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Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Historical Illustrations
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Themes
The Existence of a Common Morality Grounded in
Walzer argues that across geographical jurisdictions and historical time, ideas about the proper conduct in wartime are incredibly consistent. He is referring to moral judgments made by ordinary people, not sets of laws. This sense of morality, of right and wrong, is grounded in a belief in human rights. Throughout history, this commonly held morality has influenced decisions about just and unjust wars as well as ways of fighting.
Aggression or the unprovoked attack of a sovereign state is considered a moral crime, and victim states have a right of self-defense. States also have rights of territorial integrity and political sovereignty, even if their boundaries were established through unjust means. Walzer allows for just military intervention in such states in very limited circumstances, such as egregious violations of human rights in the form of massacres and enslavement.
A common aspect of morality throughout time is that although people are killed in wars, certain acts, such as mass rape and massacres of civilians, elicit outrage. They are indefensible and morally wrong for both aggressors and defenders. Seeing a soldier’s human side in wartime makes combatants reluctant to kill; Walzer highlights the reluctance of soldiers to kill enemy soldiers when unaware and engaged in non-threatening activities, such as bathing. The rules of war do not prevent such killings, but there is moral reluctance to kill someone who is not seen as threatening.
In most cases, the greatest affront to common morality is to kill noncombatants intentionally: The war convention differentiates between just killing in war and murder. It allows for soldiers to surrender and not be killed, but instead be taken prisoner for the duration of the war. It allows noncombatants to feel safe in the presence of the opposition’s soldiers as long as they are not engaging in acts of warfare. When civilians are massacred and prisoners of war are shot, or when no precautions are taken to protect civilians, human rights are violated and war crimes are committed.
Walzer does not expect that there will be no civilian deaths, but if at all possible, morality dictates that essential rights not be violated. Only in the case of a supreme emergency does Walzer allow the violation of individual rights. However, he defines such an emergency as an imminent threat to the survival of a national or global community, and there must be no alternative means of adequately addressing the threat.
Although there are common moral standards, there is still much disagreement about their application to particular circumstances. Walzer allows for judgment in these cases. Such latitude does not undermine the existence of common moral standards; the common rationales and language used in defense of wartime actions, in fact, speak to the consensus on moral standards.
The Importance of Distinguishing a Just War from Justice in War
The distinction between the justice of war, jus ad bellum, and justice in war, jus in bello, is critical to Walzer’s theory of just and unjust wars. The combatants in just wars can be guilty of fighting unjustly while those fighting for an unjust cause can fight justly. Walzer provides examples from World War II, which had clear sides of justice and injustice on both sides. He cites times when the Allies, on the side of justice, fought unjustly by bombing population centers when not necessary. He also cites the actions of General Rommel, a German, as a form of just fighting. Since the book was first published in 1977, several academics have called for giving more latitude to those fighting for the side of justice. Walzer answers these academics in the postscript. In most wars, both sides claim to be on the side of justice and there is no objective adjudicator. As a result, there would be no constraints in war at all unless both sides of the conflict were obligated to observe the same moral rules.
All soldiers are equal on the battlefield, with a right to fight, but they are not responsible for the political decision to begin a war. In the aftermath of a war, the leaders and the citizens who supported those leaders can and should be held accountable for the decision to start an aggressive or unjust war. If soldiers, however, were given a policy veto, the international system of states would unravel. For justice in war to prevail, soldiers must follow the war convention or rules of war, and they are responsible for violating those rules. For example, soldiers who murder or rape civilians are accountable for those crimes. It is not enough for a soldier to fear demotion or reprimand for failing to obey an illegal order; the soldier must defend such actions on stronger grounds, such as self-defense. Officers bear more responsibility, as they must ensure that soldiers follow the war convention and that strategies are consistent with it.
Despite the centrality of this distinction, Walzer acknowledges that the two principles—just war and justice in war—can conflict. In the extremely rare case when there is both imminent danger and a catastrophic threat, such as the Nazis posed if victorious, unjust means can be invoked. There must not be an alternative means to stave off the threat. Walzer places the bar for such supreme emergencies very high. For example, he condemns the British violation of Norway’s neutrality rights early in the war. Such exceptional circumstances allow for violations of rights but only to ensure the survival of civilization and nations.
The Difficulty of Distinguishing Combatants from Noncombatants
The distinction between combatants and noncombatants is critical to just war theory, and they have different rights during a war. Although Walzer notes that most combatants are coerced into the role and would prefer not to be fighting, their role as soldiers makes them legitimate targets. They have a right to fight and are entitled to moral equality on the battlefield. If they surrender, they are not to be killed but instead quarantined. Noncombatants, in contrast, retain their rights and cannot be used for a military purpose. In modern warfare, munitions workers are considered combatants but only when at work. Otherwise, they and other noncombatants are not legitimate military targets.
Of course, noncombatants are killed in war: When unintentional, the military refers to this as collateral damage. Walzer seeks to make it more difficult to justify the killing of noncombatants by revising the double effect rule with the double intention rule, requiring that military planners work to ensure the reduction of evil, such as civilian deaths, even at some risk to soldiers in legitimate military actions. He cites the example of commando raids to stop the production of heavy water in Norway during World War II. Instead of air raids, which would endanger the civilian population, the first raids took place on the ground at higher risk to soldiers. This revision to the double effect rule prevents a test of proportionality only, with the evil, as long as it is unintended, weighed against the good. That is too weak of a standard and would allow for “blanket justification” (154) of killing noncombatants.
In many cases, the distinction between combatants and noncombatants is clear. Walzer condemns siege warfare, for example, because civilians suffer more than the military; they can be starved to death in mass numbers. For siege warfare to be just, Walzer argues that noncombatants must be given safe passage if they choose to leave. Walzer condemns terrorism, whatever its cause, for targeting noncombatants. Additionally, he places limits on reprisals, ensuring that they do not target noncombatants. Similarly, the neutrality of states should be respected in all cases other than when civilization or national survival is at risk. To violate neutrality is to bring those choosing to be noncombatants into war: Walzer criticizes England for violating the neutrality rights of Norway in World War II and Germany for violating Belgium’s neutrality rights in World War I.
In other forms of warfare, the line between combatants and noncombatants is more difficult to determine, and thus it is more difficult to establish a wartime code of conduct. For example, guerrilla warfare blurs the line between combatants and noncombatants, and this complicates the distinction between their rights. The economic disparities between the aggressors—who are from a wealthier and more powerful state—and defenders—who lack adequate military resources—determine the need for guerrilla warfare in the first place. When the disparity is too great, and when it is nearly impossible to distinguish combatants from noncombatants on the side of the guerrillas, Walzer advises not fighting against the guerrillas at all because the potential human rights violations is too great. Such was the argument of many opposed to the war in Vietnam, and many considered the United States guilty of severe human rights violations, devastation to the environment, and genocide.
Nuclear war complicates the distinction between combatants and noncombatants by erasing all political and military distinctions among a population: Nuclear weapons kill everyone. As a result, they cannot be accommodated by just war theory. Since, during the Cold War, deterrence rested on the threat on mutually assured destruction (MAD), Walzer morally condemns the use (or threat) of nuclear weapons but accepts the policy as a sort of permanent emergency. He would prefer other means be found to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war. According to Walzer’s theory, nuclear war can never be transformed from a military struggle to a non-violent political struggle because the potential destruction is too great.
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