On Freedom

Borrowed from the history of Nazi propaganda and applied to contemporary politics, the “big lie” refers to a falsehood so large that it demands belief once violence is committed in its name. Snyder shows how Hitler’s antisemitic conspiracy and Trump’s election denial both functioned as big lies that reshaped institutions and generated unfreedom.

Edith Stein’s philosophical distinction structures Snyder’s first form of freedom, sovereignty. Körper refers to the body as object, while Leib refers to the lived, subjective body capable of agency and empathy. Recognizing others as Leib is essential for freedom, while reducing them to Körper enables dehumanization and manipulation.

Snyder insists that democracy is not a static noun but an ongoing practice. This reframing underscores his central claim that freedom requires continual renewal through participation, responsibility, and solidarity. It functions as a thematic touchstone for the book’s conclusion.

Defined as a mode of knowledge, empathy enables recognition of others as subjects. For Snyder, empathy is a precondition for sovereignty because it grounds understanding in intersubjective experience. Without empathy, freedom collapses into isolation and ignorance.

The fourth form of freedom in Snyder’s schema, factuality, refers to the shared truths that anchor human action. Snyder argues that without facts, societies devolve into spectacle and manipulation. From climate denial to election lies, attacks on factuality corrode all other forms of liberty.

One of Snyder’s “time warps,” the politics of inevitability, assumes that the future is guaranteed by markets or progress. He argues that this mindset discourages agency and blinds citizens to threats. In contrast, freedom requires recognizing multiple possible futures and choosing responsibly among them.

The third form of freedom, mobility involves the ability to move through space, time, and values. Snyder shows how mobility depends on infrastructure, healthcare, and education, linking individual liberty to collective supports. Immobility—through poverty, incarceration, or inequality—serves as a form of unfreedom.

Adapted from Hannah Arendt but reframed by Snyder, natality emphasizes beginnings, birth, and generational renewal as the true ground of liberty. By locating the origins of freedom in the beginning stages of life, Snyder counters traditions that define freedom in abstract or fatalistic terms.

Often defined as “freedom from” interference, negative freedom is the foil against which Snyder develops his argument. He argues that this conception of freedom is repressive, leaving people vulnerable to domination and manipulation. Negative freedom is characterized in the text as both a philosophical error and a political trap.

Snyder’s neologism for an age of “no truths,” notalitarianism describes a condition where endless feelings and falsehoods replace factuality. In contrast to totalitarianism, which imposes a single truth, notalitarianism erodes the shared reality necessary for solidarity and democratic freedom.

Defined as rule by a small group, typically the very wealthy, oligarchy appears in Snyder’s analysis as both an equilibrium and a threat to liberty. Concentrated wealth distorts political debate, restricts mobility, and undermines solidarity. Oligarchy functions as one of the structural enemies of democratic freedom.

Snyder’s term for a style of politics that gains legitimacy by spreading resentment rather than improving conditions. Instead of building infrastructure or redistributing wealth, leaders practicing sadopopulism channel suffering into envy and comparison. This strategy immobilizes societies while fostering authoritarian rule.

The first form of freedom in Snyder’s framework, sovereignty is rooted in the embodied recognition of self and others. Rather than state power, Snyder grounds sovereignty in the person, beginning with birth and caregiving. Sovereignty illustrates how freedom emerges from empathy, attention, and social structures of support.

The fifth and final form of freedom, solidarity ties individual liberty to collective responsibility. Snyder argues that free speech, voting, and civic life only exist when sustained by communities and institutions. Solidarity represents his strongest rebuttal to libertarian and purely individualist notions of freedom.

Snyder derives his concept of authoritarian spectacle from Guy Debord’s influential 1967 book The Society of the Spectacle. Contrasted with factuality, spectacle describes a condition in which appearances and reactions replace truth and action. Snyder warns that when facts are abandoned, spectacle fills the void, creating environments ripe for authoritarian manipulation. The term links media culture to the erosion of liberty.

The second form of freedom, unpredictability, emerges when individuals act from values in ways that cannot be foreseen by authorities or machines. Snyder uses dissident movements and cultural unpredictability as evidence that liberty thrives on novelty, variety, and judgment.