“It assumes all states perceive their interests in the same way and act in the same way. Its simple assumption that power is all is a starting point for understanding state behavior but does not get one very far.”

Huntington justifies his critique of alternative theories, such as the inevitability of Western universalism, on pragmatic terms. The lack of nuance or predictive power in alternative theories, he suggests, undermines their utility in the world of political science. In doing so, he asserts The Limits of Ideological Paradigms in politics and political analysis.

“There were many civilizations, each of which was civilized in its own way.”

Perspective and subjectivity are an important part of Huntington’s thesis. While he suggests that he is operating on an objective level, rising above subjective criticisms of other civilizations and cultures, he concedes that subjectivity is inescapable. Not everyone will believe in the primacy or morality of Western ideals; each civilization believes itself to be “civilized in its own way” (41), even in the modern era.

“The name ‘the West’ has also given rise to the concept of ‘Westernization’ and has promoted a misleading conflation of Westernization and modernization: it is easier to conceive of Japan ‘Westernizing’ than ‘Euroamericanizing.’”

Throughout The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington points out that the concept of Westernization is completely removed from any kind of cardinal direction. Rather than geographical, Westernization and the West itself is a political concept with its own implication and historical baggage. Huntington strives to separate Westernization from modernization, believing that countries can modernize without necessarily adopting Western values or systems.

“In this sense, English is the world’s way of communicating interculturally just as the Christian calendar is the world’s way of tracking time, Arabic numbers are the world’s way of counting, and the metric system is, for the most part, the world’s way of measuring.”

The English language has a utility which gestures toward cross-civilization bonding, yet Huntington points out the various ways in which Christian and Arabic civilizations have influenced the world without necessarily fostering any cross-civilizational bonds. The English language, he suggests, is in danger of being reduced to a tool, separated from any cultural meaning, just as most people do not acknowledge the influence of Arabic culture on the numeric system or Christianity on the most common calendar system.

“People define their identity by what they are not.”

A pervasive theme in The Clash of Civilizations is the tendency to define one’s identity in opposition to others, invoking The Nature of Civilizational Identity and Conflict. This hints at the confrontational implication of the title, in which everything—including the assertion of identity—is undertaken in a confrontational manner. Huntington’s thesis has a subtext of confrontation, comparison, and opposition, right down to the way in which he believes identity is constructed.

“Almost all of the non-Western civilizations in the world have existed for at least one millennium and in some cases for several. They have a demonstrated record of borrowing from other civilizations in ways to enhance their own survival.”

Huntington’s thesis is predicated on the inevitable confrontation between civilizations, yet he concedes that, throughout history, intra-civilization exchange has been common. Civilizations have always borrowed and cooperated with one another, yet Huntington believes that this optimistic vision of a more utopian co-existence is impossible in the post-Cold War era. According to Huntington, the world has fundamentally changed to the point where cross-civilizational relationships must now be pragmatic and cynical, rather than cooperative and benevolent.

“The willingness of other societies to accept the West’s dictates or abide its sermons is rapidly evaporating, and so are the West’s self-confidence and will to dominate.”

Huntington’s book presents the clash of civilizations as inevitable, yet his presentation of the decline of the West and the rise of rival civilizations adds an extra impetus to his work. Other civilizations, he suggests, are not willing to tolerate Western hegemony for much longer. In this sense, Huntington’s rhetoric adds an urgency to his theory, pressing readers to accept his framing before it is too late.

“Western governments, groups, and international institutions, such as the IMF and World Bank, have attempted to fill this vacuum with the doctrines of neo-orthodox economics and democratic politics.”

International organizations such as the IMF and World Bank have presented themselves to the world as objective and detached, but they require an adherence to Western orthodoxy, at least in the economic sense. Huntington believes that the failure of Western politicians and institutions to accept a multipolar world could weaken international institutions and raise the chances of future conflicts.

“Everything connected with the West and particularly the victorious United States came to be seen as good and desirable. Japan thus attempted to emulate the United States even as China emulated the Soviet Union.”

While Japan did turn to Western culture following WWII, the influence of American culture was only a transient force, with Japan gradually reverting to prioritizing its own cultural norms as the post-war era wore on. Japan’s turn inward reflects The Nature of Civilizational Identity and Conflict as Huntington understands it, just as, he argues, China gradually abandoned the Soviet influence in favor of a revised Confucianism and its own adapted version of capitalism and industrialization.

“Leftist and communist movements had been discredited and then seriously undermined by the collapse of the Soviet Union and international communism.”

Huntington has addressed the decline of the West and the potential collapse of Western civilization, yet does not accept that this decline might redound negatively on the West as the collapse of the Soviet Union did on international communism. The collapse of the Soviet Union, he feels, was inevitable and a sign of flawed ideology, while the decline of the West does not allude to any issues with Western ideology in a parallel manner.

“Almost everywhere one looks, people have been asking, ‘Who are we?’ ‘Where do we belong?’ and ‘Who is not us?’”

These fundamental questions are related to human identity on a social level, reflecting The Nature of Civilizational Identity and Conflict. Huntington believes that anxiety over identity results in the creation of civilizations, as well as creating the inevitable conflict with people whose identity differs. The final question—“who is not us”—becomes just as important in Huntington’s reasoning, as it denotes the identity of the threat to the civilization.

“The two Koreas move hesitatingly but meaningfully toward unification.”

In Part 3 of The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington makes an increasing amount of predictions for the future of geopolitics. Among them, he sees the two Koreas moving inevitably toward unification because they are closely matched in civilizational terms. Decades after the publication of his book, Korea remains divided into two countries and Huntington’s prediction seems to have faltered. Civilizational similarity has not unified the Korean peninsula.

“As of 1995 virtually no violence had occurred between Russians and Ukrainians.”

Another of Huntington’s predictions is more correct, though not perhaps in the way that Huntington expected. Though he described the social divide in Ukraine between an Orthodox east and a Western west, he believed that Russian and Ukrainian violence would be avoided due to their civilizational similarities. His prediction is no longer correct, as war erupted between Russia and Ukraine in 2022, which suggests that civilizational ties are not always an accurate predictor of cooperation.

“In the early 1990s, slowly but perceptively and ineluctably, the two Chinas were moving toward each other and developing common interests from their expanding economic relations and shared cultural identity.”

As with his prediction about Korea, Huntington’s prediction about increased diplomatic relations between two countries seemingly united by a shared civilization has not panned out. The gap between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Taiwan (or the Republic of China (ROC)) has widened since the publication of Huntington’s work. His civilizational model has not proved correct in this instance.

“Double standards in practice are the unavoidable price of universal standards of principle.”

Huntington acknowledges hypocrisy as a difficult but “unavoidable” (185) part of his pragmatic worldview. His justification for the essentialness of double standards may rankle members of non-Western civilizations, but Huntington views this hypocrisy as necessary for the preservation of Western ideals.

“At some point, however, a few terrorists will be able to produce massive violence and massive destruction.”

Huntington’s analysis of religious terrorism speaks to The Role of Religion in Politics, as he believes the revival of Islamic fundamentalism is one of the key drivers of the modern Middle East. The events of September 11th, five years after the publication of the book, showed a different level of destructive capabilities from anything that had come before. The sheer scale of the attack (and subsequent attacks) vindicated his belief in the inevitable rise of terrorists and the increased scope of their attacks.

“The relations between Islam and Christianity, both Orthodox and Western, have often been stormy. Each has been the other’s Other.”

Huntington accepts that the process of otherization, even within seemingly comparable civilizations, is multidirectional. Orthodox and Western civilizations may be built on a Christian foundation, but the schism between Orthodox Christianity and other branches of Christianity is enough to create a divide between the civilizations. In this sense, Huntington dilutes the influence of Christianity on Western culture, as other cultures are also influenced by Christianity.

“Overall the Japanese economy has not operated in the way the supposedly universal laws of Western economics dictate.”

Huntington here notes the Western economists’ frustration that Japanese economic decisions do not conform to Western expectations, yet succeed anyway, which speaks to The Limits of Ideological Paradigms. Huntington also argues that modernization is not inevitably tied to Westernization, and that it is a mistake for Western economists and political theorists to equate the two.

“What the West sees as a victory for the Free World, Muslims see as a victory for Islam.”

The civilizational divide illustrates the importance of perspective, even regarding seemingly objective events. In this instance, the same military action is touted as a victory by the West and by Islam, speaking to The Role of Religion in Politics. From Huntington’s perspective, these seemingly antagonistic forces both treat the same historical event as their own victory and they can both reasonably claim to be right. As such, the recasting of historical events to buoy certain civilizational narratives shows the importance of subjectivity in such civilizational conflicts.

“The Muslim as victim argument, however, does not explain conflicts between Muslim majorities and non-Muslim minorities in countries such as Sudan, Egypt, Iran, and Indonesia.”

According to Huntington, Muslim civilization is more disposed toward war and conflict than other civilizations. He uses this militaristic disposition to repudiate narratives about “the Muslim as a victim” (264), while also emphasizing his ominous warnings about the future of Muslim countries. Since they are more than ready to fight one another, he suggests, they will be ready to fight anyone else. This seemingly defies Huntington’s own theory about civilizational conflict, yet also bolsters his narrative about the threat posed by Muslim countries.

“Americans want to identify the forces of good and the forces of evil in any foreign conflict and align themselves with the former.”

Huntington argues that one of the flaws in American, and sometimes Western, ways of thinking about international affairs is that it can operate on the assumption that there are good and evil forces, or superior or inferior values, automatically at work in every conflict. Instead, Huntington posits that it is essential for America and the West to accept a multipolar world, where different value systems can coexist and be accepted as valid within their own sphere even when they differ from one another.

“The nationalist, aggressive, ethnic-cleansing, Greater Serbian warmonger of 1992 had become the peacemaker of 1995. For many Serbs, however, he had become a traitor.”

Huntington’s portrayal of Slobodan Milosevic illustrates the cynical way in which perspective is deployed in politics. Milosevic is recast as a peacemaker for the benefit of the broader political community, only to be demonized by his former followers. The man has not changed, but he has become useful to a different group of people, so his reputation alters accordingly.

“Societies that assume that their history has ended, however, are usually societies whose history is about to decline.”

In the closing passages of his book, Huntington again objects to the theory of Francis Fukuyama that humanity has reached something resembling the end of history. Theories such as Fukuyama’s are not only wrong, he suggests, but a sign of social decay. Any history that proclaims as much is surely on the decline. Fukuyama’s failure, he suggests, also bolsters his own theory.