54 pages • 1-hour read
No God but God: The Origins, Evolution, and Future of Islam
A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 9-10Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 9 Summary
In 1857, many Muslim and Hindu Indians revolted against the colonial rule of the British East India Company in protest both against economic subordination and the fear of being forced to convert to Christianity (a reasonable surmise in Aslan’s view). They lost, but the brute force the British used contrasted sharply with their claim to be benign agents of civilization. Some Indian Muslim “Modernists” like Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan remained loyal to Britain, finding fears of forced conversion unfounded, and believed the key to future prosperity lay in adapting Western ideas and technology to Muslim culture. Contemporary Islam, as he and others like him argued, need not be rigid and in fact the Ulama already had departed from the original roots of Muhammad’s pure preaching. These reformers wished to limit Shariah to purely religious matters.
Other reform movements popped up elsewhere in the colonial world, such as the Salafiyyah movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani in Egypt and the Young Ottomans in the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire. Unlike Ahmed Khan, al-Afghani committed himself to opposing European powers and believed that Islamic civilization was inherently superior to Western society and more socially just—provided the hidebound Ulama could be thwarted and the laws remade in the old tradition of independent ijtihad. Western society only had technological superiority, and that could be learned. In practice, both groups sought to fuse Western democracy with Islamic social ideals, separate the Ulama from political power, and cultivate a transnational sense of Islamic unity. Others agreed with many of these principles but doubted that Muslims could actually unite across their many religious divisions. These groups instead sought to resist colonialism through nationalist movements such as Pan-Arabism.
After the fall of the Ottoman caliphate at the end of World War I, Hasan al-Banna started the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt with a different vision: Modern society needed to be Islamized. Rejecting Modernists, the old Ulama, and nationalists, he sought to create a reform of modern society that would align it with Islam. In doing so, he created an extremely influential template for Muslim reformers: Aslan calls it “the first modern attempt to present Islam as an all-encompassing religious, political, social, economic, and culture system” (237). A renewed understanding of Islam could become the basis for addressing all problems in society. Al-Banna did not concentrate on the political implications of his vision; rather he worked primarily to build a social organization that helped those in need and, in doing so, won the hearts of many. When Egypt finally won its freedom under the leadership of nationalist military officers, the newly free and largely secular government banned all opposition parties and persecuted the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, the Muslim Brotherhood began to believe its reforms could only succeed with political power and began to pioneer “Islamic radicalism” under the leadership of Sayyid Qutb (238). Only by seizing power and imposing Islamic principles from above could Western corruption be effectively opposed and the oppressed faithful liberated. This movement of “Islamism” required no kings or caliphs; only Shariah would rule the nation.
Qutb’s Islamism spread through the Muslim world and combined with Wahhabism, a puritanical 18th-century Muslim reform movement in Arabia that sought to return Islam to its pure origins. It rejected rituals honoring Imams, Sufi saints, and even Muhammad as superstitions that detracted from the worship of one God. This ultraconservative Islam is called “Islamic fundamentalism,” though it differs markedly from Christian fundamentalism. It gained prominence through its alliance with the Saud family of Arabia, who joined in jihad with it against other Muslims to conquer and “purify” the holy places. The discovery of oil gave Saudi Arabia economic power. This fundamentalist state used its money to spread its ideology across the Middle East, especially to the radical faction of the Muslim Brotherhood. The luxury of the Saudi leaders, however, led radical Wahhabis to turn against the state—including one splinter group called al-Qaeda led by Osama bin Laden. Though most famous for its attack on the US on 9/11, the group also calls for the overthrow of sinful Muslim governments including the Saudis.
Chapter 10 Summary
Aslan opens the chapter with two contrasting portraits: his nervous and guilty return visit to Iran after an amnesty had been announced to those who had fled the country, and his running out with his four-year-old sister into the streets in 1979 to join the joyful crowds celebrating the successful Iranian Revolution. The initial constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran filled his family with hope since it promised democracy, equality of the sexes, an independent judiciary, and numerous rights and freedoms. It also pledged a government on Islamic principles, which (though positive in itself) included the absolute sovereignty of God vested solely in the person of Ayatollah Khomeini. In practice the state subordinated democratic ideals to absolute clerical control. When Iraq, with American support, invaded Iran the following year, Khomeini refused to allow public division in his country and used his powers to crush all dissenting voices. The result, Aslan charges, was the stifling of democratic ideals in Iran for years.
While acknowledging the many ways modern Muslims have approached religion and politics, Aslan argues Islam can be reconciled with liberal democracy. Indeed, “not only can it do so, it must” (253). For liberal democracy to succeed in a predominately Muslim culture, it must be grounded in Islamic values. That is why, Aslan argues, the colonial project of westernization failed. While the reconciliation of Islam and democracy is still a work in progress in Iran, it is in fact progressing, showing that this goal is possible. The clerical establishment hijacked the 1979 Revolution just as colonial powers hijacked earlier democratic revolutions in 1905 and 1953; but the pressure for democratic reform still exists. This is an essential part of the democratic “jihad” across the Muslim world to “strip the Traditionalist Ulama of their monopoly over the meaning and message of Islam and pave the way for the realization of the long-awaited and hard-fought Islamic Reformation” (254). Aslan believes that, just like Christianity underwent the Protestant Reformation (which he assumes to have been a positive, modernizing event), Islam too is destined for a reformation that will take power from reactionary clerics and create a better world.
For now, there is tremendous variety among countries that consider themselves Muslim. That is true even within single countries, as the succession of governments with different religious views in Muslim Pakistan illustrates. However, a true Muslim state based on the model of Medina would simply put the Ummah at its heart and take care of all its citizens based on Islamic values (while still respecting religious minorities). There is no reason why a democracy could not accomplish this goal. However, American democracy only makes sense in the context of American traditions, particularly its emphasis on separating religion and the state. The majority of Muslims, thanks to Modernist movements, already accept much of the language of representative democracy, and thus secularism is the major remaining obstacle to adopting the government system. Islam is a civilization more than just a religion; any successful government in a Muslim society must be a part of the civilization it is attempting to govern.
The harsh rules imposed by the Taliban in Afghanistan has admittedly made a government based on Islam seem antithetical to democratic ideals and gender equality. Many Americans assume secularism is a prerequisite for democracy. However, this ignores the key role of widespread Protestant beliefs in creating a shared framework of values in early American history. What makes American democracy—or any democracy—work is a commitment to pluralism rather than secularism. Muhammad’s attitude toward Jews and Christians (making them protected dhimmi and arguably envisioning them as an integral part of the Ummah) means pluralism has been part of Islam from the beginning. One can make many counterarguments: The historical view of Jews and Christians has varied considerably, Islamic states impose moral codes and provisions on non-believers, and the Quran urges attacks on polytheists. All these problems can and have been reinterpreted in ways that favor pluralism. In particular, the Traditionalist Ulama’s interpretations and the Wahhabi’s utopian fundamentalism must be challenged. Once democracy is firmly established, respect for human rights will gradually grow out of pluralism and Muhammad’s teachings on equality. The triumph of this vision of Islamic Reformation over the old oppressive Traditionalist’s and fundamentalist’s “false idols—bigotry and fanaticism” is a historical inevitability (266).
Chapters 9-10 Analysis
Chapters 9 and 10 have a marked shift of tone. Aslan’s writing becomes more passionate, personal, and polemic. Unlike the stories that opened the first nine chapters, two personal memories serve as the introductory stories for the final chapter. Presenting his own story of hopes raised and dashed gives the text an emotional tone and invites empathy with Iranians like Aslan who desire a just democratic system. This makes the average Muslim in the Middle East a sympathetic figure who is oppressed by both Western interference and fundamentalist radicals. Aslan says that Iranians’ democratic revolutions in 1905, 1953, and 1979 were all “hijacked” first by foreigners (such as the CIA) and then the Islamic clerical establishment, but Iranians’ desire for liberty and equality “must not be quelled” (254). The word “hijack” in a book inspired by the fallout from the 9/11 hijackers is a loaded term that puts opponents of Islamic democracy (including some Americans) in the same category as al-Qaeda terrorists. Aslan’s used of the subjunctive “must not” moves his argument from an indicative discussion of what happened in the past to stating his desire for the future, a desire that he insists is widely shared and the necessary next step in Islam’s historical evolution.
Chapter 10 makes clear what had been implicit in earlier chapters: that Aslan wants to offer a story of Islam compatible with democratic ideals and he believes Muhammad’s original preaching supports him. In describing Muhammad’s message, Aslan normally focuses on its positive statements; here, in contrast, he gleefully quotes the Prophet’s decree that those who opposed his egalitarian message “will be thrown into Hell” (264). Aslan applies this to those who oppose human rights in Islam. Aslan’s admiration for Islam and Muhammad’s social message are apparent throughout the book, but nonetheless he usually puts his scholarly persona at the forefront. In these last two chapters, he still narrates a history full of information and analysis. The language becomes more argumentative and personal, though, alternatively condemning some positions and building support for others through both rational and emotional appeals.
Aslan’s shift toward polemic does sometimes color his judgment and lead to questionable assertions. For example, one of the sparks of the 1857 Great Indian Rebellion was the rumor that the rifle cartridges issued to British Indian soldiers had been sealed with pig and cow fat. Since these cartridges had to be bitten open and since Hindus could not eat cows and Muslims could not eat pigs, this was seen by disgruntled native soldiers as a deliberate ploy to make them violate their religious beliefs. In his rush to condemn European colonialism (which certainly did horrible things), Aslan reports this rumor as fact: The soldiers “discovered that their rifle cartridges had been greased with beef and pork fat […] their greatest fears were confirmed [emphasis added]” (224). Aslan admits some Indians ridiculed the notion of a forced conversion plot but asserts that they deliberately blinded themselves to the “preponderance of evidence” (226). In fact, most scholars agree that there is no evidence of a deliberate British plot to use religiously offensive fat. After the rebellion ended, the British government investigated if such fat was even used: Some of the sealants definitely did not contain it, and others’ composition could not be reliably determined, but no one knowingly distributed it (e.g., LeClair, Daniel. “The ‘Greased Cartridge Affair’: Re-Examining the Pattern 1853 Enfield Cartridge and Its Role in the Indian Mutiny of 1857.” International Ammunition Association Journal, vol. 504, 2015).
Similarly, Aslan carelessly writes that in 1980 Saddam Hussain of Iraq “encouraged by the United States and furnished with chemical and biological materials from the Centers for Disease Control and the Virginia-based company the American Type Culture Collection, launched an attack on Iranian soil” (252-53). The simplest reading of this sentence is that the US gave biological and chemical weapons to Iraq and then Saddam used them to attack Iran. In fact, the report Aslan cites shows that the CDC sent anthrax and other materials to Iraq in 1985-88—half a decade after the invasion started—in accord with international treaties encouraging medical research. This material would later be used by Iraq to develop biological weapons, and the CDC was criticized after the report for its naivete in handing over such dangerous bacteria. But it is unlikely that the US intended Iraq to develop such weapons, and it is certain that it came too late for Iraq to have the time to develop and use such weapons against Iran from those materials (The Associated Press. “U.S. Supplied the Kinds of Germs Iraq Later Used for Biological Weapons.” The Gainesville Sun, 1 Oct. 2002). America can be legitimately criticized for the support it gave dubious regimes such as Saddam’s Iraq, but Aslan’s sensationalistic reporting of the evidence here undermines his ability to do so.
It should be noted that this book was written in 2005. As such, Aslan could not address key pro-democratic events and the often harsh government responses in Muslim countries that have happened since then. These include the Arab Spring uprisings from Tunisia to Egypt to Syria, the shift of Turkish democracy from secularism to explicitly embracing Islam, the creation of a democratic state in Iraq following the American invasion, and the Green Movement and Mahsa Amini protests in Iran.
Unlock all 54 pages of this Study Guide
Get in-depth, chapter-by-chapter summaries and analysis from our literary experts.
- Grasp challenging concepts with clear, comprehensive explanations
- Revisit key plot points and ideas without rereading the book
- Share impressive insights in classes and book clubs