72 pages 2-hour read

Science and Human Behavior

Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 1953

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Part 4Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Content Warning: This section includes discussion of sexism, with the source text containing offensive assumptions and language regarding women. There is also a brief reference to lynching.

Part 4: “The Behavior of People in Groups”

Part 4, Chapter 19 Summary: “Social Behavior”

Skinner defines social behavior as the interaction between two or more individuals either with each other or in relation to a shared environment. He challenges the notion that group phenomena require unique explanatory principles, insisting instead that, “it is always an individual who behaves” (298) and that social laws must be reducible to the contingencies governing individual actions. Using examples such as Gresham’s Law, he argues that collective outcomes emerge from repeated patterns of individual behavior rather than from mysterious “social forces.”


One key feature of social behavior is its reliance on social reinforcement. Unlike interactions with the physical environment, reinforcements such as attention, approval, affection, or punishment almost always involve the mediation of another person. Social reinforcement is often intermittent and context-dependent, leading to flexible but unstable patterns of behavior. Skinner illustrates this with examples like teasing, where variable reinforcement sustains persistence, and educational settings, where demands can be gradually increased, producing “a sort of human bondage” (300). He contrasts these dynamic contingencies with the more consistent reinforcement found in non-social environments.


Another dimension of the social environment is the social stimulus. Human cues—smiles, eye contact—gain importance because of the reinforcing contingencies associated with them. For instance, Skinner suggests that the power of “catching someone’s eye” (303) lies not in mysterious empathy but in the reinforcement or punishment likely to follow the recognition that one is being observed.


Skinner turns to the analysis of social episodes, which can be reconstructed by examining the reciprocal behaviors of each participant. Predator-prey interactions, conversational “stalking” of topics, and cooperative activities like rope-pulling or ballroom dancing illustrate how reinforcement contingencies interlock between individuals. Experiments with pigeons further demonstrate how roles such as leader and follower can emerge in cooperative tasks, mirroring complex human arrangements.


Skinner then discusses the group as a behaving unit. While only individuals behave, the combined reinforcement available within groups often far exceeds what individuals could achieve alone. Practices like imitation, conformity, and mutual reinforcement explain both participation in groups and the power of collective action.


He concludes that social behavior, while complex, does not require new scientific principles. Rather, it can be explained within the same framework of reinforcement and conditioning that he believes governs individual behavior. This continuity, he argues, promises a unified natural science of human conduct.

Part 4, Chapter 20 Summary: “Personal Control”

Skinner introduces personal control as a type of social relation in which one individual deliberately alters another’s behavior to obtain reinforcement. The relationship need not be consciously understood by either party, as illustrated by the infant who learns to control a parent’s attention through crying.


He distinguishes personal control from the power exercised by organized agencies such as governments or schools, noting that as individuals, most people exert relatively limited influence. Exceptions exist—the wealthy, powerful, or especially charismatic—but personal control generally relies on sensitivity to the idiosyncrasies of others, tailoring reinforcements to immediate circumstances. The first task is often simply maintaining contact with the controllee, as seen in sales, counseling, or entertainment, where sustaining attention opens opportunities for further influence.


Skinner then reviews techniques of control, many of which parallel those described earlier in the context of self-control. These range from the direct use of physical force to the manipulation of stimuli through environmental arrangement, imitation, or verbal persuasion. Reinforcement, whether in the form of money, favors, labor, or sexual incentives, also plays a central role, often mediated by conditioned reinforcers like promises or praise. Other methods include aversive stimulation or punishment. Skinner notes that subtle strategies—such as pointing out contingencies, manipulating deprivation and satiation, cultivating emotional predispositions, or using drugs like alcohol to increase compliance—are all part of the repertoire of personal control.


The discussion emphasizes that these methods, while sometimes effective, often generate negative consequences for both the controller and the controllee. Since techniques such as punishment, exploitation, and undue influence are inherently aversive, individuals frequently resist. This countercontrol can take the form of anger, aggression, or collective opposition. The social dimension of control thus heightens resistance and reinforces cultural norms opposing overt manipulation.


The chapter concludes by addressing the reluctance within behavioral science and society to confront the issue of control. Many theorists, he argues, avoid acknowledging deliberate control due to its association with coercion and the value placed on freedom. However, he argues, “science implies prediction and, insofar as the relevant variables can be controlled, it implies control” (322). For Skinner, a clear, objective understanding of the techniques and consequences of personal control is essential, particularly for those most invested in limiting its abuses.

Part 4, Chapter 21 Summary: “Group Control”

Skinner examines how the control exerted by a group is more powerful than that of any individual. Group control often emerges where competition for limited resources creates situations in which one individual’s reinforcement is another’s deprivation—for example, the “spoils of war” or a child taking a toy from another. In such cases, the affected individuals may unite as a controlling group, exerting collective influence over the offender.


The central technique of group control is the classification of behavior as “good” or “bad,” with corresponding reinforcement or punishment. Skinner defines these terms functionally: Behavior is “good” insofar as it reinforces other members of the group, and “bad” insofar as it is aversive. This classification may be consistent with actual effects, but it can also be arbitrary, accidental, or outdated. Reinforcing practices such as praise, gratitude, and approval, or punishing responses such as censure, ridicule, and criticism, constitute the informal codification of group norms. The emotional response of shame illustrates how punishment works not only through external consequences but also through conditioned aversive self-stimulation.


The rationale for group control is varied. Members may reinforce good behavior out of immediate affection, to secure future benefits, or because cultural practices have taught them to praise virtuous acts even when they are not directly affected. Punishment, too, may be driven by emotional predispositions such as anger or indignation, or by the operant reinforcement that occurs when objectionable behavior is temporarily suppressed. Educational institutions often formalize these practices, strengthening the group’s ability to regulate its members.


While group control restrains selfish or antisocial behavior and encourages altruism, it often disadvantages the individual by curtailing opportunities for direct reinforcement. Nonetheless, the individual also benefits as a participant in the controlling group. Even powerful figures are ultimately subject to the collective influence of the group.


Skinner addresses the ethical implications of group control. Rather than qualifying behaviors as “good” or “bad,” behaviorism analyzes them in terms of functional practices and their consequences. A science of behavior can describe and predict how group control operates but does not claim to resolve ethical questions about what ought to be maximized. What it can offer is a practical framework for examining the extent of control a group exerts, and the conditions under which such control becomes effective or oppressive.

Part 4 Analysis

Part 4 continues Skinner’s examination of The Ethical Implications of Control and Reinforcement, turning from the study of the individual to the larger contexts in which human behavior unfolds, emphasizing how control emerges in social encounters, personal dynamics, and group structures. Skinner argues that the principles of conditioning do not stop at the boundary of the individual but expand outward, shaping interpersonal relationships and collective life.


In exploring social behavior, Skinner insists that interactions between people can be studied with the same scientific rigor as solitary actions. A smile, for example, is not treated as an ineffable gesture of empathy but as a definable stimulus: “What are the physical dimensions of a smile?” (301). This rhetorical question strips away sentiment, reducing everything to stimuli. Elsewhere, he extends metaphors from the natural world to the social, comparing conversation to predator-prey stalking. Such literary devices highlight his central claim that complex social episodes can be reduced to the contingencies of reinforcement and punishment. He argues that what appears to be instinct, intuition, or shared understanding is instead explained through reinforcement histories and cultural contingencies.


When turning to personal control, Skinner narrows the focus to the ways individuals deliberately shape each other’s actions. He catalogs techniques ranging from coercion to persuasion, noting both their effectiveness and their limitations. Detailed images emphasize the incompleteness of force: “[H]andcuffs restrain part of a man’s rage but not all of it” (316). This concrete phrasing dramatizes the paradox that external restraint cannot reach the covert or dispositional dimensions of behavior. However, Skinner’s examples also reveal the sexist bias of his writing, especially when he writes about women: “The pretty girl uses primary or conditioned sexual reinforcement. The weakling becomes a sycophant. The shrew controls through aversive stimulation” (314). Here, women appear only as objects of sexual allure or as offensive caricatures of nagging control, while men are cast as active agents. This language not only reflects the sexism embedded in mid-20th-century science but also challenges the supposed neutrality of Skinner’s analysis. These biases problematize Skinner’s treatment of the ethical implications of control, reminding readers that scientific accounts of human behavior are themselves shaped by cultural norms and sometimes even by the personal biases of the scientists and psychologists themselves.


The discussion of group control builds outward once more, portraying the collective as the most powerful source of reinforcement and punishment and once more gesturing towards Behavior as a Product of Environmental Conditioning Rather Than Inner Will. Moral categories of “good” and “bad” are explained as shorthand for behaviors that are reinforcing to the group or aversive to its members. Shame, too, is reframed in behavioral terms as the conditioned aversive stimulation that follows punishment. These redefinitions exemplify Skinner’s larger project of stripping away metaphysical concepts in favor of functional descriptions. The imagery can also be disturbingly concrete, such as when Skinner uses the example of a lynching to confront the darker implications of reinforcement when magnified by group dynamics.


Still, Skinner does not portray group control as solely destructive, arguing that it is also the mechanism by which altruism is maintained: “Selfish behavior is restrained, and altruism encouraged. But the individual gains from these practices because he is part of the controlling group with respect to every other individual” (327). This paradox highlights how group regulation curtails individual freedom while simultaneously protecting each member from the unchecked selfishness of others. In this sense, the chapter speaks directly to the potential for social engineering, suggesting that collective practices can be designed to sustain cooperation and suppress exploitation.


Taken together, these chapters demonstrate how behavioral principles scale across levels of human life. Social behavior is recast as a series of conditioned exchanges, personal control is mapped through the deliberate use of reinforcement and punishment, and group regulation emerges as the ultimate arbiter of morality and cooperation, revealing both the promise and the peril of extending behavioral science into the social world.

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