Laches

Laches is a Socratic dialogue by Plato, set in ancient Athens, in which the philosopher Socrates and several prominent citizens attempt to define the virtue of courage. Like many of Plato's dialogues, it ends without a firm conclusion.

The dialogue opens with Lysimachus, son of the celebrated Athenian statesman Aristides the Just, addressing two Athenian generals, Nicias and Laches. Lysimachus and his friend Melesias, son of the politician Thucydides (not the famous historian), have brought the generals to watch an exhibition of fighting in heavy armor by a man named Stesilaus. The two fathers seek advice on educating their sons, named Aristides and Thucydides after their famous grandfathers. Both admit their own upbringings were neglected despite their fathers' greatness in public life, and they are determined not to repeat this failure.

Nicias and Laches agree to help, but Laches redirects the conversation toward Socrates, whom he identifies as someone always found where young men pursue worthy studies. Nicias endorses the suggestion, noting that Socrates recently recommended Damon, an excellent music teacher, for his sons. Lysimachus does not know Socrates but learns he is the son of his old friend Sophroniscus and welcomes him warmly. Laches vouches for Socrates by recounting his heroic conduct during the Athenian retreat from the battle of Delium.

Socrates defers to the generals, asking them to share their views on armored combat. Nicias argues in favor: The art provides superior exercise, trains men for combat, and encourages the study of military tactics. Laches disagrees, reasoning that if the art had real value, the Lacedaemonians (Spartans), the greatest warriors in Greece, would have adopted it. He recalls watching Stesilaus in actual combat aboard a ship, wielding a ridiculous hybrid weapon that became entangled in enemy rigging, exposing him to laughter from both crews. Laches concludes that the art would make a coward rash and expose a brave man to ridicule.

Lysimachus proposes accepting the majority opinion, but Socrates challenges this approach. He argues that one should follow the judgment of a genuine expert rather than count votes among non-experts. He then shifts the inquiry deeper: Before identifying the right teacher, they must determine the nature of what they wish to impart. The true object of their concern is the soul of the youth, and they must ask who among them understands how to care for it.

Socrates confesses he has no credentials, having never been able to afford instruction from the Sophists, the professional teachers of moral improvement, and never having discovered the art of virtue on his own. He notes that the generals' complete disagreement casts doubt on their expertise and urges Lysimachus to press them to name their teachers or admit they lack the necessary knowledge.

Lysimachus asks the generals to engage directly with Socrates. Both agree but reveal contrasting attitudes. Nicias warns that Socrates will draw any interlocutor into giving an account of his entire life; he accepts this as beneficial, citing the lawmaker Solon's maxim that one should desire to learn as long as one lives. Laches judges speakers by whether their words harmonize with their deeds and, having witnessed Socrates's courage at Delium, trusts that his words will prove equally worthy.

Socrates reframes the inquiry. Rather than asking about credentials, he proposes to investigate the nature of courage, the part of virtue to which armored combat supposedly contributes. He asks Laches directly: What is courage?

Laches answers that a courageous man remains at his post and fights the enemy rather than running away. Socrates challenges this by citing the Scythians, a nomadic people known for fighting while retreating, and Homer's praise of the Trojan hero Aeneas for skill in both pursuit and flight. He invokes the Lacedaemonians at the battle of Plataea, who first retreated from the Persians but then turned and won the battle. Laches concedes. Socrates broadens the inquiry, seeking a definition covering courage not only in warfare but in disease, poverty, politics, and struggles against desires and pleasures.

Laches offers a second definition: Courage is "a sort of endurance of the soul" (27). They agree that courage must be noble and that only wise endurance, not foolish endurance, qualifies. Yet counterexamples create a paradox: A soldier who endures with superior numbers and position fights wisely, but the man who endures against all disadvantages seems braver despite his foolish endurance. Foolish endurance thus appears to be courage, contradicting the premise that it is harmful. Laches admits the contradiction, frustrated that he feels he knows what courage is but cannot articulate it.

Socrates invites Nicias to join the inquiry. Nicias offers his own definition, drawn from a saying he attributes to Socrates: Courage is "the knowledge of that which inspires fear or confidence in war, or in anything" (33). He reasons that every person is good in what he is wise about; therefore, if the brave person is good, he must also be wise. Laches immediately objects that courage and wisdom are separate things, but Socrates suggests they examine the view rather than dismiss it.

Laches points out that physicians and farmers know the dangers in their fields, yet neither is courageous for that knowledge. Nicias responds that a physician can identify conditions but cannot judge whether death is truly terrible for a given person, since for some, death is preferable to life. Only the person who understands the genuine grounds of fear and hope deserves to be called courageous. Laches mockingly infers that only soothsayers, who claim to know the future, could then be courageous, but Nicias distinguishes between reading signs of future events and judging whether those outcomes are truly to be feared.

Socrates raises another difficulty: If courage requires this knowledge, no animal could be called courageous. Nicias accepts the implication, arguing that animals facing danger out of ignorance are merely fearless, not courageous, just as children who face danger without understanding it are not truly brave. True courage, he insists, is rare, while rashness and boldness are common.

Socrates undertakes a final examination. He secures agreement that courage is one part of virtue, alongside justice, temperance, and holiness, and that Nicias defines it as knowledge of future goods and evils. Socrates argues that knowledge cannot be divided by tense: Medicine examines health across all times, and the general claims mastery over the soothsayer precisely because military knowledge encompasses past, present, and future. Courage, therefore, cannot be limited to future goods and evils but must extend to knowledge of all good and evil at every time. A person with such comprehensive knowledge would possess not merely courage but complete virtue. Courage would become identical to the whole of virtue rather than a part of it, contradicting the premise with which they began. Nicias admits the contradiction: They have failed to discover what courage is.

The dialogue concludes in acknowledged failure but with a constructive turn. Both generals recommend that Lysimachus and Melesias entrust their sons' education to Socrates, but Socrates declines to claim superiority, noting that all three have been equally perplexed. He advises everyone present to seek the best teacher they can find for themselves as well as for the youths, regardless of expense or the embarrassment of studying at their age. Lysimachus embraces the proposal, declaring that as the oldest he is the most eager to learn, and invites Socrates to his house at dawn the next day. Socrates agrees.