Science and Human Behavior

“Scientists have simply found that being honest—with oneself as much as with others—is essential to progress.”

Here, Skinner captures the ethos of scientific inquiry through the rhetorical device of understatement (“have simply found”), which reinforces the idea that intellectual honesty is indispensable. The parenthetical phrase broadens the scope from interpersonal truthfulness to self-awareness, subtly connecting to the theme of Behavior as a Products of Environmental Conditioning, since honesty in science requires continual correction of personal bias.

“The study of any subject begins in the realm of superstition. The fanciful explanation precedes the valid. Astronomy began as astrology; chemistry as alchemy. The field of behavior has had, and still has, its astrologers and alchemists.”

Skinner uses parallelism and historical analogy to frame the evolution of knowledge as a progression from myth to science. The repetition of structure reinforces the inevitability of this developmental arc across disciplines. By linking current pseudoscientific approaches to behavior with outdated belief systems, Skinner aligns himself with the tradition of replacing superstition with empirical understanding, presenting himself as automatically more objective and authoritative. By the same token, in subtly suggesting that those who may disagree or critique his own ideas and approaches could count as the “astrologers” and “alchemists” in his field, Skinner also avoids meaningfully engaging with counterviews and instead seeks to discredit psychologists and behaviorists who advance rival theories.

“Man has, in short, created the machine in his own image. And as a result, the living organism has lost some of its uniqueness.”

Skinner employs biblical allusion in reversing the Genesis idea of man created in God’s image, framing technology as a mirror that strips humanity of distinctiveness. The phrasing “in his own image” highlights anthropomorphism, while the contrast with “lost some of its uniqueness” underscores irony: In projecting themselves onto machines, humans erase the very qualities that set them apart. This device sharpens Skinner’s critique of mechanistic models of behavior.

“The industrialist who wants employees to work consistently and without absenteeism must make certain that their behavior is suitably reinforces—not only with wages but with suitable working conditions.”

Here, Skinner blends economic and behavioral language, equating wages and working conditions with reinforcers. He stresses the multiplicity of control, dismantling the reductionist view that money alone motivates labor. The pragmatic tone reflects Skinner’s broader rhetorical strategy of grounding abstract behavioral principles in real-world examples.

“We divide behavior into hard and fast units and are then surprised to find that the organism disregards the boundaries we have set.”

Skinner highlights the artificiality of scientific categories when applied rigidly to dynamic behavior. The contrast between “hard and fast” human constructs and the organism’s fluid disregard emphasizes the tension between language and reality. His choice of “surprised” points to human arrogance in assuming nature should conform to conceptual boundaries.

“When we recognize this, we are likely to drop the notion of responsibility altogether and with it the doctrine of free will as an inner causal agent.”

This sentence uses parallel phrasing to show the domino effect of rejecting traditional explanations: Abandoning “responsibility” naturally dismantles “free will.” Skinner’s diction—"doctrine,” “agent”—borrows from religious and legal registers, suggesting that these ideas function as dogma rather than science. The statement’s declarative tone asserts inevitability, a rhetorical strategy to disarm resistance, while offering one of Skinner’s most controversial takes, as denying individual responsibility raises serious questions about moral accountability.

“Our ‘perception; of the world—our ‘knowledge’ of it—is our behavior with respect to the world.”

Skinner destabilizes common-sense assumptions with quotation marks, casting doubt on traditional notions of “perception” and “knowledge.” The equation of epistemology with behavior reduces abstract cognition to observable action, a rhetorical simplification that reframes philosophy in behavioral terms. This definitional inversion exemplifies Skinner’s reliance on reclassification as a persuasive device.

“A man does not neglect his business because of anxiety or worry. Such a statement is at best merely a way of classifying a particular kind of neglect.”

The repetition of “neglect” undercuts the causal power of mental states by showing their circularity in explanation. Skinner employs reductive diction—”merely,” “at best”—to strip psychological labels of authority. This rhetorical strategy exposes how abstract terms often mask rather than illuminate causal variables.

“In the long run, however, punishment does not actually eliminate behavior from a repertoire, and its temporary achievement is obtained at tremendous cost in reducing the over-all efficiency and happiness of the group.”

This statement underscores the ethical tension in relying on punishment as a method of control, adding to his exploration of The Ethical Implications of Control and Reinforcement. While it may appear effective in the short term, the word choice “tremendous cost” highlights the broader social consequences—diminished well-being and efficiency—that undermine collective good.

“A test is simply a convenient opportunity to observe behavior—to survey or sample our dependent variable.”

Skinner’s use of the word “simply” masks a critical redefinition: Tests are not essences of intelligence or personality but snapshots of observable behavior. The metaphor of “survey or sample” aligns psychological testing with empirical data collection, stripping away mystique.

“A special kind of chaining is represented by behavior which alters the strength of other behavior and is reinforced because it does so. Such behavior could almost be said to distinguish the human organism from all others.”

This passage highlights Skinner’s argument that human distinctiveness arises from complex layers of environmentally conditioned behavior, invoking Behavior as a Product of Environmental Conditioning Rather Than Inner Will. The idea of “chaining” emphasizes how one learned action can modify and reinforce another, creating the illusion of self-directed agency while remaining rooted in external contingencies. By framing humanity’s uniqueness in terms of behavioral reinforcement rather than inner freedom, Skinner ties human complexity back to the environment’s shaping power.

“It is of little help to tell a man to use his ‘will power’ or his ‘self-control.’”

This sentence challenges the traditional notion of inner will as a useful guide to behavior. By putting “will power” and “self-control” in quotation marks, Skinner distances himself from these concepts, marking them as fictions. The concise phrasing strips invokes Behavior as a Product of Environmental Conditioning Rather Than Inner Will.

“So long as originality is identified with spontaneity or an absence of lawfulness in behavior, it appears to be a hopeless task to teach a man to be original or to influence his process of thinking in any important way.”

Skinner uses conditional structure (“so long as […] it appears”) to highlight what he regards as the flawed assumptions behind common definitions of originality. The phrasing juxtaposes originality with lawfulness, underscoring his critique of romanticized spontaneity as incompatible with scientific teaching. He argues that the more we cling to this view of originality, the less influence we can actually exert on creative behavior.

“Contrary to the usual view, the special contact between the individual and the events which occur within his own body does not provide him with ‘inside information’ about the causes of his behavior.”

This passage is framed as a rebuttal—a rhetorical move that positions Skinner against dominant traditions of introspection. The phrase “inside information” critiques the belief that internal sensations grant privileged access to causal explanations. By contrasting “special contact” with its supposed epistemic value, the sentence strips away mystique and reorients the discussion toward observable contingencies.

“What are the physical dimensions of a smile?”

This rhetorical question functions as both provocation and critique, challenging the assumption that social phenomena can be easily measured or intuited. By reducing a smile—a symbol of warmth and emotion—to “physical dimensions,” Skinner employs defamiliarization, making the familiar seem strange. The device underscores his insistence that even subtle social stimuli must be understood in terms of observable, measurable properties, rather than left to vague notions like empathy or intuition.

“It cannot be applied to all forms of behavior; handcuffs restrain part of a man’s rage but not all of it.”

Here, Skinner uses a concrete image—handcuffs—to dramatize the limits of physical restrain. The imagery captures the paradox of control: External force may contain outward expression but cannot touch internal or covert processes. The sentence reinforces the incompleteness of coercion, a theme that threads through his critique of force-based behavioral control and The Ethical Implications of Control and Reinforcement.

“Even the political tyrant, the despotic father, the bully in the street gang, or any other exceptionally strong individual usually yields eventually to the group as a whole.”

Skinner layers a triadic list, dramatizing the range of authoritarian figures, invoking strong archetypes of domination. The cumulative force of the examples contrasts with the understated conclusion—“yields eventually”—which shifts the power dynamic. The sentence combines imagery with inevitability, reinforcing his central point that collective contingencies surpass even the strongest forms of individual power.

“To say that a person is ‘held responsible’ for an act is simply to say that he is usually punished for it.”

Here, Skinner reduces a moral and legal abstraction to a stark behavioral formula, using the word “simply” to strip responsibility of its philosophical or ethical weight. The blunt diction is deliberately deflationary, suggesting the hidden mechanism of control behind a familiar phrase. Skinner’s reduction of human accountability to reinforcement and punishment remains controversial.

“Good-luck charms have economic value when their power to mediate positive reinforcement is made convincing to the buyer.”

This sentence demonstrates how Skinner intertwines behavioral theory with economic language, redefining superstition in market terms. The formal phrasing masks the absurdity of ascribing value to charms.

“The murderer in Dostoevsky’s Crime and Punishment turns himself over to a punishing governmental official.”

By invoking Dostoevsky, Skinner draws on a widely recognized cultural reference to make his theoretical point more accessible. The allusion bridges literature and behavioral science, helping readers connect abstract ideas about punishment and authority to a concrete and familiar narrative. The choice of allusion is also somewhat ironic, as Dostoevsky was adamantly opposed to the kind of behavioral determinism that Skinner advocates.

“We pay a man for mowing a lawn if a mowed lawn is reinforcing.”

Skinner uses an everyday image to translate abstract behavioral principles into terms that are immediately accessible to readers. By grounding economic control in the familiar exchange of yard work for payment, he strips away theoretical distance and shows reinforcement as something ordinary and observable. The simplicity of the example makes his argument broadly understandable, while also underscoring how pervasive reinforcement dynamics are in daily life.

“In an American school if you ask for the salt in good French, you get an A. In France you get the salt.”

This epigrammatic comparison captures the essence of educational reinforcement. The humor makes the theoretical point memorable while also reflecting what Skinner regards the artificiality of institutionalized education.

“Why should the design of culture be left so largely to accident?”

This rhetorical question pivots Skinner’s argument around The Potential for Social Engineering Through Behavioral Science, urging readers to consider the ethical stakes of deliberate cultural engineering. Its brevity and interrogative structure emphasize urgency while also challenging the assumption that tradition and chance are sufficient guides. By framing the issue as a question rather than a statement, Skinner draws the reader into a participatory dialogue, a device that makes his scientific proposals seem pressing and accessible.