On the Citizen

Thomas Hobbes's De Cive (On the Citizen), first privately circulated in 1642 and published in an expanded edition in 1647, is a foundational work of political philosophy that constructs a systematic argument for absolute sovereign authority. Though designed as the third section of Hobbes's projected Elementa Philosophiae, it was the first section completed. The work is divided into three parts: "Liberty," "Government," and "Religion."

In the Epistle Dedicatory, addressed to William, Earl of Devonshire, Hobbes frames his project by contrasting two maxims: among fellow citizens, "Man is a God to man," but among commonwealths, "Man is a wolf to Man" (Epistle Dedicatory [2]). He argues that moral philosophy has failed where geometry succeeded, and that previous philosophers erred by beginning from the wrong starting point. Beginning from the question of how property arose, Hobbes concluded that it originates in human agreement rather than nature, and from this inquiry he derived two foundational postulates: human greed, by which each person insists on private use of common property, and natural reason, by which each person strives to avoid violent death. In the Preface, he compares analyzing a commonwealth to disassembling a clock and establishes his foundational empirical principle: Without fear of a common power, men will distrust and fear each other. People admit this through their actions, locking doors and arming themselves, even while denying it in argument.

Part I, "Liberty," opens by rejecting Aristotle's axiom that man is naturally a political animal. Hobbes argues that voluntary associations arise from self-interest, not love of others, and that mutual fear, understood broadly as anticipation of future evil, is the true origin of lasting societies. He asserts natural equality among men, since even the weakest can kill the strongest. In the state of nature, three sources of conflict prevail: the contrast between defensive actors and those driven by vainglory, or an inflated sense of one's own superiority; intellectual dissension over doctrines; and competition for scarce resources. Since self-preservation is not contrary to right reason, each person has liberty to use any means to protect his life, yielding the right of all men to all things. The natural state is therefore war, defined not as constant fighting but as the known willingness to contend by force. The fundamental law of nature follows: Seek peace when hope of peace exists; seek aid for war when peace cannot be had.

Chapter II defines natural law as the dictate of right reason about what should be done for the longest possible preservation of life. The first derived law holds that the right of all men to all things must not be retained; certain rights must be transferred, since retaining them leads to war. Hobbes defines a contract as reciprocal transfer of rights and an agreement (pactum) as a contract involving promised future performance. Agreements of mutual trust are invalid in the state of nature if justified fear arises but valid in a civil state where a common power can compel performance. No agreement not to resist lethal violence can bind, because everyone will by natural necessity choose fighting over certain death.

Chapter III enumerates 20 laws of nature derived from the requirement of peace. The second law is to keep faith. Hobbes defines wrong (injuria) as breach of an agreement, distinguishing it from mere harm. The remaining laws prescribe gratitude, considerateness, pardon, forward-looking punishment, restraint from insult, recognition of natural equality, modesty, fairness, common use of indivisible goods, arbitration, and temperance. A practical test summarizes them all: "Do not do to another what you would not have done to you" (III.26). Natural laws always bind in conscience but obligate in practice only when they can be kept safely. Hobbes equates natural law with moral law, since reason teaches that peace and the virtues necessary for it are good. Chapter IV confirms each law by citing corresponding biblical passages.

Part II, "Government," argues that natural laws alone cannot guarantee security. Mere accord is insufficient because coalitions collapse once private interests diverge. Unlike bees, whose appetites are uniform, humans are divided by competition for honor, differing opinions, and the inflammatory power of language. What is required is union: each person must subject his will to one man or one assembly by mutual agreement. Hobbes defines the commonwealth as one person whose will, by agreement of several men, is taken as the will of them all for common peace and defense. He identifies two types: the natural commonwealth, arising from force, and the commonwealth by design, arising from voluntary agreement.

Chapter VI derives the sovereign's specific rights: punishment (the "Sword of Justice"), war and peace (the "Sword of War"), judgment, legislation, appointment of officials, and control of doctrines. The sovereign is immune from punishment, not bound by civil laws, and cannot be stripped of power without his own consent. Property originates with the commonwealth, and what counts as theft, murder, or adultery is determined by civil law. Chapter VII distinguishes three forms of government, namely democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, rejecting tyranny and oligarchy as mere pejorative names and denying the possibility of mixed government. Chapters VIII and IX treat dominion over slaves and children, with Hobbes arguing that dominion over an infant belongs originally to the mother, since the newborn is first in the mother's power. Chapter X argues monarchy's superiority on practical grounds: monarchs have fewer dependents to enrich, assemblies deliberate poorly due to ignorance and factionalism, and laws become unstable as majorities shift. Chapter XII identifies seditious doctrines that dissolve commonwealths, including the beliefs that individuals may judge good and evil, that tyrannicide is lawful, and that sovereign power can be divided. Chapter XIII states that the sovereign's supreme duty is "the safety of the people" (XIII.2), understood not as mere survival but as a happy life, requiring military readiness, equal taxation, sound education, and restraint in legislation.

Part III, "Religion," argues that God's right to reign rests on irresistible power alone, not on agreement, citing God's answer to Job as justification drawn from power rather than human guilt. The laws of God's natural kingdom are exactly the natural laws already enumerated. In the natural kingdom, the commonwealth determines the forms of public worship, and the sovereign interprets all laws, sacred and secular. Chapter XVI traces how civil authority and the authority to interpret God's Word remained united throughout Israelite history, from Moses through the kings to the priests after the Babylonian captivity. Chapter XVII argues that Christ's kingdom does not begin until the day of judgment, citing "My Kingdom is not of this world" (XVII.5). In this world, Christ's regime is pastoral, not royal: He teaches and persuades but does not judge property disputes or make new laws. A Christian commonwealth and a Christian church are the same entity under two names. The sovereign retains interpretive authority over scripture, though in matters concerning the mysteries of faith, the Christian sovereign must exercise this authority through duly ordained pastors.

The final chapter argues that salvation requires two things: obedience, understood as the will to obey, and faith. Hobbes advances the controversial thesis that only one article of internal faith is necessary for salvation, namely that Jesus is the Christ. Profession of additional articles may be required as a matter of civil obedience, but internal belief in them is not necessary for salvation. In all temporal matters, God's commands are the laws of the commonwealth; in spiritual matters, they are the doctrines published by ordained pastors. If a sovereign commands denial of Christ, the Christian must accept martyrdom rather than obey but may not actively resist. Hobbes closes by observing that most disputed religious doctrines concern not salvation but political power, profit, or intellectual preeminence.