The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

Huntington deepens his argument that global conflict in the post-Cold War era will revolve around cultural and civilizational divides, rather than ideological or purely economic ones. He introduces the concepts of “fault line conflicts”—violent disputes at the local level between groups from different civilizations—and “core state conflicts,” which occur at the macro level among leading states representing those civilizations. The former often manifest along civilizational borders and are “particularly prevalent between Muslims and non-Muslims” (208), while the latter involve competition over power, influence, and values on the world stage. 

Huntington contends that civilizations are the ultimate human tribes and that relations across civilizational lines are inherently distant or hostile. While tactical cooperation may occur between entities from different civilizations, it is typically pragmatic and short-lived. Post-Cold War alliances based on ideology, like those seen during US-Soviet rivalry, will fade, giving way to intercivilizational dynamics marked by mistrust, rivalry, and occasional violence. He predicts that such interactions will be governed by patterns of cold peace, trade wars, and quasi-wars rather than genuine partnership.



The most prominent of these civilizational confrontations, Huntington argues, is between Islam and the West. This tension is rooted not only in recent political conflicts but in a 1,400-year history of “intense rivalry” (209) between Christianity and Islam. Both religions are monotheistic, universalistic, missionary, and teleological, making peaceful coexistence especially difficult. Historical examples—from the Crusades to the Ottoman expansion and European colonialism—underscore the cyclical surges of conflict and reassertion. Huntington challenges the view that contemporary tensions stem only from a fringe of Islamist extremism, asserting instead that the conflict stems from fundamental differences in political and cultural identity: Islam sees religion and politics as inseparable, while Western civilization traditionally separates them. 

This enduring antagonism intensified in the late 20th century due to a confluence of demographic, economic, and ideological factors. The Islamic Resurgence gave Muslims renewed confidence and pride in their civilization, while Western universalism, interventions, and military dominance provoked resentment. The end of the Cold War, which removed a common enemy in the Soviet Union, further polarized relations between Islam and the West. This estrangement is reinforced by migration patterns, cultural clashes, and growing intolerance on both sides. Muslims increasingly view the West not as misguided co-religionists but as “godless” (214) and morally bankrupt. In turn, Western publics and leaders see Islam as a source of terrorism, extremism, and unwanted migration.

Huntington describes the ongoing post-1979 struggle between Islam and the West as a quasi-war, a conflict characterized by sporadic violence, limited means, and mutual recognition of enmity. While it lacks the formal structure of war, it involves real casualties and is perceived by both sides as a war in essence. Islamist states and groups have used terrorism and ideological campaigns against the West, while Western powers have employed air strikes, sanctions, and covert actions in response. 

Despite US insistence that only a small minority of Muslims are violent, Huntington notes the absence of widespread Muslim condemnation of anti-Western terrorism and points out that even moderate Muslim voices often echo strong anti-Western sentiments. Ultimately, he argues, the clash stems not from extremism, but from the nature of Islam and the West as distinct and rival civilizations.

In Asia, Huntington focuses on the rise of China and the increasing cultural and political divergence between Asian societies and the United States. The economic dynamism of East Asia, particularly China, is reshaping global power balances and fueling new conflicts. Economic interdependence has not reduced tensions; instead, it has heightened cultural friction and national rivalries. Huntington contends that Asia is unlikely to develop a cooperative regional order akin to Europe’s, due to its historical lack of integration, its civilizational diversity, and its unresolved territorial disputes. Military buildups, especially in China, Japan, and the “three other Chinas” (Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore), reinforce a volatile environment.

He argues that Chinese hegemony in East Asia is increasingly likely and may be accepted by many Asian states due to a cultural predisposition toward hierarchy and accommodation, traits rooted in Confucian political culture. Unlike in Europe, where balancing against rising powers was standard, Asian states may opt to “bandwagon” (218) with China rather than resist it. Huntington notes that Japan may eventually accommodate China, especially if it perceives the United States as an unreliable partner. Similarly, Southeast Asian nations, wary of antagonizing China, may silently acquiesce to its expanding influence, as seen in their muted response to Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea.

Huntington closes by describing emerging global alignments, particularly the growing Confucian-Islamic connection that challenges the West. He identifies China, Iran, and Pakistan as the core of a “de facto alliance” (239) based on mutual opposition to US power and Western values. Though China officially denies alliance-building, it maintains close strategic ties with these countries, particularly through weapons transfers and joint opposition to Western influence. While the West maintains ties with Latin America and Africa, Huntington contends that these regions are relatively weak and dependent. The real strategic shifts, he suggests, are occurring among the core states of major civilizations, particularly China, the Islamic world, and India.

Huntington identifies the Soviet-Afghan War and the Gulf War as pivotal “civilization wars” (246) that marked a shift from ideological Cold War conflicts to confrontations rooted in cultural and religious identity. Both wars, though initially seen as traditional invasions, evolved into broader clashes between civilizations, notably between Islam and the West. The Soviet-Afghan War, while celebrated in the West as a Cold War victory, was viewed by Muslims as a “victory for Islam” (247). It was the first time an Islamic force had successfully repelled a superpower, bolstering Islamic morale and fostering a sense of collective achievement. 

This war catalyzed the mobilization of Islamic states, especially Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, which supplied significant financial and logistical support. Approximately 25,000 Muslim volunteers from various countries joined the fight, giving rise to a transnational network of jihadists. Pakistan directed American aid to fundamentalist factions, particularly those led by Hekmatyar, further radicalizing the conflict. The war’s aftermath left a legacy of militant Islamic cohesion, experience, and ideology that shaped future global conflicts.

Huntington argues that the Gulf War similarly morphed into a civilizational struggle. While initially framed as a response to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the war was broadly perceived in the Islamic world as Western aggression against Islam. Despite initial support for Western intervention from some Arab governments, widespread Muslim public opinion, fueled by religious and nationalist sentiment, turned against the West. Mass protests erupted across the Muslim world, with leaders and intellectuals viewing the conflict through a civilizational lens. Saddam Hussein, though secular, aligned himself with Islamic rhetoric to garner pan-Islamic support, framing the war as a defense of Islam against Crusader and Zionist aggression.

This perception led to a temporary unification of disparate Muslim factions, including secularists, nationalists, and Islamists, against the West. Huntington notes that the war facilitated reconciliation between traditional enemies like Iran and Iraq and suppressed intra-Muslim conflicts by focusing on the external Western threat. Even Western-aligned Muslim governments were forced to adjust their stances in response to public sentiment. Protests and political shifts occurred in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and other states that initially supported the coalition. Western victory, though militarily decisive, left a deep sense of humiliation and resentment throughout the Islamic world, reinforcing the view that Islam was under siege.

Huntington asserts that the Gulf War marked a new phase of fault line conflicts: Longstanding, violent struggles between groups of different civilizations, particularly between Muslims and non-Muslims. These conflicts are inherently protracted, rooted in issues of identity, and often resistant to resolution. They are also brutal, with goals often involving ethnic cleansing. Huntington details various ongoing fault line wars in the early 1990s, including those in Sudan, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Bosnia, and Chechnya, many of which involved Muslims on one side. These wars were increasingly internationalized due to global communications, migration, and diaspora networks, which facilitated support from cultural kin groups. 

Central to Huntington’s thesis is the notion that Islam’s borders are “bloody” (258), both externally and internally. He cites numerous conflicts involving Muslims clashing with Christians, Jews, Hindus, Buddhists, and others across Eurasia and Africa. These include wars in the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. The volume and intensity of these conflicts, Huntington contends, surpass those involving other civilizations. Studies by Gurr, the New York Times, and Sivard show that Muslims were involved in a disproportionate number of inter-civilizational conflicts in the early 1990s. These conflicts often produced high casualties and refugees. Huntington also highlights the militarization of Muslim societies, noting that they have higher ratios of military personnel and greater tendencies to use violence in international crises compared to other civilizations.

Huntington explores several causes for this conflict propensity. Historically, Islam has been a religion closely tied to military expansion, originating in the martial culture of Arabian tribes. Unlike Christianity or Buddhism, Islam lacks strong doctrinal prohibitions against violence. Its foundational history involves conquest and jihad, which continue to influence Islamic politics. Geographical proximity to non-Muslims has also bred tension. Islamic expansion often occurred through land-based conquests, resulting in long-standing borders with other civilizations. These proximity zones have become flashpoints for repeated conflict, especially where Muslims live in close contact with non-Muslims. 

Another factor is the perceived “indigestibility” (264) of Muslim populations in non-Muslim societies, and vice versa. Huntington notes that the strong absolutist nature of Islam and its fusion of religion and politics make it less adaptable to pluralistic environments. This has produced communal strife not only where Muslims are minorities, but also where they form majorities.

While these traits may have historical roots, Huntington argues that certain contemporary factors have intensified conflict. One is the absence of a core state in the Islamic world. Unlike the West, which has core powers like the United States and Europe capable of setting norms and mediating disputes, the Muslim world lacks a central authority. States like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan compete for leadership but fail to coordinate or moderate intra-Islamic conflicts. 

Another major driver is the demographic explosion in Muslim societies. Huntington emphasizes the destabilizing impact of large youth populations (unemployed and disaffected males) who are often the fuel for militant movements. This demographic bulge has coincided with weakened states, economic stagnation, and a crisis of identity, resulting in a volatile mix that breeds conflict. The combination of historical grievances, religious absolutism, proximity to other civilizations, militarism, demographic pressures, and political disunity has, in Huntington’s view, made Islam uniquely conflict-prone in the late 20th century. He stops short of suggesting an inherent violence in Islamic civilization, but argues that these conditions have produced an unparalleled level of group conflict involving Muslims.

Huntington now analyzes fault line wars. He examines how conflicts between groups from different civilizations tend to escalate, harden, and rarely resolve completely. These wars follow a recurring pattern of intensification, expansion, containment, interruption, and seldom, resolution. Once they begin, fault line wars transform from disputes over territory or autonomy into deeper struggles of identity, particularly religious, creating what Huntington calls “identity wars” (266). 

At the outset, multiple and fluid identities begin to narrow and harden, giving way to stark binaries. Moderate voices are drowned out as radical factions gain influence on both sides. This radicalization occurs when more pragmatic actors fail to achieve meaningful outcomes through negotiation, prompting the rise of extremists committed to violent, maximalist aims. Huntington offers examples from numerous global conflicts—Sudan, Chechnya, Kashmir, and Bosnia—where initial goals of autonomy or coexistence gave way to calls for total independence or ideological purity. In many of these cases, political and religious leaders appealed to their civilizations for support, heightening the broader stakes of these local conflicts.

Religion, Huntington argues, becomes the dominant identity marker as fault line wars escalate. It provides psychological and practical advantages: Justification for violence, a broad civilizational network to mobilize support, and a framework to cast the struggle as one of virtue against evil. A tribe’s local conflict can thus be internationalized if it can frame itself as a Muslim or Christian victim, thereby drawing support from coreligionists. This civilization rallying transforms small-scale wars into epic battles seen as existential by both sides. 

Muslim communities, according to Huntington, have been particularly active in redefining local struggles in religious terms. He details how groups like Saddam Hussein’s secular regime and Chechen separatists alike adopted Islamic identities to broaden their appeal. Across the Muslim world, even nationalist conflicts evolved into pan-Islamic causes, as seen in Bosnia, Kashmir, and Tajikistan. Similarly, in Bosnia, what began as a multiethnic society collapsed into hardened ethno-religious identities. Secular Bosnian Muslims increasingly embraced Islamic nationalism under pressure from war, leadership, and outside support from Muslim countries.

This civilizational redefinition also occurs in how each side perceives its enemy. Serbs labeled Muslims as “Turks,” Croats as “Ustashe,” and were themselves branded “Chetniks.” This demonization dehumanizes the other and justifies mass atrocities. Religious buildings, symbols, and cultural heritage become targets. In Bosnia, the destruction of mosques, monasteries, and libraries reflected a deeper desire to erase cultural presence, not just defeat an enemy.

As local identity hardens, support flows in from kin countries and diasporas. Huntington terms this the “kin-country syndrome” (272). Diasporas such as Armenians in the United States or Chechens in Jordan play a crucial role in funding, lobbying, and even sending volunteers. The pattern of primary (local), secondary (regional state), and tertiary (civilizational power) participants shows how fault line wars are uniquely structured for escalation. Each level has its own interests, often conflicting: Diasporas are emotionally invested; secondary states want to restrain conflict to avoid spillover; tertiary powers like Russia or the US often seek regional stability but are pressured by domestic political alignments and strategic aims.

In many fault line wars of the 1990s, Huntington notes the near-universal involvement of Muslim states. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan supported Muslims in conflicts across Bosnia, Kashmir, Chechnya, and the Philippines. The Islamist international—fighters from the Afghan jihad—moved between wars, reinforcing the religious nature of these conflicts. Likewise, Orthodox Christian nations like Russia and Greece backed the Serbs, while Catholic countries such as Germany and the Vatican supported Croatia. This alignment followed civilizational lines with remarkable consistency.

The Yugoslav wars offered the most vivid illustration of this model. Germany and the Vatican were early supporters of Croatian independence, driven by religious and cultural ties. Russia staunchly backed Serbia, supplying weapons, support, and diplomatic cover. Muslim countries rallied behind Bosnia’s Muslims, supplying funds, arms, and volunteers. Huntington argues that American support for the Bosnians, although limited, broke the civilizational mold. US elites sympathized with the image of Bosnia as a multiethnic democracy under siege, yet Washington provided only indirect aid, often by tacitly allowing Iranian and Saudi support to flow. In the end, Bosnians were more grateful to Muslim states that had supplied them directly than to the United States, whose rhetoric outpaced its actions.

Fault line wars rarely end definitively. They may pause due to exhaustion or external intervention, but they are rooted in historical grievances, religious divides, and territorial disputes that reignite easily. Cease-fires are temporary. Peace agreements, like Dayton in Bosnia or the 1994 truce in Nagorno-Karabakh, emerge when external actors intervene decisively. These actors may broker settlements by pressuring their kin to compromise, even at the risk of being seen as traitors. Milosevic, once the symbol of Greater Serbia, became a “peacemaker” (297), angering his nationalist base but serving wider geopolitical needs.

Ending fault line wars typically involves betrayal of primary parties by their kin. Secondary and tertiary states, once supporters, become restrainers when the costs of continued warfare rise. They use diplomatic, economic, or military leverage to force compliance. The process is fraught with risks: Leaders like Egypt’s Sadat or Israel’s Rabin were assassinated for their peacemaking efforts. Nevertheless, without this top-down imposition, Huntington argues, these wars are unlikely to stop.