The Coming of the Third Reich

“Developments that seem inevitable in retrospect were by no means so at the time, and in writing this book I have tried to remind the reader repeatedly that things could easily have turned out very differently to the way they did at a number of points in the history of Germany in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.”

This passage illustrates important elements of how Richard Evans views history and the responsibility of historians towards immorality in the past. This includes issues of The Fragility of Democracy and the Non-Inevitability of Historical Change. Evans insists that historical actors were not simply following a predetermined path toward dictatorship, but rather made choices within contingent circumstances. By stressing this point, he warns against viewing democracy as inherently durable and highlights how its survival depends on the decisions and actions of those within it.

“The word ‘Reich’ conjured up an image among educated Germans that resonated far beyond the institutional structures Bismarck created: the successor to the Roman Empire; the vision of God’s Empire here on earth; the universality of its claim to suzerainty; in a more prosaic but no less powerful sense, the concept of a German state that would include all German speakers in Central Europe—‘one People, one Reich, one Leader’, as the Nazi slogan was to put it.”

Germany had only been a politically unified nation-state since 1870. However, it had a powerful national identity from the beginning of Germany’s existence, one that would lead into Historical Nostalgia and the Rise of Authoritarianism. The Nazis skillfully exploited this deep-seated historical imagination, positioning themselves as the inheritors of an ancient and divinely ordained Reich. By linking their ideology to a grand historical lineage, they justified expansionist policies and authoritarian rule as part of Germany’s destiny.

“By and large, then, the Jewish story in the late nineteenth century was a success story, and Jews were associated above all with the most modern and progressive developments in society, culture and the economy.”

The Jews were a small minority in Germany. Despite that, the history of antisemitism and belief that the Jews were disproportionately represented in major institutions like the media and higher education were part of The Exploitation of Social Divisions and Cultural Anxieties. The success of Jews in various fields became a point of resentment, as reactionary forces painted Jewish influence as a sign of social and moral decay. The Nazis capitalized on these fears, recasting modernization as a threat to traditional German values and blaming Jewish elites for destabilizing society.

“What the 1880s and early 1890s were essentially witnessing, in addition to this domestication of antisemitism, was the assembling, on the fringes of political and intellectual life, of many of the ingredients that would later go into the potent and eclectic ideological brew of National Socialism.”

For Evans, the ascension of the Nazi Party into power was due to a number of factors. Rather than the Nazi Party emerging out of circumstances unique to the history of Germany, Nazism was enabled by factors both internal and external to the German experience. The ideological roots of Nazism were not an abrupt innovation but a culmination of decades of nationalist, antisemitic, and militaristic rhetoric. These ideas were already circulating on the fringes, waiting for a political movement with the means to bring them into the mainstream.

“Terror led them to believe that Communism in their own countries should be stopped at any cost, even by violent means and through the abrogation of the very civil liberties they were pledged to defend.”

One of the ways in which there was The Exploitation of Social Divisions and Cultural Anxieties by Nazis was the spread of Communism. The Nazis were able to connect fear of Communism with their own antisemitism. By framing themselves as the only force capable of preventing a Communist revolution, the Nazis justified extreme measures, persuading even conservatives and liberals to accept authoritarian solutions as a necessary evil. This fear-driven compromise ultimately enabled the erosion of democratic safeguards.

“It was in this atmosphere of national trauma, political extremism, violent conflict and revolutionary upheaval that Nazism was born.”

World War I was one such important external factor in the emergence and development of Nazism. As Evans writes elsewhere, “Without the war, Nazism would not have emerged as a serious political force…” (59). The war not only radicalized individuals like Hitler but also fostered a culture of political violence, where paramilitary groups and street battles became normalized. This atmosphere weakened faith in democratic governance and made radical solutions seem more viable.

“Thus, even the major political props of democracy in the Weimar Republic were crumbling by the end of the 1920s. Beyond them, the democratic landscape was even more desolate. No other parties offered serious support to the Republic and its institutions.”

One reason for The Fragility of Democracy and the Non-Inevitability of Historical Change was that several political parties from the left and the right questioned the legitimacy of the Weimar Republic itself. This was not because Germany did not have a strong liberal and democratic tradition, which Evans argues it did have (xxiv). Instead, it was a result of the fact that the Weimar Republic was associated with Germany’s defeat in World War I.

“The feeling that order and discipline had been swept away by the Revolution, and that moral and sexual degeneracy were taking over society, was to be found on the left as well as on the right.”

There were wide-reaching and controversial social and cultural changes under the German Empire (21). Yet, the Weimar Republic became associated with the social and cultural movements of modernism. This sense of disorder, whether real or exaggerated, was weaponized by reactionary forces who sought to position themselves as protectors of traditional values. The Nazis’ ability to channel frustration toward an imagined cultural enemy gave them broad appeal across ideological lines.

“Far more important to them was the overriding experience of political dislocation, economic privation, war, destruction, civil strife, inflation, national defeat and partial occupation by foreign powers, an experience shared by young people born in the decade or so leading up to the First World War.”

The generational trauma of World War I and the economic crises of the 1920s created an environment in which the Nazis could succeed to an extent. While Evans would argue that these factors did not make the Third Reich inevitable, they do help explain the success of the Nazis and the failures of the Weimar Republic. The shared experience of crisis shaped an entire generation’s political consciousness, making radical ideologies—both left and right—more attractive than incremental reform. The Nazis’ promises of national renewal and stability resonated deeply with those who had grown up in an era of chaos and uncertainty.

“How had the disaster happened? Searching for an explanation, Hitler seized eagerly on the rapidly spreading story of the ‘stab-in-the-back.’ The Jews, whom he already regarded with suspicion and distaste, must have been to blame, he thought.”

Historical Nostalgia and the Rise of Authoritarianism was one of the trends that benefited the Nazis. Along with this nostalgia came resentments over World War I and the conspiracy theory that the Jews had engineered Germany’s defeat in World War I. By framing Germany’s loss as an internal betrayal rather than a military failure, the Nazis could justify extreme political action as a form of national self-defense. This myth not only fueled antisemitism but also allowed Hitler to portray his movement as the rightful avenger of Germany’s past humiliation.

“The ‘National Socialists’ wanted to unite the two political camps of left and right into which, they argued, the Jews had manipulated the German nation. The basis for this was to be the idea of race. This was light years removed from the class-based ideology of socialism. Nazism was in some ways an extreme counter-ideology to socialism, borrowing much of its rhetoric in the process, from its self-image as a movement rather than a party, to its much-vaunted contempt for bourgeois convention and conservative timidity.”

With Historical Nostalgia and the Rise of Authoritarianism, the Nazi Party did draw on conservative nostalgia for the German Empire. At the same time, Nazi ideology was built on a new vision for a race-based society run by a supreme, charismatic leader.

“Still, no one who read the book could have been left in any doubt about the fact that Hitler considered racial conflict to be the motor, the essence of history, and the Jews to be the sworn enemy of the German race, whose historic mission it was, under the guidance of the Nazi Party, to break their international power and annihilate them entirely.”

Stoking antisemitism and racism was part of the Nazi strategy of the Exploitation of Social Divisions and Cultural Anxieties. However, antisemitism was at the core of Nazi ideology. This passage reinforces the fact that Hitler’s antisemitism was not a mere political tool but a fundamental pillar of Nazi ideology. The genocidal policies of the Third Reich were not improvised but stemmed directly from the worldview Hitler laid out in Mein Kampf.

“The Nazi Party depended on such commitment; much of its power and dynamism came from the fact that it was not dependent on big business or bureaucratic institutions such as trade unions for its financial support, as the ‘bourgeois’ parties and the Social Democrats to varying degrees were.”

The Nazi Party was unique in that originally it depended on grassroots support. It was part of its strength, although as it became more influential it did also need support for constituencies like major businesses. This grassroots energy allowed the Nazis to present themselves as an authentic, anti-establishment force, untainted by political compromise. Yet, as they gained power, they strategically aligned with industrial leaders, demonstrating their ability to shift tactics when necessary.

“Like many Germans, Brüning and his political opponents on the left still found it impossible to take the Nazis’ extremist rhetoric and bullying tactics on the street as anything other than evidence of their inevitable political marginality. They did not conform to the accepted rules of politics, so they could not expect to be successful.”

While complex historical factors made the Nazi Party’s rise possible, Evans argues that the decisions made by prominent individuals also played a role. Specifically, leading conservatives like President Paul von Hindenburg and Heinrich Brüning made Adolf Hitler the Reich Chancellor. This passage illustrates the fatal underestimation of the Nazis by traditional politicians, who failed to recognize how their tactics, though unconventional, were alarmingly effective. The establishment’s dismissal of the Nazis as a passing radical fringe movement helped enable their ascent to power.

“The Nazi Party had established itself with startling suddenness in September 1930 as a catch-all party of social protest, appealing to a greater or lesser degree to virtually every social group in the land.”

Even at the height of their popularity among voters in 1930, the Nazis never achieved a representational majority in the Reichstag. Also, they depended on specific constituencies like Protestants in rural northern Germany. Nonetheless, in one example of The Fragility of Democracy and the Non-Inevitability of Historical Change, the Nazi Party also drew heavily on discontent with the Weimar Republic.

“Papen’s coup dealt a mortal blow to the Weimar Republic. It destroyed the federal principle and opened the way to the wholesale centralization of the state. Whatever happened now, it was unlikely to be a full restoration of parliamentary democracy. After 20 July 1932 the only realistic alternatives were a Nazi dictatorship or a conservative, authoritarian regime backed by the army.”

In reference to his theme of The Fragility of Democracy and the Non-Inevitability of Historical Change, Evans argues that the Third Reich was not “inevitable” (xx). Nonetheless, he also suggests that, even before the Nazis consolidated their power, by 1932 the Weimar Republic was severely weakened and made susceptible to authoritarian movements.

“Surrounded by friends of Papen, who had the all-important ear of Reich President Hindenburg, Hitler and the Nazis—vulgar, uneducated, inexperienced in government—would surely be easy enough to control.”

The Nazi Party’s own extremism and dependence on grassroots support was a major weakness and, under different historical circumstances, may have kept them from achieving major political power. However, the Nazis’ weakness proved to be a strength when it caused conservatives to underestimate them to the point they handed power over to Adolf Hitler.

“Once more, a dialectical process was at work, forged in the days when the Nazis often faced police hostility and criminal prosecution for their violence: the leadership announced in extreme but unspecific terms that action was to be taken, and the lower echelons of the Party and its paramilitary organizations translated this in their own terms into specific, violent action.”

The Nazis consolidated power through “illegal acts” (456). However, they also tried to maintain a degree of respectability in politics by maintaining a thin veil of legality. By allowing violence to be carried out unofficially, while publicly distancing themselves from it, the Nazis cultivated both fear and plausible deniability. This tactic would later become essential in suppressing opposition under the Third Reich.

“Social hygiene was to be swept away; racial hygiene was to be introduced in its stead. That meant, as some eugenicists had been arguing since the end of the nineteenth century, drastically reducing the burden of the weak on society by introducing a programme of preventing them from having children.”

The philosophy of the Nazi Party was built on the idea of race. In practice, this meant their policies were deeply shaped by pseudoscientific and racist arguments like Social Darwinism and eugenics. As such, this shift from “social hygiene” to “racial hygiene” reflects the Nazis’ broader ideological transformation of society.

“This process of ‘co-ordination’ took place in the spring and summer of 1933 at every level, in every city, town and village throughout Germany. What social life remained was at the local inn, or took place in the privacy of people’s homes.”

In order to understand the Third Reich, it is important to see that the Nazis sought not only political supremacy. They also strived to reshape German society and culture. This complete restructuring of public life helped eliminate alternative power structures, leaving Germans with little choice but to participate in Nazi-approved organizations.

“But art was anything but unpolitical in Germany at this time, for the radical modernist movements of the Weimar years, from Dadaism to the Bauhaus itself, had propagated the view that art was a means of transforming the world; the Nazis were only adapting this cultural-political imperative to their own purposes.”

The Exploitation of Social Divisions and Cultural Anxieties was an important element in how Hitler came to power. At the same time, influencing culture became a major part of Nazi policy after Adolf Hitler became Reich Chancellor. The Nazis understood that cultural hegemony was just as vital as political control. By denouncing modernist art and promoting idealized Aryan imagery, they sought to define what it meant to be truly German—excluding anything that challenged their rigid worldview.

“[T]he Nazis saw the Jews above all as the repositories of an alien, un-German spirit, and their removal as part of a cultural revolution that would restore ‘Germanness’ to Germany.”

Antisemitism and German nationalism were deeply linked in Nazi thought. It was the belief that German nationalism was fundamentally incompatible with the presence of a Jewish minority. This ideology justified increasingly extreme policies, from boycotts and discrimination to genocide. By framing Jews as existential threats rather than just political opponents, the Nazis convinced many Germans that antisemitic measures were necessary for national renewal.

“It was the core of Hitler’s cultural revolution, the key, in the Nazi mind, to the wider cultural transformation of Germany that was to purge the German spirit of ‘alien’ influences such as communism, Marxism, socialism, liberalism, pacifism, conservatism, artistic experimentation, sexual freedom and much more besides.”

In Evans’s discussion of Historical Nostalgia and the Rise of Authoritarianism, he argues conservative nostalgia for the German Empire and the leadership of Otto von Bismarck influenced politics in the Weimar Republic. Yet, the Nazis were not fundamentally conservative. Instead, their vision of the future for Germany was radical in its ambitions for race and German culture.