93 pages 3-hour read

Politics Among Nations

Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 1948

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Part 7Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 7: “International Politics in the Contemporary World”

Part 7, Chapter 20 Summary: “The New Moral Force of Nationalistic Universalism”

Nationalism, Old and New


Morgenthau believes that “the moral limitations upon the struggle for power on the international scene are weaker today than they have been at any time in the history of the modern state system” (349). This has been the result of the breakdown of an international order into various national orders. Bonds between the leaders of nations (like the one that united the aristocracies of pre-19th century Europe) are weaker than present-day institutional and religious bonds.


In the 19th century, there were “two kinds” of conflicts. One arose between nations “over the delimitation of their respective spheres of dominion” (350), and the other type was characterized by wars of resistance that specific groups brought against dominant nations. After World War I, it was widely believed that the act of giving every national group their own nation-state would lead to global peace. However, the late 20th century has proven that the new form of conflict is instead driven by “nationalistic universalism” (351), which denotes the drive of one nation to impose its values on other nations.


The Struggle for the Minds of Men


In the past, city-states and nations always used propaganda to win the support of other nations. In the post-World War II era, technology has made propaganda more effective, and it has become a tool that is just as important as military power and diplomacy.


Three Principles of Propaganda


The first principle of propaganda, according to Morgenthau, is that the success of propaganda is not related to its inherent truth or lack thereof. Instead, successful propaganda “give[s] satisfaction to deeply felt intellectual and political needs” (353). The second principle is that all ideologies—even those that claim to be universally true—only appeal to specific people at specific times under specific circumstances. The third and last principle is that propaganda “must define clearly its objectives and the methods through which it proposes to attain them” (356). The target audience must be determined, and it must also be decided whether the propaganda can actually support the political goals in question.

Part 7, Chapter 21 Summary: “The New Balance of Power”

Inflexibility of the New Balance of Power


The number of nations in Europe was reduced with the Treaty of Westphalia, the Napoleonic Wars, and the German and Italian unification. The number of great powers also declined, with only three great powers left after World War II: Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union. This situation had a negative impact on the “restraining effect” of the balance of power because the lower number of powerful nations made it much more difficult to sustain the balance of power through national coalitions (361).


At the time of writing, the decline of Britain has caused the international situation to change again. Bipolarity (i.e., the fact that there are only two superpowers—the Soviet Union and the United States) “has become the paramount feature of international politics” (363).


As a result of this bipolarity of power, the balance of power no longer has “flexibility.” This is because the United States and the Soviet Union are each stronger than any coalition of nations. As a result, all other nations are relegated to the role of “satellites” of one of the two remaining superpowers (363). Nonetheless, both superpowers need support from other nations.


Disappearance of the Balancer


Another consequence of the bipolar system is that no nation can fulfill the position of the balancer. Britain may have been able to fulfill that role during the Cold War, but it has experienced a decline in the years since World War II.


Nations have attempted to form a coalition that could be a “Third Force”; this is what French leader Charles de Gaulle hoped to accomplish with a pan-European coalition. However, Morgenthau argues that such a plan is impossible because of the power disparity involved and because Europe is politically and geographically embroiled in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union.


Disappearance of the Colonial Frontier


Another development in the post-World War II era was the collapse of colonial empires. In the 19th century, European nations were able to outsource conflicts between each other to their colonial peripheries. However, this approach became impossible once the colonial frontier no longer existed and all territory on the globe had been claimed by independent nations or by colonial empires.


The Colonial Revolution


The tendency of European colonial empires to shift conflicts to their colonies has, in a sense, continued with the superpowers. The conflicts between them are carried out by colonies seeking independence or via clashes between nations that are former colonies. The “colonial revolution” began with the American Revolution and the Latin American revolutions (371), but it did not conclude until the late 20th century after World War II weakened the European powers. Morgenthau also argues that the nations of Asia adapted Western ideas of national self-determination. This has led to Asian nations “condemning and revolting against Western political and economic policies in the name of the West’s own moral standards” (372).


The Decline of the West


Morgenthau suggests that there has been an “obvious decline of American power” (372). During World War II and the aftermath, the United States benefited from the fact that its industrial resources were not damaged by the war. Also, the United States’ government was never seriously threatened by fascism or communism, and it was therefore able to claim the position of “leader of the free world” (373).


The problem is that the rhetoric of the United States reduced the conflict between capitalism and communism to “a simple juxtaposition between good and effort” when, in reality, the appeal of communism to other nations came from specific needs and circumstances (374). This dynamic became obvious when, for anti-communist political purposes, the United States supported colonial empires “not because it was in favor of colonialism, but because it was afraid that Communism might be the alternative to colonialism” (374).


In the eyes of nations that were once colonies, the United States has become a new colonizing power. Despite the United States’ military power, it has still lost its moral power. In turn, these “satellite” countries have adopted Western nations’ moral ideals in order to justify their own national self-determination. At the same time, the West’s dependence on oil, which can be exploited by nations producing oil, has proven to be another major weakness.


Potentialities of the Bipolar System


By building up their respective allies and trying to attract new allies, the United States and the Soviet Union are creating a “two-bloc system” (377). Morgenthau also asserts that in addition to the rise of a new two-bloc system, there is also the possibility of the rise of China, which is held back only by a lack of access to modern technology. He also contends that nations that are at least reluctantly committed to one of the superpowers might be drawn to new, emerging power centers with access to nuclear weapons.


However, Morgenthau argues that it is “likely” that the bipolar system will continue. In that instance, war goals will continue to be pursued not just through military power but also through diplomatic means. In the late 20th century, the influence of the United States over Western Europe has declined, benefiting the Soviet Union. Such changes have led to strong nations like West Germany, China, and Japan engaging in a “diplomacy of movement” between the two superpowers (383). For example, this has manifested in the “normalization of relations” between China and the United States (383), even as China still maintains ties with the Soviet Union. Likewise, the United States has also become more flexible by supporting both Israel and its neighboring rivals. However, the diplomacy of movement could still lead to new conflicts between nations—conflicts that could ultimately lead to nuclear war.


Under US Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Jimmy Carter, attempts were made to forge a lasting peace with the Soviet Union through “a foreign policy of détente” (385): a diplomatic effort to relax tensions. The problem is that a successful peace still relies on a nuclear weapon stalemate between the superpowers, while both superpowers’ continued self-interest and their involvement with other nations inevitably create new problems.


Unlike with the powers of the 18th century, no morality unites the United States and the Soviet Union. Instead, both nations are united “only by the fear of nuclear war that might destroy them both” (389). The Soviet Union, through its own propaganda, has kept itself cut off from the rest of the world, both morally and culturally, presenting yet another obstacle to détente. While the two superpowers have achieved a successful “equilibrium,” an “inherent instability” still arises from their “struggle for power” (391).

Part 7, Chapter 22 Summary: “Total War”

War has become total, in contrast to limited wars like the wars fought between the Italian city-states in the 14th and 15th centuries, when armies consisted solely of mercenaries led by mercenary captains, the condottieri. By contrast, total wars in modern times draw upon the resources of the entire nation.


War of Total Populations


Limited warfare fought largely with mercenaries and conscripted forces was the common system in Europe. By the time of the Catholic and Protestant wars of the 16th and 17th centuries, armies became increasingly motivated by shared causes. This had the consequence that the era of limited war was also a time of an amoral view of war, while total war historically coincided with moral standards for war.


War by Total Populations


In the 20th century, war became so total that women—and, in some cases, children—have become involved in the war effort, and “all the productive forces of the nation are harnessed for the purposes of warfare” (397). The two historical circumstances that shaped this trend were the increasing size of armies and the fact that technology led to the mechanization of warfare.


War Against Total Populations


Total war in the 20th century means that everyone is both a potential participant in war and a potential victim of war. For example, during World War II, the Soviet Union’s civilian casualties outnumbered military casualties; the nation lost 10% of its total population (399).


The Mechanization of Warfare


Before the 19th century, armies in Europe were largely reluctant to accept artillery technology. By the second half of the 19th century, the invention of the machine gun radically changed warfare. Biological and nuclear warfare in the 20th century escalated warfare even further.


Since the end of the 18th century, technology in communications and transportation has vastly improved with the invention of railways and telegraphs and then the radio and television. This has all made “the whole earth […] considerably smaller” (403).


War for Total Stakes


Such technological advances result in a “stable world-wide empire” (405). This is because it is easier to keep a population in check through propaganda (and to quickly raise organized forces to deal with rebellions) despite factors such as distance, geography, and climate. Morgenthau believes that a “nation that has a monopoly of nuclear weapons and […] the principal means of transportation and communications can conquer the world and keep it conquered, provided it is capable of keeping that monopoly and control” (407). With propaganda, communications, and technological weaponry, even revolts would be impossible.


Total Mechanization, Total War, and Total Dominion


Until the late 19th century, the ability to wage war was limited by the available “muscular power” of animals and humans. With advances like railroads, waging war requires much less labor—a change that “has made total war and world-wide dominion possible” and has also freed up people from “the intellectual and moral burden of keeping one’s self and one’s dependents fed, clothed, and protected from the elements and from disease” (411). The tendency may result “in world dominion or in world destruction or both” (412).

Part 7 Analysis

In this section of the text, Morgenthau turns to the circumstances of the Cold War, which would have been his contemporary political reality when Politics Among Nations was written, published, and distributed. In Morgenthau’s analysis, the post-World War II era of world history and international relations was shaped by three core influences: the dominance of the Soviet Union and the United States over world politics, the end of colonial empires, and the threat of a nuclear war. To summarize, “Thus the international situation is reduced to the primitive spectacle of two giants eyeing each other with watchful suspicion” (379). All these factors played a role in The Limitations of International Law and Morality during the post-World War II era.


For Morgenthau, all three factors have made achieving peace more difficult. Contrary to what might be expected from having only two great powers in the world, the “greater the number of active players, the greater the number of possible combinations and the greater also the uncertainty as to the combinations that will actually oppose each other and as to the role the individual players will actually perform in them” (362). Such an analysis supports the Hobbesian view that a functioning society requires a certain number of members to surrender a portion of their own self-interest. With fewer members in a group, the less helpful such a grouping can be.


However, along with the bipolarity between the United States and the Soviet Union, there is a third factor: the colonies-turned-nations that Morgenthau collectively refers to with the now-outdated term “Third World.” In the years since Politics Among Nations was published, Morgenthau’s perspective on these nations has been viewed as contentious, especially his biased description of the colonized territories as “the politically empty spaces of Africa and Asia” (369). With this phrasing, Morgenthau does not refer to polities that historically achieved a certain degree of urban development (such as Japan and Egypt, which are both political entities that Morgenthau would likely consider complex). His problematic view on politics in history has since fallen out of favor as historians and other scholars have become more receptive to the idea of the political and social complexity of civilizations that are not based on cities.


The author’s adherence to the tenets of classical realism leads him to view the motives of formerly colonized countries with skepticism and through the critical lens of The Concept of National Interest. Instead of seeing the increasing assertiveness of former colonized territories in global affairs as an effort to claim equality with their former colonizers, Morgenthau views their political efforts as ideological excuses to strive toward self-interest and power and challenge the existing status quo. As he opines, “The Third World attacked the United States with the same arguments that America used to argue against the colonialism, racism, and exploitation perpetuated by its friends” (375). He also discounts the idea that colonialism is responsible for the underdeveloped state of these formerly colonized nations.


Morgenthau does describe how advancements in military technology and nuclear bombs contributed to the destructive nature of modern warfare, especially when it threatens civilian life—even though warfare’s increased dangers to civilian life have also led to greater attempts to put ethical limitations on warfare itself. As the author states, “War has become total not only in the sense of everybody being a prospective participant in war but also in the sense of everybody being a prospective victim of warfare” (399). Even so, classical realism would suggest that self-interest alone would prevent a nation from beginning a nuclear war that would threaten its own existence. Yet Morgenthau also suggests that a true guarantee of peace would come from not just “fear” of a nuclear conflict but also from a “common morality that is indispensable for a viable balance of power and genuine détente” (389), not unlike the shared civil society that Hobbes wrote about.

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