The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War

Should the US have included Taliban remnants in the newly formed Afghan government? Would that have made the country more stable, or would it have put a hostile power within the government and thereby made it all the more able to undermine it from within?

Whitlock emphasizes how the US constantly cut corners in its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan. Would a greater commitment to resources earlier on have made a difference, or was the effort in Afghanistan doomed no matter what?

Why was the Afghan government so prone to corruption? To what extent is the US responsible for that corruption, and how much is it attributable to the particular conditions of Afghan society at the time?

Should President Obama have declared victory after the killing of Osama bin Laden? Why might he have played into the pattern of pressing on with the US presence in Afghanistan despite a decade’s worth of evidence that the US and NATO could not accomplish their stated goals?

Why did so many high-level officials lie about a war that they knew was going badly? What mechanisms prevented them from being held accountable?

What were the most consequential ways in which the US failed to take into account the realities of Afghan politics and culture, and what effects did that have?

Efforts to destroy opium crops failed, but it would have been unlikely for the US and NATO to simply allow the production of opium given the political ramifications at home. Is there anything the US and NATO could have done differently to manage the issue of opium better?

What did President Trump do differently from his predecessors, and how did he continue well-established patterns? To what extent does he deserve credit for negotiating with the Taliban and blame for not following through on his own deal?