Politics Among Nations

The “struggle” for power is reflected in both domestic and international politics, although among Western countries, domestic political situations tend to be “more stable and less subject to violent change” than international politics. Morgenthau argues that there are “three basic patterns” behind all politics, which are “to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power” (53). Nations seeking to increase power adopt aggressive stances, while those that want to demonstrate power try to improve their standing. Finally, nations that want to keep their existing power work to preserve the status quo.

Morgenthau defines the status quo as “the maintenance of the distribution of power which exists at a particular moment in history” (53). He cites examples of treaties and agreements that seek to return to the status quo after a war, such as the 1815 Treaty of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty of 1920.

What Imperialism Is Not

Morgenthau accuses critics of US and British foreign policy for overusing the term “imperialism.” He counters that “[n]ot every foreign policy aiming at an increase in the power of a nation is necessarily a manifestation of imperialism” (59), nor is every foreign policy that seeks to preserve the power of an already existing empire. Morgenthau uses the example of British imperialism, which he argues did not become a common term until the late 19th century, when British foreign policy was focused on the consolidation of the nation’s territories, not on expansion. Similarly, Morgenthau points out that debates over American imperialism did not really begin until after the United States had finished most of its expansion.

Economic Theories of Imperialism

There are three different theories contending that economics is a basis for imperialism. The first is Marxist theory, which argues that capitalist interests drive societies to expand via colonization and conquest in order to create and expand markets. Similarly, the liberal theory of imperialism holds that imperialism is driven by a “surplus of goods and capital which seeks outlets in foreign markets” (62). The last theory, the devil theory, suggests that corporations that profit directly from military expansion (e.g., weapons manufacturers) pressure governments to adopt imperialist policies.

Morgenthau rejects all three theories, arguing instead that historically few modern wars were fought mainly or entirely for economic reasons. Instead, he contends that most major modern wars that occurred during the period of major capitalist expansion in the late 19th and early-to-mid 20th centuries (e.g., the Crimean War of 1854-1856, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, and the two World Wars) were fought “for the purpose of establishing a new distribution of power” (63).

Morgenthau also refutes the idea that premodern history supports economic theories of imperialism. Ancient and medieval imperialist powers like the empire of Alexander the Great and the Islamic Caliphate primarily sought to overturn existing political orders and achieve power. He also asserts that capitalists have historically opposed wars and aggressive foreign policies because war “carries with it an element of irrationality and chaos which is alien to the very spirit of capitalism” (66).

Despite these criticisms, economic imperialism has been a popular explanation for the rise of European, American, and Japanese colonial empires. One reason for this is that the influence of capitalism over society in the 19th and 20th centuries created the impression that business interests controlled foreign policies.

Different Types of Imperialism

Instead of offering economic explanations, Morgenthau asserts that imperialism emerges from specific types of political circumstances. He proposes three “inducements” that motivate nations to adopt imperialism: victorious war, lost war, and weakness. “Victorious war” occurs when a nation must fight a defensive war against an aggressive nation. When the nation being attacked wins the war, they alter the status quo in their favor. An example of this dynamic can be found in the ancient Roman victory over the Carthaginians.

The second inducement, “lost war,” is a case in which a once-subordinate national power seeks to overturn the status quo and expand its influence at the expense of other nations that once marginalized it via their own imperialist expansions. This dynamic played out during the time frame from 1935 to the end of World War II, when Germany acted against the dominant European nations that defeated it in World War I.

The last inducement is “weakness,” when weak nations or “power vacuums” give a strong nation opportunities for expansion (69). One example can be found in the expansion of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe after World War II.

The first of the three common goals of imperialism is to achieve a world empire; this dynamic is seen with Alexander the Great, Napoleon, and Adolf Hitler and is defined as “an urge toward expansion which knows no rational limits, feeds on its own successes and, if not stopped by a superior force, will go on to the confines of the political world” (69). Continental empires are defined by the efforts of a nation to become the dominant power on a continent. The last common goal is local preponderance, in which a nation tries to become predominant “within self-chosen limits” (70).

Also, there are three different methods of imperialism. The first is military imperialism, which is imperialism achieved through conquest. Economic imperialism is the use of economic influence to develop indirect control over other nations using “economic control” (73). The last category is cultural imperialism, which occurs when a nation successfully influences the citizens of another nation through cultural appeal, entertainment media, and political propaganda.

These methods are not mutually exclusive and have often coincided with each other. Cultural imperialism often supports both military and economic imperialism or closely accompanies economic imperialism alone. The use of economic and cultural imperialism instead of military imperialism has increased in the period since World War II because of the fear of nuclear war.

How to Detect and Counter an Imperialistic Policy

One important point for foreign policy experts to determine is whether a nation is acting in an imperialistic manner or is acting merely to preserve a status quo. Morgenthau suggests that the failure of nations to identify and address imperialism ultimately led to the two World Wars and to the rise of Adolf Hitler.

Nations seeking to preserve a status quo “can be dealt with by a policy of give and take, of balance, of compromise” (77). However, nations with an imperialistic policy do not accept compromise and can only be dealt with by containment, which means to force them into specific geopolitical boundaries that they cannot try to exceed without triggering the threat of war.

Morgenthau defines “appeasement” as an attempt to deal with an imperialist nation using the sort of foreign policy that would work with a nation supporting a status quo. In this context, he describes appeasement as “a corrupted policy of compromise” (78), in which victories by the imperialist nation might mistakenly be seen as successful compromises. This is what happened with early attempts to negotiate with Hitler. However, “containment” could force an imperialist nation to adopt a status-quo stance and accept a compromise.

Conversely, leaders may mistakenly treat a status-quo foreign policy as an imperialistic one, leading to a series of misunderstandings that eventually results in a war. In this type of situation, fear of other nations becomes a major factor that leads to increased militarism, regardless of the actual long-term motivations of the nations involved. Morgenthau claims that the causes of World War I involved such a situation.

One problem in determining whether or not a foreign policy is imperialistic is that not every policy of aggression or conquest is actually imperialistic. Also, nations that seek to achieve economic power may be doing so out of self-interest or survival, not in order to pursue a policy of economic imperialism. Furthermore, policies of cultural and economic imperialism may stop being imperialistic as a result of changes in political circumstances. The types of imperialism adopted by a nation may also change; for example, a localized imperial nation may become one that is attempting to achieve a world empire. Thus, “policies and counter-policies are ever subject to re-evaluation and reformulation” (85).

The idea of the “policy of prestige” has “rarely been recognized in modern political literature” (86) as being a form of the struggle for power. Morgenthau explain this oversight as a result of scholars who focus more on more overt and tangible forms of power, such as military aggression. Also, prestige is incorrectly associated with the outmoded, “aristocratic,” pre-19th-century form of diplomacy and international relations. Finally, policies to build prestige are so commonly used that they are often not seen as being worthy of analysis. However, Morgenthau asserts that prestige is an important component of international relations.

Diplomatic Ceremonial

An example of power achieved through a policy of prestige occurred in 1804, when Napoleon crowned himself emperor of the French rather than being crowned by the Pope, as would have been traditional.

Prestige serves as a means for a nation to represent its own military and economic power, the power that it aspires to have, or the power that it wants others to believe it has. This dynamic is still relevant for modern nations.

Display of Military Force

Demonstrations with armies and navies have also been employed to project prestige in a way that exhibits a nation’s military capabilities. These displays often take the form of naval maneuvers, military mobilizations, or demonstrations made to foreign observers.

Two Objectives of the Policy of Prestige

Morgenthau names two “ultimate objectives” that can come from a policy of prestige: “prestige for its own sake” (94) or prestige to further either a status quo or imperialistic policy. The former are rarer and are only enacted by “foolhardy egocentrics” (94). The latter is based on calculations of a nation’s relative power compared to other nations, such as by projecting strength to weaker nations in order to preserve the status quo. The ideal method is to achieve policy goals without having to use military force, as this approach gives a strong nation a “reputation for power tempered by self-restraint” (96).

Three Corruptions of the Policy of Prestige

It is possible for a nation to miscalculate by attempting a policy of prestige “out of all proportion” to the nation’s “actual importance” (97). On the other hand, it is also possible for a strong nation to avoid losing prestige even in the midst of military losses, as when France maintained its prestige even after giving up its colonial territories in North Africa and Southeast Asia.

It is possible for a nation in a position of weakness to employ a “policy of bluff” (98), but in order to succeed, this method must draw upon that nation’s earlier successes. Overall, the “discrepancy between prestige and actual power ought not to be a matter of indifference” (100).

The Nature of Political Ideologies

Morgenthau argues that the fact that politics is a “struggle for power” is “concealed” by ideology. The closer politicians are to a particular political conflict, the more likely they are to believe that the conflict actually is ideological. Conversely, the further politicians are from a conflict, the more likely they are to recognize it as a power struggle. Failing to deny that a policy is concerned with power will risk alienating that nation’s people and gaining the hostility of other nations.

Typical Ideologies of Foreign Policies

It is safer and easier for status-quo foreign policies to be framed openly as being concerned with power. This is because the status quo has, “by virtue of its very existence, acquired a certain moral legitimacy” (104-05). Still, concealment might be important to “allay the resentment of other nations and its own scruples” (105). International law and peace are two common examples of ideological concealment. After World War I, these justifications became “rather common” (106).

Ideological concealment is much more important for imperialism because “imperialism always has the burden of proof” (106). Also, imperialism is naturally opposed to international law and instead appeals to a “higher law” (106). Those who embrace imperialist foreign policies often justify them by framing them as opposition to a status quo that resulted from the imperialist nation’s past defeat or by claiming that the conquest of weaker nations is justified by a “just natural law” (107). One such example is the so-called “white man’s burden” (107), a deeply racist belief that was popular in the heyday of British imperialism and posited that it was the duty of white imperialists to “civilize” the rest of the world. In the modern era, eugenics and racial supremacy have similarly been used as justifications for imperialistic foreign policies.

Ironically, Morgenthau argues that the most effective ideological concealment has “been the ideology of anti-imperialism” (108). For example, Nazi Germany justified its invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 by claiming that it was opposing Soviet imperialism. Another justification that has emerged in present circumstances has been the “drastic differences in standards of living” between developed industrial nations and nations that were recently colonies of imperialist nations (109). Morgenthau argues that the ideological view that the latter have been disadvantaged because of colonialism is not entirely valid; he contends that the problems of these nations had causes beyond colonialism. Also, taking a stance of ideological anti-imperialism conceals the fact that the “real object is exactly a new distribution of power” (110). For Morgenthau, this dynamic is demonstrated by the fact that the governments of countries that were recently colonies generally cannot drastically improve the lives of their people without accepting revolutionary change that would threaten their own power.

Anti-imperialism as an ideology “draws its effectiveness from its ambiguity” (110) and from the fact that it can easily be used for defending both the status quo and imperialist purposes. Before the 20th century, preserving the “balance of power” was used to justify imperialism and the status quo (110). In the 20th century, including with Nazi Germany, the “principle of national self-determination” has similarly been used as a motive for military action (111). Similarly, the ideological use of anti-imperialism can be seen in appeals to the legitimacy of the United Nations, while ideological concealment can be seen in the use of campaigns for nuclear disarmament. Morgenthau argues that “well-nigh universal professions of peaceful intentions are meaningless as references to the actual foreign policies pursued, since […] all nations would rather pursue their aims by peaceful means than by war” (112).

The Problem of Recognition

Ideological concealment makes it difficult “to determine correctly the character of the foreign policy with which one happens to deal” (112). Mussolini’s and Hitler’s governments are examples of a failure to truly recognize a foreign policy until it is too late. In the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union have used anti-imperialist claims, using propaganda to advance the argument that they are fighting the other’s imperialism; the two superpowers also claim that they have no desire to expand and that they want to establish free governments around the world. To see through the use of ideological concealment, one must consider “the sum total of the factors determining the foreign policy of a nation” (114).