Greene argues that confrontation often leads to more resistance, while indirect pressure works by disorienting the opponent, forcing them to deal with unexpected threats. The central argument of the chapter is that power breaks down when the opponent’s weak points are exposed.

Greene supports his arguments using historical evidence from military battles, particularly Napoleon’s Italian campaign and the Battle of Arcola. He explains how Napoleon lured the Austrian army into head-on battles and then threatened their supply lines and retreat routes from the side. This strategy did not rely so much on numerical strength as on causing confusion when the enemy was most extended. Greene also refers to Caesar’s political and military maneuvers, particularly his clemency toward his defeated enemies. Caesar’s strategy eliminated the emotional basis of resistance and turned former enemies into friends and allies against Pompey.

Greene suggests that resistance is often strongest when faced head-on and weakest when the opponent is distracted. However, the assumption that opponents will always respond to indirect influence with confusion and paralysis may not always work if the opponent anticipates such tactics. In such cases, indirect influence may lose its destabilizing effect and become defensive.

Greene asserts that one acquires decisive power through the creation of a state of total enclosure, rather than the exploitation of partial advantages. The strategy of annihilation, therefore, entails the elimination of all avenues by which the opponent can maneuver, adapt, or recover. Greene argues that resilience is human nature as long as there are alternative options, but it deteriorates quickly if all avenues appear closed. Therefore, the strategy of envelopment is not about the use of overwhelming power, but about applying pressure from all sides until all hope is lost and willpower is diminished.

Greene cites the Zulu victory over British forces at Isandlwana to support his argument. Although the Zulu had fewer technological resources than their opponents, they used their concealment, timing, and cultural discipline to encircle the British forces and instigate panic due to increasing pressure. Hannibal employed a similar strategy with the use of double envelopment at Cannae, where he leveraged the Romans’ arrogance and spatial constriction to turn their superior numbers into a weakness. Greene extends this strategy of annihilation beyond physical warfare, using American oil tycoon John D. Rockefeller’s use of annihilation against the competing Tidewater Pipe-Line Company, and the Iran-Contra scandal, both of which use the strategy of psychological encirclement over a brute force approach.

The chapter endorses a tactic of pre-modern and early industrial warfare, in which the use of annihilation, as opposed to negotiation and containment, is the preferred outcome. By focusing on the psychological effects of encirclement, Greene’s strategy of annihilation, in which the opponent is forced to surrender due to the lack of options, illustrates the nature of modern warfare, which is decided through pressure and perception, not physical prowess. However, the strategy of annihilation, as proposed by Greene, assumes an entity with sufficient resources, patience, and information reach to exert pressure in all directions, limiting the use of this strategy in an environment governed by legal constraints, transparency, and information saturation.

Greene argues that the key to achieving a significant advantage is strategic maneuvering, setting the opponent up in a position of weakness prior to the actual conflict. He also contrasts maneuver warfare with attrition warfare, which relies on the exhaustion of the opponent through continued pressure, as opposed to the disruption of balance and the creation of confusion through the psychological dislocation. According to Greene, most key battles are won before the actual conflict begins if the opponent is lured into a trap, misled by false threats, or forced into a position in which any action makes the opponent’s position worse.

Greene cites the campaign of Napoleon in Italy to illustrate the use of calculated maneuvers and flexibility in planning to gain advantage even in the face of adversity. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1936 presidential campaign highlights a political use of maneuver, forcing an opponent to overcommit themselves and placing them in a precarious position. Greene refers to British officer T. E. Lawrence, often known as Lawrence of Arabia, whose campaign against the Turks during WWI demonstrates the use of maneuver in warfare to gain advantage over a stronger opponent. In each example, the strategist forces the opponent into defeat due to their rigidity, predictability, or emotional response.

The chapter encourages readers to think in terms of process rather than outcome when approaching competition or conflict, which requires a certain level of cognitive discipline not easily influenced by emotional response or the desire for immediate gratification. Greene highlights the use of maneuver as a mode of thinking, in which the advantage is gained gradually rather than through a single demonstration of force.

Greene argues that negotiation is not an alternative to conflict but an extension of it. He advocates for the use of moral language and the idea of fairness as strategic tools. For him, a good negotiator is one who persists in asserting their position both before and during negotiation by exerting pressure and making concessions only when in a position to do so. The effectiveness of negotiation is not based on the goodwill of the other party but on the leverage and the ability to make the other party’s delay costly.

Greene supports these arguments with historical evidence that demonstrates the use of negotiation as a tactic to conceal conflict and expansion. For example, King Philip II’s many concessions and diplomatic agreements with the Athenians were used to conceal the gradual expansion of Macedon’s power over Athens. Greene further supports this logic by analyzing the way Metternich used Russian diplomacy during the Greek crisis in the early 19th century to gain strategic concessions. Other case studies, such as Charles de Gaulle’s inflexibility during World War II, reinforce the idea that the appearance of resolve during negotiation can provide significant leverage even from a position of weakness.

This chapter places Greene firmly within a broader realist tradition that views negotiation as a continuation of strategic rivalry rather than a space of good faith agreement. His approach is consistent with the conditional nature of political commitment as described in Machiavelli’s The Prince (1532), where concession is only given to the extent that the circumstances allow. At the same time, the focus on leverage, reputation, and concession within the chapter also echoes the logic of diplomacy described by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his book, A World Restored (1957), which emphasizes balance, restraint, and the management of expectations as a way of negotiating a successful outcome. Greene’s text defines the nature of negotiation as the application of pressure and the management of timing, where leverage is a product of advantage rather than a precursor to it.