Arendt closes Volume I with a quotation from Cato the Elder, a Roman soldier and senator: “Never am I less alone than when I am by myself, never am I more active than when I do nothing” (216). In this citation, Arendt crystalizes her view of thinking as action—one that has the power to influence morality and worldly matters. Her distinction between the thinking ego and Being underscores her insistence that thinking is not about producing definitive truths, but about circling questions, engaging in reflection for the sake of meaning rather than conclusion.

The “homelessness” of the thinking ego marks both its danger and its necessity. In Chapter 20, Arendt turns to Kafka’s parable of the man trapped between two antagonists, one pushing him from behind and the other blocking him from ahead. The figure steps out of their struggle and becomes an umpire, judging the tension from the side. For Arendt, this parable reveals the structure of the thinking ego, which stands between past and future. However, this very position reveals risk. If the thinker forgets their embeddedness in time and appearance, they risk detachment from The Plurality of Experience and Responsibility that gives thinking meaning. To reflect between past and future is valuable, but only if the thinker remembers they remain part of the apparent world.

Arendt concludes the first volume with a “Postscriptum” that gestures forward to her next sections on willing and judging. She situates these mental activities differently in relation to time. Thinking hovers in the gap, but willing belongs to the future and judging to the past. Unlike thinking, willing and judging are more securely tethered to The Primacy of Appearance.