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Huntington argues that the post-Cold War world is undergoing a profound reconfiguration as nations increasingly align themselves not according to ideology or geopolitical interest, but along cultural and civilizational lines. While the Cold War permitted states to remain nonaligned or to shift allegiance based on strategic calculation, the new global order compels every state to confront a more fundamental question: “Who are you?” (126). This emphasis on cultural identity—defined by religion, language, history, and shared values—now shapes national and international alignments, fostering cohesion among culturally similar states and conflict among culturally disparate ones.
This cultural realignment has sparked identity crises around the globe. Throughout the 1990s, countries from Canada and Germany to India and Iran were engaged in internal debates over their civilizational identities. In this new landscape, people seek security and belonging through affiliation with those who share similar ancestry, religion, and values. For example, Western European countries that were formerly neutral during the Cold War have integrated with their cultural kin through institutions like the European Union, while Muslim countries such as Turkey and Bosnia face exclusion based on civilizational differences. Similarly, Cold War alliances in the Balkans have dissolved and have been replaced by religiously defined coalitions—such as Orthodox Serbia and Greece aligning against Muslim Albania and Bosnia—with regional conflicts increasingly mapped along civilizational fault lines.
Huntington provides further examples in the former Soviet Union and East Asia. Post-Soviet republics like Armenia and Azerbaijan are supported by cultural allies (Russia and Turkey, respectively) while Russia wages war against Muslim groups in Chechnya and Tajikistan. In East Asia, despite economic integration, cultural divides remain potent. Chinese cultural commonality facilitates informal economic integration among Sinic societies, while Japan, lacking deep cultural ties with its neighbors, finds itself isolated. In Southeast Asia, tension between Muslim and non-Muslim groups also intensifies. Latin America, meanwhile, illustrates how cultural cohesion can support economic integration, as shown by organizations like Mercosur. However, attempts to include culturally distinct Mexico in North American structures, such as NAFTA, expose the limitations of such initiatives without deep cultural commonality.
This pattern holds at the global level. As civilizations become the dominant actors in world politics, states increasingly identify with broader civilizational groupings, such as “Greater Serbia” or “Greater China” (127). Although pragmatic alliances may sometimes cross civilizational lines, Huntington argues that these are less sustainable in the long term. Cultural identity, more than strategic necessity, now drives cooperation and conflict. He emphasizes that culture fosters trust, and trust is the basis of lasting political and economic partnerships. Thus, single-civilization organizations like NATO or CARICOM tend to be more effective than multi-civilizational ones, such as ASEAN, which struggle with internal cohesion and consensus.
Economic cooperation, too, increasingly follows cultural lines. Huntington notes that the most successful economic unions (such as the European Union) are grounded in civilizational unity. Multicivilizational organizations, including ASEAN and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, remain limited in effectiveness. The East Asian Economic Caucus, proposed by Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohammad, attempted to capitalize on East Asia’s shared cultural traits but ultimately struggled due to regional rivalries and Japan’s ambivalence. In practice, informal networks, such as those among overseas Chinese, have proven more resilient than formal organizations. The failure of efforts to include culturally distinct countries, like Israel in a Middle Eastern common market or Haiti in a Caribbean bloc, further demonstrates the centrality of cultural alignment to economic integration.
Huntington also elaborates on the structural dynamics of civilizations, which he categorizes into core states, member states, cleft countries, lone countries, and torn countries. Core states—like Russia for Orthodoxy or China for Sinic civilization—provide cultural and political leadership. In contrast, cleft countries, such as Nigeria and India, are internally divided along civilizational lines and prone to conflict. Lone countries, such as Japan and Haiti, lack civilizational allies. Torn countries are those whose elites attempt to reorient their nation from one civilization to another, often unsuccessfully.
Case studies of torn countries illustrate the deep difficulties of civilizational transformation. Russia remains divided between Westernizers and Slavophiles, its identity crisis compounded by the collapse of communism and renewed Orthodox nationalism. Turkey, despite nearly a century of Kemalist reforms aimed at Westernization, faces mounting Islamist sentiment and exclusion from European institutions, signaling its persistent Islamic identity. Mexico’s reorientation toward North America under NAFTA, while supported by its elites and the United States, may ultimately falter if democratic reform fuels cultural resistance. Australia’s effort to redefine itself as an Asian country, though driven by economic interests, is similarly thwarted by cultural incompatibility and rejection by its Asian neighbors.
Ultimately, Huntington concludes that civilizational identity is enduring and resistant to manipulation. Cultural values and institutions shape alliances, trade patterns, and political structures. Attempts to override or shift civilizational identity—whether through modernization, economic integration, or elite-driven reforms—tend to generate internal tensions and external rejection.
Huntington outlines the rise of core states—dominant countries within cultural blocs—that provide order within their civilizational sphere and negotiate relationships across civilizational boundaries. Huntington posits that core states such as the United States (West), Russia (Orthodox), and China (Sinic) now serve as gravitational centers of political and cultural alliances.
Countries within these civilizations tend to cluster around their core, forming concentric circles of influence based on cultural affinity. However, the absence of a core state in Islamic civilization renders it uniquely fragmented. Unlike other civilizations, Islam exhibits a consciousness without cohesion, lacking a central power that can represent and organize the ummah (i.e., the transnational Muslim community). This void contributes to internal disorder and external volatility, as no single state commands religious and political legitimacy across the Islamic world.
Huntington explains that civilizations now function as spheres of influence. Core states are accepted as legitimate leaders by virtue of shared culture, which provides both moral authority and practical effectiveness. Attempts by non-core states, such as the United States in Bosnia or the UN in Sudan, to impose order in foreign civilizations often fail due to cultural disconnection. Huntington argues that effective peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the new world order depend on culturally embedded leadership within civilizations.
This framework also drives the “bounding” (157) of the West, particularly in Europe. Huntington describes the European Union as increasingly defining itself in civilizational terms, constructing a layered identity that includes only Western Christian countries at its core. Proposals for differentiated integration within the EU and NATO reflect efforts to align political membership with cultural boundaries, excluding Orthodox and Muslim-majority countries. The historical line separating Western Christianity from Orthodoxy and Islam has reemerged as the effective eastern boundary of Europe, determining eligibility for Western institutions.
Countries like Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic states are increasingly accepted into the Western fold due to their Western Christian heritage, while countries like Romania and Bulgaria are seen as marginal. Turkey’s EU aspirations are complicated by its Islamic identity, and Greece—despite its Western institutional affiliations—is portrayed as an Orthodox outlier whose post-Cold War behavior increasingly aligns with Russia. The reconfiguration of NATO and the EU along civilizational lines underscores Huntington’s thesis that cultural identity is becoming the key determinant of international alliances and political order.
Russia’s post-Soviet strategy exemplifies the formation of a civilizational bloc. Russia seeks to consolidate leadership over the Orthodox world and exert influence over its “near abroad” (163), including Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, and parts of Ukraine. Though countries like Georgia and Ukraine have national identities that resist full integration, Russia uses cultural and historical ties, as well as military pressure, to reassert its dominance. Ukraine, Huntington argues, is a cleft country, divided along a civilizational fault line between its Western and Orthodox halves. While outright conflict is unlikely due to deep historical and familial ties with Russia, long-term political unity remains uncertain.
In East Asia, China’s strategy centers on reestablishing itself as the hegemon of a Sinic civilizational sphere. China is positioning itself not only as a political power but also as the cultural nucleus of a transnational Chinese identity. Through economic integration and diasporic networks—the “bamboo network” (170)—China deepens ties with ethnically Chinese communities in Southeast Asia and politically ambiguous territories such as Taiwan and Hong Kong.
These relationships rest on shared culture, trust, and familial networks rather than formal treaties, highlighting the power of cultural affinity in forging economic and political unity. While Taiwan moves closer economically to the mainland, tensions persist over questions of sovereignty and independence. The possibility of unification remains open but fraught, contingent on Taiwan’s internal politics and China’s military and political strategies. Singapore, once skeptical of Beijing, has band-wagoned with China’s rise, illustrating how smaller states adjust their alignments in response to shifts in civilizational power.
Islam, in contrast, lacks cohesion due to the absence of a core state. Huntington describes a fragmented Islamic world defined by strong tribal and religious loyalties but weak national structures. While Islamic consciousness has grown, especially through communications, pilgrimage, and educational exchange, this has not translated into political unity. Competing centers—such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey—vie for leadership, but none possess the combination of legitimacy, power, and geographic centrality needed to unify the ummah. This leadership vacuum perpetuates conflict both within Islam and between Islam and other civilizations.
In Huntington’s model, international organizations like NATO and the European Union are not merely political or economic entities, but expressions of civilizational identity and cohesion, illustrating The Nature of Civilizational Identity and Conflict. He argues that such organizations function effectively when they align with civilizational boundaries, particularly when they reflect shared cultural and historical foundations. NATO, in his view, is not simply a military alliance but an instrument of Western civilization. Similarly, the EU is more than a common market, it is a project of Western (specifically European) integration.
In this sense, Huntington expands his theory beyond countries and societies to the institutions and bureaucracies which they produce. Huntington is skeptical of attempts to expand these organizations beyond civilizational lines. For instance, he cautions against including countries like Turkey in the EU or extending NATO’s reach too far into Orthodox or Islamic regions. Such expansions, he argues, risk internal incoherence and external conflict, as they blur the cultural boundaries that sustain these institutions.
Huntington’s theory imposes a cultural realism onto international relations: Institutions succeed when they reinforce civilizational unity, and they falter when they try to bridge incompatible cultures. While Huntington acknowledges the practical roles of these organizations in diplomacy and security, he embeds them in a larger argument about global fragmentation. As the world moves toward a civilizational order, the effectiveness and legitimacy of international institutions will depend on their alignment with cultural identities. Attempts to universalize or globalize institutional frameworks, he warns, may invite resistance and instability.
Huntington’s treatment of Russia and China is framed through the lens of civilizational identity and geopolitical assertion. His forecast that Russia would pivot away from the West and toward a distinct Orthodox civilizational bloc has proven largely accurate. He anticipated that Russia would seek to assert its identity against Western influence, especially in former Soviet territories where fault lines divide Orthodox and Western Christian populations.
In this context, Huntington’s analysis of Ukraine is prescient. He identified Ukraine as a cleft country, torn between Western and Orthodox civilizational loyalties, and predicted that it could become the site of violent internal division or even war. The events of 2014, when civil conflict broke out in Ukraine, and the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia align closely with this vision of civilizational fracture, though his suggestion that the two countries may resolve their differences due to a shared Orthodox society has not proved true.
Regarding China, Huntington foresaw its economic rise and the assertion of a Confucian political identity. He argued that China would resist Western norms, particularly in human rights and governance, and would seek to challenge US dominance in East Asia. His projection of increased strategic unity over Taiwan has not held true, though open conflict has not occurred.
Huntington also asserts that Muslim civilization lacks a core state, loosely united largely by The Role of Religion in Politics. This is a central theme in his explanation for why Islam presents a unique challenge in the civilizational order. Unlike other major civilizations—such as the West (anchored by the US), Sinic civilization (anchored by China), or Orthodox civilization (anchored by Russia)—the Islamic world, he argues, is fragmented, lacking a dominant power to lead, coordinate, or restrain its civilizational bloc.
This framing reinforces Huntington’s broader thesis: That the Islamic challenge is not one of conventional war but of diffuse cultural resistance. It also heightens his sense of threat. Without a core state to engage diplomatically, the West cannot easily negotiate or contain Islamic resurgence. In Huntington’s model, this statelessness makes Muslim civilization a more diffuse and enduring challenge, one that resists traditional methods of international engagement. This ominous warning of a diffuse, unpredictable Islamic threat helps to explain why Huntington’s theories were elevated and employed in the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks and the ensuing War on Terror.



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