Politics Among Nations

Geography

Geographical circumstances can either protect a nation or make it vulnerable. The author cites the example of the Pyrenees mountain range, which provides a natural barrier that has helped to protect Spain but has also isolated Spain from broader social and political developments in the rest of Europe. On the other hand, Russia’s lack of a natural western border (e.g., mountains or a body of water) has historically rendered it vulnerable to invasions. Also, the threat of nuclear war has made the geographical size of a country even more important, as a larger nation is more likely to survive a nuclear strike.

Natural Resources

Achieving self-sufficiency in food production is important for a nation, especially because other nations can disrupt a nation’s importation of food during times of war, as has happened with Britain.

Food self-sufficiency has been a strength for the United States, but a lack of food has weakened nations like India, which become dependent on aid from other nations.

Self-sufficiency in the production of raw materials is important for industry and for war. The “mechanization” of warfare has only increased the urgency of gaining access to certain raw materials. Generally speaking, changes in military technology can render previously unnecessary raw materials essential, as when the importance of uranium rose sharply after the invention of the nuclear bomb.

Technological and military changes have greatly impacted the valuation of raw materials. After the start of World War I, access to oil strengthened some nations, such as the Soviet Union, and weakened others. However, in the 1970s, the oil-producing nations of the Middle East managed to coordinate economic pressure on wealthy nations by using access to oil as a pressure point; these developments proved that oil-producing nations have an advantage even over nations with strong industrial sectors, like Japan. Oil-producing nations are also in a position to exercise power over the United States, the political and economic allies of which are more dependent on oil than the United States is itself. Such a case illustrates “the utter irrationality” of leaving the control of oil and nuclear bombs to a few specific nations (136).

Industrial Capacity

Possessing raw materials does not always guarantee a national power. For example, the Congo “has vast deposits of high-grade uranium,” but this fact “has not affected the power of the Congo in relation to other nations” because the Congo does not have the industrial capacity to exploit its own uranium (136). Examples of the opposite case can be found the United States and the Soviet Union, which both have large amounts of coal and iron and the industrial resources needed to process them. As a result of such situations, the most powerful nations in the modern era are also the most industrialized ones. The superpowers are distinguished by their nuclear arsenals and by their “virtual industrial self-sufficiency and their technological capacity to stay abreast of the other nations” (138). They also benefit from the fact that other nations are dependent on them for technological and military support.

Military Preparedness

Military technology can easily give nations a vast advantage; for example, in the 15th century, the impact of new artillery technology in Europe gave France a huge military advantage over the Italian city-states. In the 20th century, the submarine, the tank, the ability to coordinate air forces with the navy and soldiers on land, and the development of nuclear weapons all proved to be dramatically decisive factors for the first nation to use them.

However, there are “paradoxes” with nuclear technology. Once a nation has amassed a decisive number of nuclear weapons, increasing its arsenal of nuclear weapons further does not increase its power—simply because nuclear weapons are so destructive. Another paradox caused by nuclear weapons’ unique destructive power is that they cannot “be used for rational military purposes” (140).

Even with the importance of military technology, “military leadership has always exerted a decisive influence upon national power” (141). Besides the obvious benefits of intelligent military leadership, there is the problem of leadership that has not updated its knowledge of technology and tactics since the previous war.

A poorly organized military can be a significant disadvantage, even for a nation with advanced military technology. Nations must successfully balance the size of their militaries and the resources that they can and should spend to support their military forces.

Population

There is no automatic link between the size of a nation’s population and the extent of its power. Still, nations such as the United States have historically benefited from “waves of mass immigration” (143). For a nation to be a “first rank” power, it must have “a population sufficiently large to create and apply the material implements of national power” (145). Nonetheless, a large population can also be a problem for nations that lack sufficient resources, such as food.

Although there is not always a direct correlation between a nation’s power and its population, population growth or the lack thereof can help to predict a nation’s future prospects. However, there are nuances, as populations that are younger offer more of an advantage, on average.

National Character

“[N]ational character and national morale” are both difficult to understand rationally (146). However, they also have an influence over national power. Morgenthau argues that nations have traits that are historically expressed in their people’s intellectual and cultural contributions, such as the “trait of intellectual curiosity” shown by the French or the “individualism” of the British (147).

Some national characters are more beneficial than others when it comes to supporting national power. Morgenthau cites the examples of Russia’s “elementary force and persistence,” the United States’ “individual initiative and inventiveness,” and Germany’s “discipline and thoroughness” (151). The authoritarian tendencies in the German and Russian national characters give these nations an advantage in power. Nonetheless, during World War II, the Germans suffered because they underestimated Americans’ “individual initiative, gift for improvisation, and technical skill” (152).

National Morale

National morale is defined as “the degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or war” (153). National morale affects military activity, production, diplomacy, and public support.

Foreign policy depends on the mood or morale of a nation’s public, which can change under the pressure of specific circumstances at any time. Morgenthau asserts that “[t]he breaking point is different for different peoples and under different circumstances” (154).

National morale is important not just during war but during any foreign-policy issue. Ethnic divisions within a nation’s population can pose a morale problem. For example, in the late 19th and early 20th century, the Slavic segments of Austria-Hungary’s population tended to oppose Austria-Hungary’s foreign policy, to the point that they supported Slavic nations against Austria-Hungary’s interests.

Autocratic states try to control public opinion through “democratic symbols” (157), authoritarian pressure, and government policies that ostensibly benefit the people. Democratic nations have to manage the conflicts that arise between different forces and opposing segments of the population. The problem with democracies is that “they can never be sure of the support of their peoples” (158). Still, democracies have the advantage in that foreign policies are most likely to be aligned with public opinion. If a “truly representative” government has democratic institutions and implements foreign policies that reflect the popular will (158), it will be the most successful at managing national morale.

The Quality of Diplomacy

Just as “national morale” is the “soul” of a nation, diplomacy is “the brains of national power” (159). Diplomacy can bridge the gap between a nation’s available resources and its foreign policy. For example, after World War I, Romania was able to play a significant role in international relations, as it exhibited good diplomacy despite being a minor power.

The Quality of Government

Good government requires three factors: “balance between […] the material and human resources” (162), a balance with available resources, and public sentiment. In order to achieve good government, a nation must base its foreign policy objectives on the amount of power that it has. However, the exception is “when the very existence of the nation is at stake” (163), in which case a nation must employ any policy needed to survive, regardless of its power.

After a nation balances its power with its desired foreign policy, it must then achieve the “right admixture […] of those resources of power which will allow it to pursue a given foreign policy with a maximum chance of success” (163). For example, in order for a large population to be a benefit, a nation must also have adequate food resources.

In addition to the balance between different types of resources and power, democratic nations must also ensure public support. This is a problem because the public may or may not support a good foreign policy. To deal with the issue of public opinion, a government must recognize that a split between public opinion and good foreign policy can only be partially mitigated. Also, a nation must know that a government can act to change public opinion. Finally, it must understand what will be “essential” to its foreign policy and what can be sacrificed.

Morgenthau stresses that, especially in the Cold War era, a successful foreign policy requires convincing other governments and populations through the means of propaganda. The Cold War is defined by the fact that the Soviet Union and the United States “compete with each other not only as the two political and military superpowers but also as the foremost representatives of two different political philosophies, systems of governments, and ways of life” (169). Because of the importance of image and propaganda, there is less of a distinction between domestic and foreign policies than there was in the past.

The Task of Evaluation

For a good foreign policy, domestic factors affecting national power also have to be evaluated. Any analysis must also account for present-day international relations and possible changes in the future, even though political and diplomatic factors “are in constant flux” (172). Even with the best informational sources and the most intelligent people, some situations cannot be predicted. A foreign policy’s success or failure depends on the number and importance of correct and incorrect assumptions, and “the success of the foreign policy of a nation may be due less to the accuracy of its own calculations than to the greater errors of the other side” (173).

Typical Errors of Evaluation

There are three general types of errors in foreign-policy analysis: believing that a nation will always be powerful or weak, assuming that a certain political factor will always be true, and focusing on one factor while ignoring others.

The power of a nation is determined relative to other nations. The error of evaluating the extent of a nation’s power comes from assuming that the “power of a nation” relative to that of others will remain constant.

Similarly, this type of “miscalculation” presupposes that a nation that was once powerful will always remain that powerful, and vice versa. Morgenthau cites the example of the United States’ assumption that it will always dominate Central and South America.

The last kind of miscalculation occurs when an analysis focuses on a single factor and ignores the others. For example, Morgenthau views geopolitics as “a pseudoscience erecting the factor of geography into an absolute that is supposed to determine the power, and hence the fate, of nations” (178). Morgenthau rejects the geopolitical view that history is shaped mainly by geography.

Another type of miscalculation is nationalism. In this view, foreign relations are driven by immutable factors of nation and race. This pattern is seen in nations that engage in “the racist worship of the national character” (180). The third and last type of miscalculation is militarism: “the conception that the power of a nation consists primarily, if not exclusively, in its military strength” (181).