The British Are Coming: The War for America, Lexington to Princeton, 1775-1777

Between January and March 1776, the British prepared an ambitious military expedition to the American South, centering its logistical operations in Cork, Ireland. The port city became a vital hub, supplying preserved beef, pork, bread, and other provisions for British troops, though it soon “stank of blood and livestock excrement” (298). Despite thriving commerce for Protestant elites, most Irish Catholics remained marginalized. British recruiters sought to bolster regiments by raising enlistments in Ireland, offering incentives and reduced terms of service. Yet recruitment lagged due to low pay, a reluctance to be “an obvious source of cannon fodder” (299), and widespread Irish distaste for fighting American colonists, many of whom were related in some way. Some recruits deserted immediately or were sabotaged by nationalist sympathizers.

Cork was chosen as the launch point for a major British campaign to support Southern loyalists and divide the rebellion. Governor Josiah Martin of North Carolina, exiled to a British warship called the Scorpion after being driven from New Bern, urged London to send troops and arms, promising to rally thousands of loyalists. Despite skepticism from some ministers, British leadership—including King George III, Lord North, and Lord Germain—embraced the plan, imagining a swift restoration of control. The expedition force expanded to “an immodest campaign of confused purpose” (302), composed of seven regiments, artillery, and a naval squadron under Commodore Sir Peter Parker, with General Charles Cornwallis joining the command.

Departure was delayed by adverse winds, grounded ships, missing stores, and fatal accidents, including the sinking of a transport with ninety troops. Seven regiments waited aboard transports moored in Cork harbor under poor conditions, living on rationed food and strong rum. Finally, on February 12, the fleet departed for America, but a storm scattered the convoy, damaging ships and delaying progress. By early March, Parker reported that only a third of the fleet remained together near the Iberian coast. Cornwallis, still aboard his ship, lamented the delays and uncertain arrival.

Meanwhile, in North Carolina, Governor Martin, still aboard the Scorpion off Cape Fear, issued a call on January 10 for loyalists to rise “with all possible secrecy” (309). He appointed Brigadier General Donald MacDonald to lead the militia. By mid-February, about 1,400 Highlanders had gathered at Cross Creek, many poorly armed. They began marching toward the coast, but swampy terrain, poor weather, and desertions hampered progress. Rebel forces mobilized rapidly, arresting loyalists, collecting weapons, and preparing defenses.

On February 26, Patriot forces under Colonel Richard Caswell camped west of Moore’s Creek, fortified a bridge, and prepared an ambush. Early on February 27, loyalist Highlanders attempted a surprise attack, charging across the greased bridge to the cry of “King George and broadswords!” (311). Rebel fire decimated them. The fight lasted just minutes, leaving 70 loyalists dead or wounded and hundreds captured, including the sick General MacDonald. Rebel casualties were minimal. The rebel victory at Moore’s Creek crushed loyalist hopes in North Carolina. Martin, unaware of the defeat, continued issuing requests and denunciations. Soon after, his estate in New Bern was confiscated. He remained confined aboard his ship, lamenting the failed timing that ruined his plan. On March 12, Major General Henry Clinton arrived at Cape Fear after a rough seven-week voyage from Boston, expecting to meet an assembled loyalist army and a British fleet. Instead, he found neither. Clinton conferred with Martin and quickly grasped the bleak situation.

A seasoned officer, Clinton understood the difficulties of subduing the South. His experience in America, familiarity with the terrain, and cautious temperament shaped his views, and he doubted the loyalists’ reliability, recognizing that British power alone could not sustain their cause without permanent presence. Clinton believed the southern colonies had become increasingly hostile and urged them to focus on a concentrated northern campaign instead. He proposed shifting operations to the Chesapeake and joining General Howe in an effort to secure New York. As Clinton waited at Cape Fear, the scattered fleet from Cork struggled to regroup. With no word from Howe, strategic uncertainty dominated. Clinton, frustrated but pragmatic, hoped that the arrival of Parker and Cornwallis would yield a coordinated plan. In the meantime, he busied himself with naturalist observations and reflections on the state of the war, aware that the challenges ahead would only grow more complex.

In early March 1776, American forces intensified pressure on British troops occupying Boston. On March 2 and 3, sustained cannon fire from Roxbury and nearby places attempted to provoke a British response with minimal effect. Abigail Adams, writing from nearby Braintree, described sleepless nights from the noise, as her “heart beat pace with [the cannon] all night” (317). The bombardment damaged little, and American mortars exploded prematurely due to poor preparation. In spite of the American plans, the British did not sortie from Boston.

On March 4, preparations began for the overnight seizure of Dorchester Heights, a strategic bluff overlooking Boston and its harbor. General George Washington issued strict orders, emphasizing discipline and readiness. Troops gathered entrenching tools, cleared trees, and constructed timber frames called “chandeliers” (318), which would be filled with fascines and stones for improvised fortifications. Expecting heavy casualties, the Americans prepared field hospitals and called for medical supplies and nurses. Their gunpowder stores were limited, but reinforcements from Connecticut and Rhode Island slightly improved the situation. Engineer Rufus Putnam devised ways to build defenses on frozen ground using chandeliers and gabions.

In the early hours of March 5, under an intense cannonade and a full moon, 800 American troops and 280 carts loaded with fortification materials ascended the Dorchester isthmus. Brigadier General John Thomas led another 1,200 men to construct redoubts. By dawn, six defensive positions had been established and 3,000 reinforcements arrived to hold the heights. Washington reminded his troops that the day marked the sixth anniversary of the Boston Massacre.

British commanders were caught off guard. General William Howe had received intelligence of possible American movements but failed to act. By morning, British officers saw the new American defenses and realized the rebels could now fire upon the town and harbor. British artillery fired on Dorchester with little effect, and Howe prepared for an assault with 2,400 men. Meanwhile, Washington organized a counterattack against Boston in case the British attacked the heights.

On March 5, worsening weather thwarted British plans. A violent storm wrecked transports and made a landing impossible. By the next day, Howe announced that his army would abandon Boston. Food supplies were critically low, and the Royal Navy had already loaned provisions to the army. Plans were made to withdraw to Halifax; evacuation orders were issued. British troops and loyalists prepared to depart. Over 1,000 loyalists, along with British soldiers and their families, faced difficult choices about what possessions to bring. Amid growing confusion, soldiers and sailors looted warehouses and private homes. Disorder spread despite Howe’s efforts to impose strict discipline. Boston’s inhabitants were “greatly terrified” (326). Military and civilian property was abandoned or destroyed. Surplus supplies were dumped, burned, or left behind. Castle William, the key British fort in the harbor, was rigged with mines and blown up on March 20 to prevent its use by the Americans. The fleet, over 100 ships strong, prepared to sail.

On March 17, after 333 days of siege, the British began to embark in silence. By 8:00 am, the final detachment left Bunker Hill, and the fleet sailed from Boston Harbor. American troops watched from Dorchester, cheering. However, the fleet lingered off Nantasket Roads for several days to reorganize.

Washington entered Boston cautiously. Suspecting biological sabotage, he ordered only smallpox survivors to enter first. Looting was forbidden, and prisoners were questioned for signs of a British return. Troops discovered that British forces had left behind traps, including iron spikes and dummies dressed as soldiers. Washington inspected the town on March 18 and found much of it damaged, though many elite homes were intact. Abandoned supplies included weapons, food, and medical stores, some of which had been poisoned. Loyalist plunder was recovered, and prominent citizens found their homes looted or destroyed. Washington oversaw restitution of property where possible.

A Thanksgiving service was held on March 28. Washington received honors, including a gold medal and an honorary degree from Harvard. Though he was “yet to fight a battle or demonstrate particular martial competence” (332), Washington’s leadership and resolve were widely praised. He immediately began preparing for a move to New York, anticipating further British action there. By March 29, Washington’s troops began marching south through Connecticut. Logistics were strained, with shortages of wagons and pay, but the army moved on, banners flying and fifes playing Yankee Doodle, “that new battle anthem fairly won from the routed enemy” (334).

In late April 1776, Benjamin Franklin arrived in Montreal after a grueling journey from Philadelphia, greeted by Benedict Arnold and hopeful crowds. Franklin, nearly 70, had come with a congressional commission to revive the failing American campaign in Canada. Franklin joined Arnold at the Château Ramezay, where they were met with elaborate hospitality despite the deteriorating military situation.

General Arnold had replaced David Wooster as the American commander in Montreal. Arnold briefed Franklin and the other commissioners—Charles Carroll, Samuel Chase, and Father John Carroll—on the dire state of the American army besieging Quebec. Arnold lacked the hard currency needed to maintain discipline and procure local goods. Due to Wooster’s harsh measures and the army’s misbehavior, “whatever zeal the habitants had once evinced for the American invasion had subsided, not to be roused again” (341). Franklin and the commissioners quickly realized they had arrived too late to salvage the campaign. On May 1, they reported to Congress that the American army needed £20,000 sterling and 8,000 reinforcements. Troops around Quebec had less than ten days of food and only 150 pounds of gunpowder. Franklin himself gave Arnold £343 from his own pocket, but the situation was beyond repair.

Inside Quebec, General Carleton maintained a defensive posture, uncertain of American strength. Relief arrived on May 6, when British warships under Captain Charles Douglas broke through the ice-choked St. Lawrence and landed reinforcements. Behind them came American general John Thomas, who took command of the American army but quickly fell ill with smallpox. On May 3, the Americans attempted to trick the British with a fireship, Peggy, but the ruse failed. The fireship floated harmlessly down the river and “winked out with a wet hiss” (346).

On May 6, with British regulars landing, Thomas began a hasty retreat. Carleton pursued with 900 men, and the Americans abandoned their positions in disarray, leaving supplies, weapons, and many sick soldiers behind. Thomas died of smallpox on June 2, already “blind and disfigured beyond recognition” (350). His successor, John Sullivan, assumed command in a chaotic environment. Believing the British vulnerable, Sullivan launched an attack on Trois-Rivières on June 8, but poor guidance led the Americans into the “most horrid swamp that ever man set foot in” (351). The resulting defeat cost around 400 American casualties, and General William Thompson was captured.

British reinforcements under General Burgoyne, including German auxiliaries and massive supplies, now pressed into Canada. Sullivan ordered a withdrawal to Sorel, then Chambly, and finally to St. Johns. Benedict Arnold evacuated Montreal on June 15, torching boats and threatening destruction when locals were reluctant to provide carts. British pursuit was slowed by fatigue, illness, and summer heat, allowing the rebels to stay narrowly ahead. At St. Johns, disease ravaged the army. Soldiers suffering from smallpox, dysentery, and other illnesses were loaded into boats for transport to Île aux Noix, a malarial island in the Richelieu River. Thousands of sick soldiers crowded the island with insufficient tents, food, and medical care. Franklin and the other commissioners had already departed. Sullivan delayed evacuation, waiting for orders, while disease claimed dozens of men each day in “this last, awful outpost in Canada” (359).

On June 25, the American army finally left Île aux Noix for Crown Point. Sick and healthy alike traveled by bateau or marched along Lake Champlain’s shore. Many died en route and were buried in unmarked graves. Franklin, having already departed, wrote of his despair and physical decline. Others, like Matthew Patten of New Hampshire, learned of loved ones lost to smallpox. The retreat was completed by early July.

The failed Canadian campaign cost thousands of Americans lives to battle and disease, and thousands more were captured or incapacitated. Atkinson describes it as a “botched campaign of liberation and aggrandizement, laden with miscalculation and marred by mishap” (361). The campaign, intended to win Canadian support and deny the British a northern base, ended in disaster. General Carleton reclaimed Quebec and Montreal. British plans to invade New York through the Lake Champlain corridor were now viable. Arnold, in a final warning, urged Washington to build “an inland fleet capable of challenging the Royal Navy on Lake Champlain” (363).