The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin

The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Oriented Deliberation in View of the Dogmatic Problem of Hereditary Sin (1844) is a philosophical work by Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. The work is considered a foundational text in existential philosophy, in which Kierkegaard explores anxiety as an essential condition of human freedom. He argues that anxiety arises when an individual becomes aware of the possibility of choice and the accompanying responsibility. The Concept of Anxiety has been influential in the fields of philosophy and psychology for its exploration of anxiety, guilt, sin, and individuality. Like many of Kierkegaard’s writings, The Concept of Anxiety was published under a pseudonym, Vigilius Haufniensis, which means “Watchman of Copenhagen” in Latin.

This study guide uses the English translation from the original Danish by Reider Thomte and Albert B. Anderson, published in 1980 by Princeton University Press.

Summary

The Concept of Anxiety begins with Kierkegaard describing his work’s goal as “the psychological treatment of the concept of ‘anxiety,’ but in such a way that it constantly keeps in mente [in mind] and before its eye the dogma of hereditary sin” (14). The difficulty in this project is that Kierkegaard also believes that sin “does not properly belong in any science” (16). Instead of being a matter for psychology or ethics, sin is a matter for theology or dogmatics. Even so, Kierkegaard believes that sin and anxiety could be understood as connected phenomena.

Kierkegaard’s analysis begins with the account in Genesis of the creation of the first humans, Adam and Eve, and their expulsion from paradise for disobeying God by eating the fruit from the Tree of Knowledge. He argues against the idea that humanity has inherited its sins from Adam, a Christian doctrine known as original or hereditary sin. Instead, every person experiences their own fall from paradise, “Just as Adam lost innocence by guilt, so every man loses it in the same way” (35). Kierkegaard calls this experience the “quantitative leap,” and every individual experiences it the same way Adam did.

Anxiety existed before sin. This is because anxiety does not have to come from sin and the guilt arising from it. Instead, Kierkegaard sees anxiety as coming from each individual’s freedom to choose from numerous possibilities, asserting that “anxiety is always conceived in the direction of freedom” (66). Nevertheless, anxiety is closely related to sin as well. Kierkegaard argues there are two types of anxiety: One that exists within an individual and a state of innocence, which he calls subjective anxiety, and the anxiety that comes from sin and the fallen state of the world, which he terms objective anxiety. 

Objective anxiety results from the fact that humanity is a “synthesis” (58) of spirit and animal. It is because of this synthesis that the erotic aspects of human nature—what Kierkegaard describes as “sensuousness”—are not inherently sinful but often lead to sin. Further, humans do bear the weight that comes from the knowledge of sin accumulated over the course of generations, which increases an individual’s anxiety over sin and choice. Kierkegaard also argues that, while anxiety is universal, women experience it more intensely, something reflected in the story of Eve in Genesis.

An individual’s choice and its consequences also comes from the nature of the Christian understanding of time, which Kierkegaard describes as a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal. This means that, for the Christian, there are certain moments that they experience that intersect with eternity. Such moments drive an individual’s freedom of choice. Kierkegaard argues that Christianity, especially the Christian understanding of time, does help reduce anxiety even if repentance does not completely absolve a person of anxiety. By contrast, there is what Kierkegaard calls paganism, which can exist even among Christians and which “really knows no distinction between the present, the past, the future, and the eternal” (94). For people who follow that system and believe in something like fate, anxiety is actually worse.

Some individuals experience anxiety over evil, while others suffer from anxiety over their contact with the good. Kierkegaard terms the latter group of people “demonics.” While anxiety is related to the freedom of choice, demonics themselves lack freedom: “The bondage of sin is an unfree relation to the evil, but the demonic is an unfree relation to the good” (119). This is because true freedom comes from an authentic relationship with the self, rather than a false sense of self-consciousness. An authentic self also depends upon communication with the good. To avoid being a demonic, a person must have earnestness, which is a full and healthy understanding of their selves and their relationship with the world around them.

Faith is necessary “in order that an individual may thus be educated absolutely and infinitely by the possibility, he must be honest toward possibility and have faith” (157). Freedom of choice, anxiety, and finitude are instructional, helping an individual learn about themselves and the world. However, faith is necessary for an individual to derive the correct lessons from anxiety, even though Kierkegaard argues that the rest of the subject is a matter of dogmatics, not psychology.