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Power always inspires a “revolt against power” (243). In order to guard against this universal tendency, specific “ideologies” are used to conceal power. There are also “normative systems” designed “to keep aspirations for power within socially tolerable bounds” (243-44). Some philosophies and political ideologies, like fascism, reject these systems. Even so, such ideologies “have proved impotent and self-destructive” (244).
Systems that enforce themselves through laws, morals, and ethics tend to prevail. These three enforcement mechanisms are mutually empowering, but there are some taboo actions, like lying, that are only opposed by morality and ethics, not by law. Morgenthau argues that Western civilization has been able to “mitigate the struggle for power on the domestic scene” by replacing violent competition with peaceful competition via education, work, and wealth (247).
When considering the influence of ethics and morality on international relations, it is important to distinguish between the moral rules that people follow and the moral rules that intellectuals believe people should follow. Morgenthau also warns against forgetting that moralistic ideologies can be used to conceal actual goals. Still, he refutes the idea that international relations are inevitably evil, contending that politicians will “refuse to consider certain ends and […] certain means […] because certain moral rules interpose an absolute barrier” (249).
The Protection of Human Life
Methods like assassination, which was often considered by the Republic of Venice in the 15th and 16th centuries, have become less common in modern times. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States attempted assassinations, these incidents gave rise to negative reactions from the American public due to the CIA’s “violation of moral restraints” (250).
After the Thirty Years War, which took place in the 17th century, the concept of war shifted from an all-out attack on all inhabitants in a territory to an attempt to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants. This shift was cemented in a series of treaties and international agreements such as the Geneva Convention. While the treaties may not have been entirely effective, they still represent “the existence of a moral conscience aware of moral limitations” (255).
In recent centuries, politicians have sought to end war itself. The United Nations is an attempt to find an alternative to war through negotiation. However, Morgenthau suggests that this attitude has been a detriment, especially given that the participating nations avoided wars that might have prevented World War II.
However, despite growing anti-war sentiment and historical changes in how war has been conducted, war became “total” in the 20th century due to modern changes in military tactics and technology. Modern wars have targeted civilians who are involved in industrial production and scientific research for the war effort. Additionally, as the number of weapons of mass destruction has increased, more civilians have been inadvertently affected by war. The breakdown in the moral restrictions on warfare became especially apparent in World War II.
Universal Morality Vs. Nationalistic Universalism
In the 17th and 18th centuries, the subject of morality in international relations became the concern of a small political elite: specifically, monarchs and “a relatively small, cohesive, and homogenous group of aristocratic rulers” who were alienated from the average people of their own nations (260). During this time frame, morality in international relations was preserved by concerns over losing honor and prestige.
Aristocratic diplomacy declined in the 19th century as democratic governments took power. As a result, more diplomats were career politicians who were accountable to representative bodies like parliaments. One negative consequence was that foreign policy has become more unstable, with newly elected governments sometimes radically changing foreign policies. The author also contends that as international relations have become less personal, moral restrictions are proving to be less effective; although the voters of a nation are the ultimate deciders of foreign policy, they are not held accountable in the way that monarchs and aristocratic ministers once were.
As a consequence of the decline of aristocratic governments, the sense of European unity that came from “cosmopolitan aristocratic society” collapsed and was replaced by national rivalries (266). Rather than becoming new sources of unity, socialist activism and religion became involved with individual nations. Also, moral standards in international relations are now seen as belonging to specific nations, rather than being shared across an international community.
Morgenthau argues that European international relations has historically been sandwiched between a more universal morality and a more localized form of national ethics (e.g., a moral ban on killing in general versus specific and situational restrictions on killing a nation’s enemies). Generally, people choose “national ethics” over universal morality. This trend has strengthened as modern propaganda and nationalism have enabled governments to influence individual morality. Likewise, new military technology has made it easier for soldiers to kill large numbers of people with a single action. These issues make it more difficult for an individual to reconcile universal morality with national ethics.
In the modern era, nations no longer have “shared beliefs and common values” (271). Instead, each nation has a separate ethical system. This was seen when World War I became viewed as a “war ‘to make the world safe for democracy’” (272). Likewise, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany embraced the systems of communism and fascism, respectively. Although wars in previous eras were explicitly fought over “glory,” “wealth,” and “power,” wars in the modern era are ostensibly fought to protect a “system of beliefs and ethical convictions” (273).
A type of “relativism” exists in modern international relations. There are two types of relativism: one across different eras of history and one across different nations with different values. There has been some effort to create universal values between nations via the concept of human rights. However, human rights vary according to time and place (e.g., the difference between human rights under a democracy and under a dictatorship).
Ever since President Woodrow Wilson of the United States tried to restructure the international order after World War I, there was a shift in the core US policy toward enforcing democratic values and human rights on the rest of the world. Morgenthau views this approach as flawed. He believes that it is impossible to “enforce[e] the universal application of human rights” (276), and he also contends that an agenda of spreading human rights can contradict the United States’ other foreign-policy objectives.
Any foreign policy that is based on defending human rights faces problems, given that human rights are “not the prime business of a state” and can clash with other aspects of diplomacy (277). Another problem arises from the fact that nations that have committed to human rights in their foreign policies make themselves susceptible to blame when these policies have unintended human-rights consequences. A prime example occurred when the United States’ treatment of Cambodia during the Vietnam War was cited as the reason for the Cambodian genocide that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
The League of Nations was established to create a vehicle for expressing world public opinion. However, past attempts to rally world opinion against a nation’s foreign policy all failed. Such failures result from the fact that public opinion on international relations varies greatly between the “publics” of different nations.
Psychological Unity of the World
Morgenthau believes that people universally desire freedom and self-fulfillment. The objectives of freedom and fulfillment are the same across cultures, but the philosophical and ethical ways of achieving them vary widely.
Ambiguity of Technological Unification
The author asserts that contrary to what some believe, technology has not unified the world even though it has vastly facilitated communications. However, at the same time, technology has made it easier for governments and private entities to censor international communications. Even without censorship as a factor, national and cultural differences have too much of an influence over opinions and perspectives for there to ever truly be a world public opinion.
The Barrier of Nationalism
Although President Wilson’s “Fourteen Points” was well received, differences based on national divisions soon arose, preventing the meaning of the Fourteen Points from being universally interpreted. These divisions exist even in the context of politicians’ universal aspirations, such as avoiding war. Abstract, universal principles, such as the desire for peace, often break down when they are translated into practical actions and used to address specific situations. This disconnect often leads to moral condemnations of actions that are deemed to be less than “effective” (286).
Within the context of The Limitations of International Law and Morality, Morgenthau’s understanding of classical realism seeks a balance between the universal and the specific. He acknowledges the existence of both an objective universal morality (e.g., the desire for peace and self-fulfillment) and a national morality (e.g., an emphasis on community support and solidarity in Norwegian society). In the modern era, however, the balance is skewed in favor of national morality. As Morgenthau writes, “Between the elemental aspirations for life, freedom, and power, which unite mankind and which could provide the roots for a world society and university morality, and the political philosophies, ethics, and objectives actually held by the members of the human race, there intervenes the nation” (288-89). Even with universal values, national morality determines how people seek to achieve those values (e.g., a culture that emphasizes starting a business versus another culture that places a higher value on public service or religiosity).
A controversial point that Morgenthau makes is that the values developed by the West (specifically the values of self-determination and freedom) benefited the West to an extent that was greater than the benefits from the values of other societies. He argues,
The best that Western civilization has been able to achieve—which is, as far as we can see, the best that any civilization can achieve—has been to mitigate the struggle for power on the domestic scene, to civilize its means, and to direct it toward objectives that, if attained, minimize the extent to which life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness of the individual members of society are involved in the struggle for power (247).
Although Morgenthau’s views on The Role of Power in International Relations have been widely adopted and remain highly relevant today, this particular passage vividly illustrates the author’s distinctly Eurocentric bias. His main goal in this section is to praise “Western” legal systems that are designed to mitigate the more unruly and harmful manifestations of power that individual people may embrace in the iconic “pursuit of happiness” that lies at the heart of many modern societies. By taking this stance, however, Morgenthau implicitly discounts (or, at the very least, diminishes) the worth of other societies’ values. Despite his own belief that each nation has an unchanging national character, he will later argue that non-Western nations have been able to adopt Western values (like self-determination) for their own advantage.
This discussion is crucial for the paradox in Morgenthau’s arguments that people desire peace universally, even more so now that military technology poses an existential threat to the survival of humanity, but that, at the same time, the goal of achieving a permanent, global peace seems unattainable. In addressing The Concept of National Interest, Morgenthau explains that “men are incapable of translating this abstract opposition to war as such into concrete action against this particular war” (286). This is similar to how Morgenthau understands universalism in other areas. He believes that self-interest and the desire for self-fulfillment are universal and innate to all people and nations, but he also contends that the ways to achieve that self-interest are complex, varied, and situational. Likewise, he holds that there is a universal morality but that the ways of fulfilling it are local and subjective. This assertion introduces the complex problem of the limitations of international law and morality.
Lastly, he asserts that the need for peace is universal, but he also acknowledges that that need breaks down when faced with specific and situational circumstances and with national self-interests. For these reasons, determining the opinions of the worldwide populace is completely futile. Thus, Morgenthau disagrees with a foreign policy that seeks to impose a specific understanding of freedom and human rights onto other nations—even though he also believes that certain universal values exist. To place the nature of this issue in more mundane terms, it would be like using the reality of human hunger as a justification for forcing one particular type of cuisine upon the entire world.



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