Science and Human Behavior

Skinner distinguishes science from philosophy, art, and other intellectual pursuits through its cumulative progress. The achievements of science, however, can obscure its essential nature, leading some to confuse it with its products (e.g., organized bodies of knowledge) or its tools (e.g., laboratory instruments, mathematical calculations). Skinner asserts these are aids, not science itself.

At its core, Skinner argues, science is “a set of attitudes” (12)—a commitment to facts over authority and to honesty over “wishful thinking.” Beyond attitude, science seeks lawful relationships among events, building from individual observations to general rules, and eventually to systems or models that enable both prediction and control.

Behavior, unlike microscopic elements of cosmic phenomena, is directly observable but deceptively complex. Familiarity can lead to unscientific conclusions, and scientific study often requires a “great deal of unlearning” (15). Accounts such as anecdotes, biographies, and case histories are useful starting points, but science advances by uncovering uniformities, making them explicit, and subjecting them to rigorous proof.

Resistance to a science of behavior often arises when scientific laws challenge prescientific conceptions of human nature. Objections include appeals to quantum indeterminacy, the uniqueness of individual cases, the complexity of behavior, the interaction between the observer and the observed, and the difficulty of controlling all relevant variables. Skinner counters that these objections are not unique to behavior, and history shows that supposed limits to science often dissolve with methodological advances.

Skinner argues that a degree of control over behavioral conditions already exists in domains like education, industry, government, and media. The pressing need, he concludes, is to understand and refine these processes, preparing for the challenges such knowledge will bring.

Skinner reframes the question of why organisms behave in terms of functional relations between variables, rather than traditional “cause and effect” explanations. The goal of a science of behavior is to identify the external conditions that influence action, predict behavior based on those conditions, and, where possible, manipulate them for control.

Historically, the search for causes has preceded science, producing prescientific explanations such as astrology, numerology, and personality typing. Even when these methods find occasional validation (e.g., seasonal birth effects), their predictive value is limited. Inner causes—whether neural, psychic, or conceptual—are likewise problematic. Physiological states, mental entities, or abstractions like “hunger,” “habit,” or “intelligence” often serve as redundant descriptions or speculation, distracting from the external factors that Skinner asserts actually control behavior.

Skinner emphasizes that a functional analysis should prioritize external variables—such as environmental conditions and histories—because they are observable, measurable, and often controllable. For example, the probability of drinking water can be reliably altered by manipulating deprivation, temperature, or salt intake, without invoking unobservable inner states. As he notes, “The objection to inner states is not that they do not exist, but that they are not relevant in a functional analysis” (35). He outlines the types of data available for such analysis: Causal observation, controlled fieldwork, clinical studies, institutional research, experiments, and studies of nonhuman animals. The latter are valuable because they simplify variables, allow greater experimental control, and reveal basic processes that may extend to human behavior.

Skinner rejects claims that a functional analysis cannot be done simply because it has not yet been completed. Scientific progress often accelerates when research shifts to more productive variables, and he argues that specifying behavior as a dependent variable in relation to manipulable physical conditions is a promising approach. Achieving meaningful advances, according to Skinner, will require rigorous, detailed study rather than superficial theorizing.