The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Huntington establishes the foundation for his civilizational paradigm by arguing that human history is best understood as the history of civilizations. Civilizations, in his view, are the broadest and most enduring cultural identities people have formed. They are central to understanding patterns of continuity, conflict, and transformation across time. 

Huntington begins by noting the long tradition of scholarly inquiry into civilizations, citing a wide range of thinkers such as Weber, Toynbee, Braudel, and McNeill. Despite methodological and conceptual differences, these scholars broadly agree that civilizations represent large-scale cultural entities that rise, evolve, and sometimes fall, shaping the course of human development. He distinguishes between “civilization” in the singular (a concept tied historically to European ideas of refinement and modernity) and “civilizations” in the plural, each rooted in different cultures and histories. The singular conception once served as a normative standard for judging societies, particularly during the era of European imperialism. This notion has been largely abandoned in favor of recognizing the “civilizations in plural” (41), each valid in its own right.

According to Huntington, a civilization is essentially a culture writ large. It encompasses the full spectrum of a society’s values, beliefs, institutions, practices, and historical experiences. Drawing on thinkers like Braudel and Wallerstein, he defines civilization as a historically integrated and coherent system of worldview and social organization. Religion, Huntington emphasizes, is often the most crucial element in defining civilizations. Shared religion can bind together people of different races, while differing religions can divide people who otherwise share ethnicity and language. Historical examples such as the Lebanese civil war or the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia illustrate how religion can be a more potent divider than ethnicity. 

Civilizations are not reducible to race or nation-states. While some overlap exists between racial and civilizational groupings, Huntington stresses that race is not a reliable marker of civilizational affiliation. Civilizations transcend political boundaries and encompass various types of political organization. Some civilizations, like Japan’s, are contained within a single nation-state, while others, like Islamic or Western civilizations, span many.

Another key feature of civilizations is their comprehensiveness. The internal components of a civilization—whether states, ethnic groups, or regions—are best understood in relation to the larger civilizational whole. Civilizations provide the context in which smaller cultural units operate. They are the highest level of cultural identity that people strongly associate with, short of belonging to the human species. Huntington illustrates this point with a hierarchy of identities: A person might identify as Roman, Italian, Catholic, Christian, European, and Westerner, but “Westerner” (43) is the most encompassing civilizational identity.

Civilizations are also the most durable form of human association. They often outlast empires, regimes, and ideologies. Huntington describes them as realities of the “extreme longue durée” (43), capable of surviving revolutions, conquests, and ideological shifts. While civilizations can decline or disappear, they evolve and adapt over time. Scholars have proposed various models to explain their life cycles. Toynbee, for instance, describes a civilization’s rise in response to challenges, its period of growth under a creative minority, its consolidation into a universal state, and finally its disintegration. 

Though the details differ, most models agree that civilizations pass through phases of ascent and decline. Importantly, civilizations are not political units. They do not make treaties, levy taxes, or wage wars. Their political makeup can include multiple states with varying degrees of integration. Western civilization today, for instance, includes several states that share deep institutional ties, but it is not a single political entity. In contrast, China may represent a unique case where civilization and statehood coincide, as Lucian Pye suggested.

Huntington identifies a generally accepted list of major civilizations in world history. While scholars debate the total number, there is agreement on the broad outlines. Seven civilizations—Mesopotamian, Egyptian, Cretan, Classical, Byzantine, Mesoamerican, and Andean—are no longer active. Five civilizations remain: Sinic (Chinese), Hindu (Indian), Islamic, Orthodox, and Western. To these he adds Latin American and possibly African civilizations as distinct, though somewhat contested, cultural entities. Latin America, for example, shares roots with the West but diverges in religion, political development, and Indigenous influences. Whether it should be considered a “subcivilization” (46) or a separate one depends on the context, but Huntington finds it analytically useful to treat it as separate. 

Each major civilization, according to Huntington, is tied closely to a central religion or worldview. Christianity defines Western and Orthodox civilizations, Islam defines the Islamic world, Hinduism is the core of Indian civilization, and Confucianism is foundational to the Sinic world. Buddhism, despite its historical importance, does not constitute the basis of a major civilization due to its fragmentation and adaptation into other cultures. A limited Buddhist civilization exists in places like Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, but it has not developed into a distinct large-scale civilizational structure.

Huntington then turns to the historical relationships among civilizations. From the emergence of early civilizations to roughly the year 1500, civilizations were largely isolated from one another. When contact occurred, it was either rare, brief, or limited to trade and conquest. The term “encounters” (48) best describes these interactions. Civilizations were geographically and temporally separated. Significant diffusion of ideas or technology took centuries. For example, it took nearly 600 years for Buddhism to spread from India to China, and Chinese innovations such as paper and gunpowder took even longer to reach Europe. A dramatic change began around 1500, when Western civilization launched a sustained and overwhelming expansion. Enabled by advancements in navigation and military technology, Western powers explored, conquered, and colonized much of the globe. By the early 20th century, the West dominated 84% of the planet’s land surface. 

In this process, non-Western civilizations were subordinated, Indigenous civilizations in the Americas were destroyed, and others like Islamic and Indian civilizations were reduced to colonial or semi-colonial status. Huntington argues that this dominance was not due to Western ideas or values but rather its mastery of organized violence, a fact often forgotten by Westerners but not by others. This dominance culminated in a Western-centered international system characterized by sovereign states, international law rooted in Western traditions, and capitalist economic structures. 

However, even within the West, there was intense internal conflict. First, there were religious and dynastic wars, then national wars, and finally ideological struggles during the Cold War. The ideological conflicts of the 20th century—liberalism, communism, fascism—all had Western origins. No other civilization, Huntington observes, has generated a comparable set of political ideologies.

With the end of the Cold War and the decline of Western dominance, the world has entered a new phase marked by intensified and multidirectional interactions among civilizations. Western expansion has halted, and what Huntington calls “the revolt against the West” (53) has begun. Power is shifting, as non-Western civilizations are asserting themselves. The global order is becoming increasingly multipolar and multicivilizational. While the West remains powerful, it is no longer hegemonic. In this new environment, the Western ideological paradigm of separating religion from international politics is breaking down. Religion is resurging as a central force in global identity and conflict. As political ideologies decline, civilizations are returning to culturally rooted sources of allegiance, especially religion.

Finally, Huntington argues that the world today resembles an international system more than an international society. While there are numerous interactions and points of contact among civilizations, shared values and institutions are lacking. Civilizations still see themselves as the center of the world. The West, in particular, has long assumed its own historical experience to be universal. Scholars like Spengler, Toynbee, and Braudel have criticized this parochialism and urged a broader view that recognizes multiple, coexisting civilizations.

Huntington critically examines the notion of a “universal civilization” (56) and systematically dismantles its assumptions. He begins by distinguishing between different meanings of the term. At its most profound, a universal civilization implies shared moral values and institutions across all human societies, such as the condemnation of murder or the existence of family structures. While foundational, these values are not new, nor are they relevant for understanding historical change. If these commonalities define civilization, they cannot explain the complex cultural distinctions that exist globally. 

Huntington warns against semantic confusion when using “civilization” to denote only what is universal. This redefinition would either force the invention of new terms for historically recognized civilizations, or wrongly imply that major civilizational groupings no longer matter. Figures like Vaclav Havel acknowledge the superficial global culture but emphasize the deep persistence of diverse historical and religious traditions beneath it. A second interpretation of universal civilization refers to the broad spread of literacy and urbanism that differentiates civilized from primitive societies. This idea has historical precedent and continues to grow, but it remains compatible with the existence of multiple distinct civilizations.

Huntington then analyzes what he calls the “Davos Culture” (57), a cosmopolitan elite characterized by education, international orientation, and liberal democratic values. Despite its global influence, this culture is confined to a tiny fraction of the global population and lacks deep roots outside the West. As Hedley Bull notes, it represents a common intellectual, not moral, culture. 

Another argument for universal civilization centers on the global spread of Western consumer habits and pop culture. Huntington dismisses this as superficial and culturally insignificant. Cultural imports are often either exotic fads or products of power, not indicators of deep assimilation. He argues that adopting Western consumption patterns, such as jeans and fast food, does not equate to adopting Western values. The contrast between the Magna Carta and the “Magna Mac” (58) highlights this trivialization. Cultural convergence is not guaranteed by shared entertainment preferences, and pop culture often elicits backlash against perceived Western cultural imperialism.

Global media, dominated by Western content, is cited as another vector for universal culture. However, Huntington emphasizes that shared media does not produce shared interpretations. Instead, communications are filtered through local values and experiences. Western military actions viewed positively in the West may provoke resentment elsewhere. The global reach of Western media incites cultural defensiveness, leading to the rise of regional media and civilizational networks. Thus, media globalization reinforces rather than erases cultural boundaries. 

Regarding language, Huntington challenges the assumption that English is becoming a universal language. Data shows a relative decline in English speakers globally. English functions as a “lingua franca” for intercultural communication, but it does not foster cultural convergence. Instead, English adapts to local contexts, producing distinctive versions like Indian or Nigerian English. These evolutions reflect and reinforce cultural diversity. Language trends also follow shifts in global power. As Western dominance wanes, the use of English and other Western languages is likely to decline. 

Efforts to replace imperial languages with indigenous ones after decolonization further underscore cultural autonomy. Nationalist elites often use Western languages to distance themselves from the masses, but democratization trends support the resurgence of indigenous languages. The post-Cold War era has witnessed linguistic revivals in former Soviet republics and elsewhere, aligning language with civilizational identities. Huntington points to a “Babelization” (64) of language, not its unification.

Religious trends further undermine the idea of a universal civilization. Despite the spread of Christianity and Islam, the 20th century saw a resurgence in religious identification and fundamentalism, deepening rather than diminishing religious divisions. While Christianity spread through conversion, Islam’s growth is fueled both by conversion and high birth rates. Islam is projected to surpass Christianity in global population share. 

The idea of a universal civilization, Huntington argues, is fundamentally a Western construct. It echoes colonial-era ideologies like “the white man’s burden” (66) and serves to justify Western cultural hegemony. Intellectual migrants to the West may advocate universalism to resolve identity crises, but this view finds little support in non-Western societies. To them, the Western “universal” (66) appears as a parochial imperialism.

Huntington critiques three flawed assumptions behind the universal civilization thesis. First, the fall of communism did not usher in liberal democracy as the sole global ideology. Religious and civilizational differences persist and generate conflict. Second, globalization does not necessarily promote peace. High levels of trade and communication can increase tensions, as seen historically and confirmed by recent studies. Third, social psychology suggests that increased contact heightens identity distinctions. People define themselves against others, which exacerbates civilizational awareness and loyalty. 

Modernization is often conflated with Westernization, but Huntington rejects this equivalence. Modernization involves industrialization, literacy, urbanization, and technological progress. While the West was the first to modernize, it did so long after its distinctive civilization formed. Western civilization’s uniqueness predates modernity and includes features such as classical inheritance, Christianity, pluralistic institutions, separation of church and state, rule of law, and individualism. These characteristics enabled the West to lead in modernization but are not prerequisites for it.

Huntington outlines three responses by non-Western societies to Western influence: Rejectionism; Kemalism; and reformism. Rejectionism seeks to preserve indigenous culture by rejecting both modernization and Westernization. Kemalism embraces both, assuming that modernization requires wholesale adoption of Western culture. Reformism, the most common approach, seeks to modernize while retaining cultural identity. Examples include China’s late Qing reformers and Islamic modernists who argued for compatibility between Islam and modern science. Over time, Huntington observes, initial modernization may involve Westernization, but as societies modernize further, they often reassert their own cultural identities. Modernization enhances a society’s power and cultural confidence, fostering de-Westernization and cultural resurgence. 

Theoretical and historical evidence supports this pattern. Civilizations borrow selectively from others, adapting external influences to reinforce internal values. China absorbed Buddhism without becoming Indianized; Japan maintained its culture despite significant borrowing. Islamic societies have similarly adopted scientific and technological advances without embracing Western ideology. 

Finally, Huntington argues that modernization without Westernization is not only possible but increasingly common. Indigenous cultural identities are deeply rooted and resistant to wholesale transformation. As modernization spreads, so does cultural diversity. The result is a world that becomes “more modern and less Western” (78).