The Histories

The war started well for Otho. He mustered a large army and ordered the Po River to be secured as a defensive line against the Vitellian forces. Otho followed his army with Praetorian detachments and Roman marines. Tacitus notes that while on campaign, Otho did not exhibit his usual taste for luxury; he marched on foot and in armor with his soldiers. The naval raids he ordered were largely successful, and their leader allowed his soldiers to plunder the area “as if they were foreign shores” (68). During this time, Tacitus focuses on one example of bravery: A woman hid her son from Othonian soldiers, who were convinced that the son had money. She refused to say where he was even under torture.

In Italy, Caecina’s forces initially made quick and peaceful progress. He was concerned about the damage to his reputation that raiding Italian towns would cause, and Tacitus claims that the Italians were prepared to submit to anyone. As Caecina’s forces neared the city of Placentia, the Othonian defenders rebelled against their general in their eagerness to confront him. However, they soon realized that they were outmatched and retreated to the city. Tacitus uses this to prove that the Othonians did not lack passion, but they did lack discipline. Caecina’s forces soon attacked Placentia and were repulsed several times. During the combat, the Vitellians mocked the Othonians as lazy, while the Othonians called the Vitellians foreign. With his siege failing, Caecina retreated across the Po River and toward Cremona, which nearly caused another mutiny among the Othonians, who were eager to attack.

Soon after, rumors spread in the Othonian camp about the loyalty of some generals. This worried Otho, who placed his brother in charge of the war. The generals Suetonius Paulinus and Marius Celsus then fought a battle against Caecina. Caecina, worried about his reputation and hoping to defeat the Othonians before Valens arrived, had tried to lure the Othonian forces into a trap. However, the Othonians were told about this plan by a deserter and were themselves able to ambush Caecina’s army, routing him.

The primary result of this defeat was shoring up discipline in Caecina’s army as they began to take their enemy more seriously. Within the ranks of Valens’s army, the Batavian auxiliaries and the Romans were coming into conflict over the boasting of the Batavians. The conflict eventually led to a riot, in which the soldiers only stopped when Valens hid and the soldiers realized that they had no one to lead them. Another mutiny nearly broke out when they heard about Caecina’s defeat, as they felt that Valens had denied them the chance to participate in the battle. The soldiers took the initiative in a quick march to link up to Caecina, who most soldiers liked better than Valens. As both generals already were jealous of each other, this series of events worsened the mutual antipathy.

With the Vitellian force now combined, Otho held a counsel to discuss if he should attack them then or wait. Paulinus and Celsus suggested that they wait, as the Vitellians were trapped between the Alps and Po River. Their supplies would dwindle, while Otho could summon reinforcements from the provinces. However, Otho’s brother was convinced that a decisive battle would bring Otho an immediate victory, and Otho agreed with this. It was also decided that Otho would not directly participate in the battle, so he took many of his Praetorian Guard away with him, weakening the army.

For a time, both armies skirmished across the Po. Tacitus mentions that other historians include a story of soldiers in both armies wanting to make peace and overthrow their emperors, but he doubts that this is true. He believes the soldiers did not have the self-control to make peace. The growth of the empire meant that people’s passion for power had grown. Due to this, soldiers would not have voluntarily given up their chance at power.

The Othonian army advanced to the town of Bedriacum, and, after skirmishing, both sides drew up battle lines amid thick plantations and vegetation. The Othonian side was hampered by nervous generals, disloyal troops, and confused battlelines while the Vitellians advanced in ordered ranks. Despite this, the Othonian put up stout resistance until the Batavian auxiliaries attacked the Othonian flank and the formations in the center of the battlefield collapsed. As the Othonians fled, many were killed by Vitellian soldiers who felt that there was no point in taking prisoners since they could not sell fellow Romans. When the Othonians rallied at their camp, some wanted to continue fighting, but the following day, the camp surrendered.

When Otho learned about the defeat at Bedriacum, many around him urged him to stay cheerful—reinforcements from the provinces were coming, so he might have still been able to win. However, Otho gave a speech to those near him saying that it was his responsibility to prevent further fighting. He had tested himself against fortune and lost. Now he would die by suicide, and in doing so, he hoped to leave behind an honorable legacy. He then urged his soldiers to flee and ordered the destruction of any letters in which people expressed criticism of Vitellius. Otho slept for a night and died by suicide with a dagger the next morning. Tacitus gives a summary of Otho’s life. He was 37 when he died and was known to history equally through the disgraceful act of overthrowing Galba and through the noble act of his suicide.

After Otho’s funeral, his troops resumed their usual mutinous behavior. They demanded that their leaders elect a new leader or make diplomatic overtures toward the Vitellians. Generally, panic and confusion reigned in the Othonian camp following his suicide.

In Rome, the populace quickly sided with Vitellius when they heard the news. They began to celebrate Galba’s memory to show their dislike of Otho and sent messages of congratulations to Vitellius’s army. However, the Vitellian advance heralded significant violence. The army looted as it moved across Italy, and some citizens used the chaos of the war to settle private feuds. Of the generals, Caecina was the least greedy during the army’s advance, as he was more concerned with his reputation.

Vitellius was initially unaware that he had won the war. He was gathering his army to attack Italy when he heard that the Othonian resistance had collapsed. He then rushed to meet with Valens and Caecina. The leading centurions of Otho’s army were executed, but the generals were spared. Otho’s brother was also spared.

Tacitus moves on to say that after the war, Vitellius became obsessed with banqueting. He was also worried that the defeated legions were disloyal, so he dispersed them among the provinces. However, there was still mutinous behavior in the victorious army, including a small battle between legionaries and auxiliaries prompted by a drunken brawl. The Batavian cohorts of the army were sent back to Germany, and the Gallic auxiliaries disbanded.

The closer Vitellius drew to the capital, the more riotous his march became. Gladiator shows were held, entertainers joined the march, and soldiers plundered local villages. Tacitus comments that Vitellius had always supported Nero’s gluttony and was now embodying it.

In Judea, Vespasian was considering war. Many of the nearby governors were loyal to him or Titus, but he was worried that the Rhine legions were strong and experienced while his own soldiers were not. However, Mucianus (the governor of Syria) told him that if Vespasian would become emperor, it would be good for both the state and for himself. He also assured Vespasian of his loyalty and that with Vespasian’s sons, Titus and Titus Flavius Domitianus (Domitian), a Flavian dynasty could grow. After this speech, people comforted Vespasian with soothsayers’ predictions, which he put much stock in. On July 1, the legion in Alexanderia acclaimed Vespasian emperor, and the Judean and Syrian legions followed suit soon after. Before long, all the eastern provinces as far as Greece had sworn for Vespasian.

A counsel of war was held in which they decided that their priority was increasing the size of their army. Titus was told to stay in Judea while Vespasian secured the critically important Egyptian province. Mucianus would lead an advance into Italy, moving slowly so that Vespasian’s reputation would spread and bring more provinces to their side.

As the eastern provinces were preparing for war, the Illyrian armies also joined Vespasian’s cause. They had been devoted to Otho and so did not like Vitellius. The rest of the Balkan legions soon joined as the appearance of Vitellius’s power crumbling led to a knock-on effect.

While Vespasian’s revolt was beginning, Vitellius was becoming lazier every day. He was leading 60,000 soldiers in a ponderous march to the city, stopping often for banquets or entertainment. The day after Vitellius arrived in Rome, he gave a speech in which he extolled his own virtues. The people, used to the need to flatter emperors, shouted their approval of him despite knowing how he had acted on his march. Vitellius made a show of refusing the title of Augustus until the crowd shouted that he must. Tacitus calls this entire display useless.

Caecina and Valens carried out most of the functions of government, with their mutual hatred growing as they did. They competed for Vitellius’s favor and felt equal contempt and fear of the emperor. Both quickly seized large states from rich Romans and acted in generally corrupt ways. Valens was more popular than Caecina in the city, which Tacitus says may have begun the decline in Caecina’s loyalty. The city barracks were overcrowded by soldiers who Tacitus says were losing their physical and moral suitability because of the “lures of the capital” (117). Vitellius himself was focused on luxuries, and he acted like the state had a large surplus of money when following Nero’s reign and the civil wars—it did not. Tacitus estimates that Vitellius squandered 900 million sesterces during his reign.

Vitellius’s sycophants played down the news of Vespasian’s revolt and tried to hide the extent of it from the city. Vitellius did send for reinforcements but did not demand that they come urgently. When Vitellius finally ordered his generals to prepare for war, Valens was sick and could not immediately react. Caecina led the Rhine legions out of Rome, but the legions’ strength had been sapped, and Caecina himself had become apathetic because of either excessive indulgence or wavering loyalty. When they garrisoned northern Italy, Caecina and the local fleet commander, Lucilius Bassus, decided to defect. They set about trying to persuade elements of the Vitellian army and navy to do the same.