Politics Among Nations

Divide and Rule

One method for preserving the balance of power is the concept of divide and rule, which occurs when one strong nation works diplomatically to thwart an alliance among weaker nations or to turn those weaker nations against a strong rival. One example is the long-time French policy of keeping Germany divided between smaller nations. This approach can also be achieved when one nation gives strength to another.

Compensations

A common method for preserving a balance of power in the 18th and 19th centuries was the use of territorial compensations, in which two or more nations would avoid hostilities by dividing territory between themselves. One major historical instance occurred with the partitions of Poland, when Prussia, Austria, and Russia divided Polish territory among themselves. The concept of compensations represents the more general fact that negotiations between nations depend on “receiving proportionate advantages” (200).

Armaments

Armaments are the “principal means” by which nations try to preserve or reestablish a balance of power and can refer to the act of building up the military to match other nations’ military strength and resources (200). Another technique is disarmament, although Morgenthau argue that this measure is usually unsuccessful because it is difficult to assess the relative power of nations in order to determine how much each nation should disarm.

Alliances

While a nation may increase its own or other nations’ power or try to reduce the power of rival nations, it can also seek alliances. Strong nations are sometimes reluctant to seek formal alliances because they believe that they are strong enough on their own or because they fear making too many commitments to their ally. Nonetheless, informal alliances (like the one between the United States and Britain) can be formed. Britain and the United States’ informal alliance arose from a shared historical identity, as well as from common interests such as protecting the balance of power in Europe.

Formal alliances are necessary if the shared interests between nations are not so clear. They might be needed in the case of an “ideological alliance” like the 1941 Atlantic Charter. In this scenario, nations share “general moral principles” and “general objectives” (203-04). More commonly, an alliance will have “the addition of ideological commitments to material ones” (204). Adding an “ideological factor” to an alliance that already had tangible causes behind it can strengthen that alliance. Ideally, an alliance should possess “complete mutuality” (204). However, in some cases, a strong nation has developed a successful alliance with a weaker nation, based on something that the weaker nation can offer.

There are two types of alliances: operative and inoperative. An operative alliance can “coordinate the general policies and concrete measures of its members” (206). By contrast, inoperative alliances are very general and have no practical elements. This distinction is especially important for alliances between nuclear-armed nations, in which the nations in question must determine whether or not they will risk nuclear devastation for the sake of an alliance.

Alliances are a “protective device […] against another nation’s designs for world domination” (207). In other words, alliances help to preserve the balance of power. This is seen in both the Napoleonic Wars and in World War II, as both conflicts resulted in the diplomatic creation of new balances of power.

Historically, the most constant disruption to a balance of power is a struggle between two groups of alliances, especially when one or both has an imperialistic policy. This kind of balance of power was an established part of Europe’s system, but by World War I, it became “a world-wide system” (210). The establishment of the League of Nations did see a new international system of collective security emerge, wherein an aggressive nation would be automatically opposed by all other nations. This system is more reliable than the system of alliances and counter-alliances because one nation in an allied group might leave the alliance or switch sides if that nation were to feel that doing so would better serve its own interests.

The “Holder” of the Balance

A balance of power is often maintained by two opposing groups of nations and a “holder” or “balancer” (213). The balancer is not permanently aligned with each group; instead, the balancer switches sides to serve its own interests and maintain the balance of power. Historically, Britain was often the balancer between France and the Hapsburgs of Austria.

Dominant and Dependent Systems

Balances of power are often composed of different “subsystems that are interrelated with each other” (218). For example, in the 16th and 17th centuries, there were multiple balances of power in Europe that coexisted and were interrelated, such as the balance of power between France and the Hapsburgs. However, there were also local, connected balances of power between the Italian city-states and one in northern Europe. Historically, when a subsystem is threatened, greater powers that represent the wider balance of power will intervene.

Structural Changes in the Balance of Power

Twentieth-century history saw these subsystems becoming more subservient to wider balances of power. Also, the author contends that the core of the global balance of power has shifted away from Europe and that the European balance of power is just one basis for “the power contests between the United States and the Soviet Union” and the two superpowers’ “new world-wide balance” (221).

The Uncertainty of the Balance of Power

From the 16th to the 18th centuries in Europe, the balance of power was often seen in mechanical terms; this was common to European thought at the time. Another common belief during this time frame was that a nation’s power lay in the amount of territory that it held.

Various factors, like national morale and the quality of government, also contribute to the strength of a nation, thereby influencing any balance of power in which it participates. Because of the complexity of such factors, there is always an “uncertainty of power calculations” that affects balance-of-power policies (225).

The Unreality of the Balance of Power

Because no calculation of the power of other nations relative to one’s own nation can be certain, governments should strive for a “margin of safety” when enacting policies (227). Also, even when a balance of power is preserved, there may still be changes in which a nation seeking to defend a status quo might later become an aggressor, or vice versa. Thus, the act of supporting a specific balance of power may still serve as a cover for a nation’s self-interest.

In the 17th and 18th centuries, intellectuals like Edward Gibbon and Jean-Jacques Rousseau considered the European nations to be forming “among themselves an invisible nation” (235). This phrase articulates the sense that European nations shared a common identity: one that proved vital to the balance of power.

Morgenthau concludes that the European balance of power and its system of nation-states historically depended on “a number of elements, intellectual and moral in nature” (237). The European nations assumed an “ultimate standard of the behavior of states” (240). This assurance broke down the Napoleonic Wars, but it was restored when the nations of Europe united in the Holy Alliance against revolutionary forces and the shared threat of France. It broke down a second time after World War I but was restored again with the League of Nations.