Science and Human Behavior

Science and Human Behavior (1953) is a work of psychology and behavioral science by B.F. Skinner. The work systematically presents the principles of operant conditioning as a framework for understanding all human actions, aiming to reorient the study of behavior away from introspective methods toward a scientific, experimental approach rooted in observable data. Skinner views psychology not just as a discipline of the laboratory but as a framework for understanding—and potentially redesigning—human life. The work explores Behavior as a Product of Environmental Conditioning Rather Than Inner Will, The Potential for Social Engineering Through Behavioral Science, and The Ethical Implications of Control and Reinforcement.

Skinner was a leading proponent of behaviorism and spent his career developing theories of operant conditioning and their application to human society. Though controversial in its determinist outlook, Science and Human Behavior remains central to debates about free will, control, and the role of science in shaping society.

This guide uses the digitized version of Science and Human Behavior published in 2014 by the B.F. Skinner Foundation.

Content Warning: The source text and this guide include discussion of sexism, with the source text containing offensive assumptions and language regarding women. There are also brief references to lynching and enslavement.  

Summary

Science and Human Behavior presents a comprehensive introduction to behaviorism and its potential applications to society. Across six parts, the book moves from foundational definitions of behavior to wide-ranging discussions of ethics, culture, government, and the future of humanity. Skinner’s central claim is that human actions are not the result of an inner “will” but the product of environmental contingencies of reinforcement and punishment. From this basis, he proposes that a scientific analysis of behavior can not only explain individual and collective conduct, but also guide the deliberate design of better social systems. Though framed in scientific language, the book ultimately tackles questions of morality, freedom, and cultural survival, positioning behaviorism as a powerful—if controversial—tool for shaping the human condition.

In Part I, Skinner lays the groundwork for his approach by defining psychology as the science of behavior, not of inner states or hidden causes. He critiques traditional reliance on concepts such as “will,” “instinct,” and “consciousness,” arguing that these are “explanatory fictions” which obscure rather than clarify the causes of action. Instead, he introduces the framework of operant conditioning, in which behavior is strengthened or weakened depending on its consequences. By comparing behavioral analysis to other sciences that moved past pre-scientific explanations—such as astronomy’s abandonment of astrology—Skinner situates behaviorism as a necessary step in the maturation of psychology. This opening establishes the book’s core premise that human life can be studied in terms of observable interactions between organism and environment, without recourse to metaphysical notions of free will or inner causation.

Part II develops the technical foundations of behavioral science. Here, Skinner distinguishes between classical conditioning, pioneered by Ivan Pavlov, and his own theory of operant conditioning, which emphasizes the active role of behavior in producing consequences. He employs analogies, such as the sculptor shaping clay, to make abstract concepts accessible. Skinner also engages in close dialogue with earlier thinkers—Enlightenment philosopher René Descartes, American psychologist Edward Thorndike, and others—both to trace the intellectual history of behaviorism and to demonstrate its empirical rigor. The chapters address reinforcement, extinction, punishment, discrimination, and generalization, laying out the mechanisms by which behavior is shaped and maintained. While the focus is technical, Skinner hints at larger implications, noting that “whether these improvements should be permitted is a matter to be discussed later” (106), foreshadowing ethical debates to come.

In Part III, Skinner applies his framework to questions of self and consciousness, reframing traditional psychological concepts in behavioral terms. Self-control, he argues, is not the exercise of inner will but a set of learned responses in which one behavior modifies the probability of another. Similarly, self-knowledge arises not from privileged access to an inner world but from social practices of verbal behavior and reinforcement. By dismantling the notion of a private, inaccessible mental realm, Skinner challenges dualistic assumptions and emphasizes the public, observable basis of all psychological phenomena. Illustrative examples—such as the inconsistency of a churchgoer who is pious on Sunday but ruthless in business on Monday—suggest how context and environment, not inner essence, explain the variability of human conduct. This section questions common assumptions about personal responsibility and autonomy, positioning them instead as outcomes of environmental conditioning.

Part IV turns outward to interpersonal and group dynamics, examining how behavior is controlled by other people. Skinner analyzes forms of social control ranging from direct coercion to subtler mechanisms of approval, disapproval, and cultural norms. He emphasizes that even tyrants and bullies ultimately yield to the group as a whole, highlighting the reciprocal nature of reinforcement within communities. At the same time, he does not shy away from darker illustrations, such as the reinforcement individuals gain from participating in a lynch mob, which dramatize the destructive potential of collective behavior. This part also reveals some of the book’s dated assumptions, particularly in gendered examples that portray women in reductive, stereotypical terms. Overall, this section demonstrates how individual behavior is, according to Skinner, inseparable from the practices and expectations of the surrounding group.

Part V shifts to institutions—government, religion, psychotherapy, economics, and education—as organized systems of behavioral control. Skinner’s critiques are often provocative: Government is “the use of the power to punish” (336); psychotherapy’s belief in inner causes makes it an “impossible assignment” (374); and wage labor is likened to a refined form of enslavement. By stripping away idealized self-conceptions, Skinner presents institutions as networks of reinforcement and punishment that sustain conformity, shape values, and perpetuate cultural norms. He also highlights paradoxes, such as the dilution of educational prestige as more people attain it, illustrating how reinforcement systems shift with cultural expansion. In treating institutions as mechanisms of control, Skinner questions how much of what humans regard as freedom or progress is actually a function of hidden contingencies.

The final section, Part VI, addresses the “problem of control” explicitly. Having argued that behavior is determined by environment and institutions, Skinner asks who should wield this knowledge, and to what ends. He considers various strategies—denying control, refusing to control, diversifying control, and controlling control itself—while acknowledging the dangers of concentration in a single authority. He insists that the ultimate strength of any controlling system depends on the productivity and well-being of those controlled, suggesting that ethical governance aligns with long-term survival. Still, he recognizes that survival itself is not always compatible with values like happiness or freedom. By concluding, “we all control, and we are all controlled” (438), Skinner reframes human society as a vast system of interlocking reinforcements. The final chapters underline both the promise and the peril of behavioral science: It can guide cultural design and perhaps ensure human survival, but it offers no guarantee that its power will be used for humane ends.