared novels would foment discontent among servants and young women. To counter the genre’s disrepute, Richardson emphasized moral intent, and Rousseau framed Julie with a preface that rehearsed common objections to novels before proceeding anyway.
Defenders developed a positive account centered on Clarissa’s power to evoke compassion for ordinary people. Philosopher and art critic Denis Diderot, eulogizing Richardson in 1761, emphasized the reader’s immersion, recognition of self in characters, and the experience of living many lives in a few hours as a form of moral education.
The British aristocrat Henry Home, Lord Kames, gave the most sustained philosophical account in Elements of Criticism (1762), arguing that fiction creates an “ideal presence” or “waking dream” in which readers imagine incidents as unfolding before them. This “ideal presence” fosters morality by strengthening social bonds and motivating benevolence. Thomas Jefferson shared this view. In 1771, when advising Robert Skipwith, he placed fiction—including works by Sterne, Fielding, Marmontel, Goldsmith, Richardson, and Rousseau—at the center of a reading list, asserting that imaginative literature could imprint both principles and practices of virtue more effectively than history.
At stake was the valorization of ordinary secular life as morality’s foundation. For critics, sympathy with a novelistic heroine signaled decadence; for defenders, aroused passion could reshape the inner self and produce a more moral society. In practice, writers like Richardson and Rousseau drew readers into daily life as a kind of substitute religious experience, teaching appreciation of the ordinary and the capacity of people like themselves to create a moral world. The concept of universal, natural rights grew from these feelings: Equality flourished when people learned to think of others as like themselves through identification with fictional characters.
Female heroines were compelling because their quest for autonomy could never fully succeed in law and custom. Pamela marries Mr. B, accepting implied limits on her freedom; Clarissa dies rather than marry Lovelace; Julie renounces Saint-Preux and dies. While modern critics sometimes see martyrdom, contemporaries often saw will and personality. Readers wanted not only to save the heroines but also to be like them. The central drama in all three novels is the heroine’s will for independence, with male characters’ actions highlighting that will. Through empathizing with these heroines, readers learned that all people—even women—aspired to autonomy and could imagine the psychological effort that struggle entailed.
18th-century novels reflected a deeper cultural preoccupation with autonomy. Enlightenment thinkers framed freedom as individual self-governance, culminating in the German philosopher Immanuel Kant’s essay “What Is Enlightenment?” (1784), which defined Enlightenment as humanity’s emergence from self-incurred immaturity. Earlier, philosophers Hugo Grotius and John Locke had reimagined legitimate authority as a compact among autonomous men, prompting educational reforms that emphasized reasoning over punishment. Rousseau in Emile urged parents to cultivate and protect their children’s inner lives; Welsh philosopher Richard Price, in a 1776 pamphlet, defined liberty as self-direction.
Reformers sought to widen the scope of individual decision-making. French revolutionary family law illustrates the shift: In the years immediately after the Revolution, the National Assembly abolished primogeniture (the right of the firstborn male child to inherit his parents’ estate) and lettres de cachet (orders from the king that could not be appealed), created family councils for disputes, mandated equal inheritance for sons and daughters, lowered the age of majority to 21, ended adult paternal authority, and introduced divorce on equal grounds for men and women. In Britain and its North American colonies, law changed more slowly, but cultural trends favored autonomy. Despite the restrictive Marriage Act of 1753, patriarchal domination waned, and literature—from Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719) to Benjamin Franklin’s Autobiography (1791)—celebrated independence. American states began to accept divorce petitions after independence; in Revolutionary France, about 20,000 divorces were granted between 1792 and 1803.
As autonomy expanded, a dilemma emerged: What would bind communities of self-directed individuals? Midcentury Scottish philosophers centered the answer on “sympathy,” which this book calls “empathy” to stress the active will to identify with others. Francis Hutcheson treated sympathy as a moral faculty that drew people beyond self-interest. Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) explained how imaginative identification—he used the example of torture—allows observers to feel another’s pain and develop an “impartial spectator” within, joining autonomy to empathy.
Sympathy and sensibility resonated widely in the late 18th century. Jefferson read Hutcheson and Smith but cited Laurence Sterne as offering “the best course of morality.” The first American novel, published in 1789, was titled The Power of Sympathy. Sensibility permeated literature, painting, and medicine, even prompting worries about excess.
Sympathy aided many disenfranchised groups, but women were often left out. Early abolitionists leveraged novelistic techniques in firsthand narratives like Olaudah Equiano’s Interesting Narrative (1789)—the autobiography of a formerly enslaved man who became a leading abolitionist—yet most failed to connect antislavery to women’s rights. After 1789, many French revolutionaries supported rights for Protestants, Jews, free people of color, and even enslaved people while opposing political rights for women. In the United States, slavery provoked immediate debate; women’s political rights received far less attention.
Women were widely viewed as dependents defined by family status and thus not fully capable of political autonomy. They could symbolize self-determination as a private, moral virtue—as in novels like Pamela and Clarissa—without implying political rights. In 1789, Abbé Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyès distinguished natural and civil rights from political rights: All inhabitants, including women, enjoyed protection of person, property, and liberty (passive citizenship), but only some were active citizens with the right to participate directly in public affairs. His qualifier—“at least in the present state”—left a narrow opening for change.
Advocates of women’s rights often expressed ambivalence about novels. Traditional opponents cast women as especially susceptible to romantic enchantment, and even defenders like Thomas Jefferson later worried about young girls’ “inordinate passion” for novels. British philosopher and early feminist Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797) contrasted novel reading with rational, active study, yet she wrote and reviewed novels avidly.
Learning to empathize opened the path to the rights of “man,” but not for everyone at once. No one understood this better than Jefferson. In 1802, he wrote that the United States was acting for all humankind by testing how much freedom and self-government a society could entrust to its members. He pushed to expand participation as widely as he could imagine—primarily to white men, and perhaps to Indigenous men if they became farmers. Although he recognized that enslaved people had human rights, he continued to participate actively in their enslavement. He did not envision a polity in which they or women of any race took an active part. For most Americans and Europeans of his era, even decades later, that remained the outer limit of the imaginable.
Hunt begins her analysis by noting a paradox in the late 18th-century discourse of human rights: If rights are inherent and universal, their declaration at specific historical moments requires explanation. The text resolves what it calls “the paradox of self-evidence” by shifting the locus of historical change from the realm of abstract philosophy to the interior lives of individuals (19). It posits that for rights to become “self-evident,” a widespread emotional and psychological transformation was necessary. This methodological pivot, based on the premise that “any account of historical change must in the end account for the alteration of individual minds” (34), recasts the Enlightenment as a revolution in feeling as much as in reason. Human rights are presented not as a pre-existing truth discovered by philosophers, but as a new capacity forged through concrete cultural experiences. This approach treats Empathy as the Engine of Rights, arguing that empathy is a learned, imaginative skill that flourished at a specific moment in history, driven by cultural developments including the epistolary novel and the movement against judicial torture. By historicizing the psychological faculties required to conceive of universal rights, Hunt suggests that in order for rights to become self-evident, people first had to develop the faculties needed to recognize those rights.
The concepts of autonomy and empathy form the theoretical core of this new emotional landscape. Autonomy, like empathy, is rooted in historically specific changes: a developing sense of bodily integrity and of the sacredness of the individual form. Hunt draws on changes in behavior and material culture as evidence of changes in worldview:
Spitting, eating out of a common bowl, and sleeping in a bed with a stranger became disgusting or at least unpleasant. Violent outbursts of emotion and aggressive behavior became socially unacceptable. These changes in attitudes toward the body were the surface indications of an under-lying transformation (82-83).
These changes reflect a growing sense of the individual body as separate from the community and deserving of privacy and protection, a shift reflected in an increasing revulsion toward judicial torture. Empathy, in turn, is the imaginative capacity to recognize a shared interiority in others—to understand that strangers possess a psychological depth equivalent to one’s own. These two qualities are presented as interdependent; rights can only attach to a self that is both inviolably separate and emotionally legible to others. By tracing the development of these dispositions, the analysis grounds the abstract language of political declarations in the tangible, physical experiences that shaped a new understanding of what it meant to be human.
Hunt turns to literary history to explain the origins of this flourishing of empathy. Readers of epistolary novels like Samuel Richardson’s Pamela and Clarissa or Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Julie inhabited the consciousness of the protagonists by reading their “private” letters. As the contemporary Denis Diderot observed of Richardson’s work, the reader’s immersion was so complete that it served as a form of moral education, allowing one to experience many lives in a few hours. This process taught a radical new lesson: Ordinary individuals, regardless of class or gender, possessed a rich interior life and a will to self-determination. The novel thus functioned as a training ground for empathy, making the abstract notion of fundamental human equality a palpable, emotional reality for a growing readership and providing the necessary emotional resonance for political claims of universal rights.
A central tension explored is the disjuncture between the symbolic function of female novelistic heroines and the political reality for women. Characters like Clarissa and Julie became avatars for the universal human aspiration for autonomy, their struggles against familial and societal constraints serving as the central drama that captivated readers. Through them, readers learned to empathize with a woman’s desire for self-possession. Hunt notes with irony that this wave of empathy did not translate into political rights for women, who were almost universally relegated to the status of “passive citizens.” This contradiction reveals the uneven and contested application of universalist principles, showing that while the capacity for empathy could be expanded through fiction, its political application was constrained by entrenched social hierarchies. Women could serve as the imaginative vehicle for a new understanding of individual will without being seen as fully capable of the political autonomy that was its logical consequence. Despite The Tendency of Rights to Become More Inclusive over time, entrenched social hierarchies proved durable.
Defining the scope of these new principles was therefore a critical step. The emergence of the specific phrase “rights of man” (droits de l’homme) in the 1760s is presented as a crucial linguistic and conceptual shift (23): away from the more ambiguous “natural rights”—which could apply to the rights of a deity or a king—to a more pointed insistence on rights belonging to the common people (though this class was still often quite narrowly defined). The text traces the term’s popularization through the works of Rousseau and its subsequent adoption by French revolutionary thinkers like the Marquis de Condorcet and Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès. This focus on terminology demonstrates how a new political vocabulary was forged to articulate the new emotional and psychological realities fostered by cultural change. By treating language not merely as a reflection of change but as an agent of it, the analysis connects the history of ideas to the practice of revolutionary politics, showing how the “self-evident” had to be named before it could be declared.



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